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Abstract  
My research examines the extent to which features of ‘openness’ might usefully 
contribute to mechanisms of governance of human stem cell lines, with a view to the 
production of therapeutic stem cell treatments for the provision of health benefits.  
The impetus for the project is the UK Stem Cell Bank, a national repository for stem 
cell lines and the focal point of a unique set of publicly supported, non-statutory 
arrangements for the informal (but mandatory) oversight of human embryonic stem 
cell lines (hESCs) in the UK.  The sharing of stem cells through this mechanism 
promotes public confidence in embryo and stem cell research, and supports research 
by making (ethically-sourced and quality-controlled) human stem cell lines widely 
available to researchers, but the structure and functions of the Bank also impose 
constraints on the imminent commercial development and manufacture of stem cell 
therapies for human application.  My thesis examines the role of ‘openness’ in 
systems of governance designed to facilitate not just research but the whole 
trajectory of stem cell technology, from research to production and delivery of 
clinical treatments.  What is openness and what function does it have in purposive 
attempts to design mechanisms that will advance stem cell technology?  
The bulk of my thesis maps out the conceptual foundations upon which systems of 
governance for the production of stem cell therapies may be grounded.  It does not 
address the ethical and social debate surrounding embryo research and the embryonic 
derivation of stem cell lines, which are legally permissible in the UK.  In Part I, I 
frame the problem of governance of ongoing use of stem cell lines as part of a larger 
policy endeavour related to the provision of public goods.  Secondly, I propose a 
conception of reflexive governance that is capable of facilitation of technology in a 
multi-faceted heterogeneous environment.  Part II explores traditional narratives of 
openness in science and technology, and how they might be reconceived in the 
context of modern scientific technology.  In Part III, I apply my conception of 
facilitative governance to collective strategies or ‘commons’ approaches to 
facilitative governance.  I then identify its applicability for the present UK system 
governing stem cell lines, and for the proposition of alternative structures and 
processes that might be better able to achieve the policy goal of provision of health 
benefits through delivery of therapeutic stem cell treatments. 
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Lay Summary   
My thesis is about how human stem cell lines should be ‘governed’ in order to best 
facilitate the production of medical therapies.  The UK Stem Cell Bank is an example 
of a type of governance mechanism in which the sharing of an asset with other 
researchers for the promotion of research (‘openness’) has an adverse effect on the 
potential for production of the goods that the research is intended to promote.  It 
raises a wider set of issues about the tension between the need for disclosure 
(‘openness’) in the public system of science to enable the growth of knowledge, and 
the need for private companies to maintain control over knowledge and other 
resources (‘exclusivity’) in order to produce commercial products.  The development 
of goods for the benefit of society (‘public goods’ such as stem cell therapies) 
requires the promotion of both scientific understanding and technological utility, and 
the task of governance is to work out how to promote them equally.     
The first part of my thesis describes the current regulatory structure for stem cells in 
the UK, and sets out what I mean by ‘public goods’ and ‘facilitative governance’, 
which includes informal or social impacts on behaviour as well as government 
regulation.   Most of my thesis is spent developing an accurate picture of ‘scientific 
technology’ in which there is increasing integration of science with technology, and 
overlap between the once separate systems of ‘academic science’ for production of 
pure knowledge, and ‘private industrial technology’ for production of practical 
knowledge and goods.  My thesis suggests that in order to work out how to facilitate 
‘scientific technology’ we ought to stop thinking of them as two separate systems, 
one of which is open and the other closed.  I propose an integrated way of thinking 
about it to demonstrate how research, innovation and utilisation of resources for all 
purposes co-exist, and how ‘openness’ is achieved by exchange, through mutually 
negotiated terms of access to property, collective arrangements for sharing resources, 
and networks of interactive relationships.  
In the last section of my thesis, I apply my concept of scientific technology to some 
collective strategies, and finally, I go back to the UK Stem Cell Bank to ask how my 
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The immense promise of human stem cells as a platform for development of 
therapeutic treatments that has been reported in recent years has raised much 
academic and policy debate related to the governance of their use.  Chief among 
these is the debate over the use of human embryos in the cultivation of stable 
pluripotent cell lines, which provide the primary material for the generation of most 
types of tissue in the human body.  The ethical, legal and social questions raised by 
this debate are fundamental and divisive and colour all aspects of policy-making 
related to research and development in the field of stem-cell based regenerative 
medicine.  They persist, even though there are now technical means of inducing 
embryo-like pluripotency in cells of non-embryonic origin. 
Important as the debate over embryo use is, the questions that it raises are not my 
questions.  My thesis starts from the premise that – despite the above ethical 
concerns - the legal policy position taken in the United Kingdom is to permit the 
derivation of stem cell lines during the course of embryo research, which may be 
undertaken for the purpose of enabling development of treatments for serious 
disease.  The aim of my thesis is to consider how the ongoing use of established stem 
cell lines, legitimately derived from embryos donated in accordance with statutory 
consent requirements, is to be governed in order to best facilitate the delivery of 
therapeutic products and concomitant benefits for individual and population health. 
This in itself is an important ethical and legal policy question, but not one which has 
received sufficient attention to date.  I argue that, having taken the decision to permit 
embryo research for this purpose, it is incumbent upon policymakers to follow 
through with the support that is necessary to maximise the benefits of stem cell 
technology by fostering an environment conducive to the production of public goods. 
This is however only part of the focus of my work. 
 8 
Openness  
The focus of my consideration of facilitative governance is the concept of 
‘openness’, which is the central element of a different type of ethical debate in 
relation to public support for science and the private production of technological 
goods.  Questions associated with the notion of openness in the context of stem cell 
technology were brought to my attention by the existence of the UK Stem Cell Bank, 
a national repository for human stem cell lines, established as part of a system of 
informal oversight of cell lines of embryonic origin, instituted on primarily ethical 
grounds.  The questions addressed by my thesis have come out of an examination of 
the unique features of the Bank as a vehicle for mandatory and voluntary sharing of 
stem cell lines among researchers, and the non-statutory power of its governing body 
to determine the ongoing uses to which stem cell lines disseminated by the Bank are 
put.  These features were not problematic at the inception of the Bank, but now that 
the industrial production of the first clinical therapies involving embryonic stem cells 
appears imminent, they raise concerns about certain disincentives for private 
commercial activity in the field.  This particular example is, moreover, simply one 
instantiation of a much wider set of questions about the nature of policies and laws 
that might facilitate the delivery of biotechnological products. 
Cell developers, who are currently recipients of public funding, suggest the ‘one-
size-fits-all’ banking requirement - by which they are required to relinquish their 
exclusive control over all of the cells derived from any one embryo and all cell lines 
generated under embryo licence - adversely affects their potential for involvement in 
the anticipated for-profit production of large quantities of stem cells as basic 
materials of manufacture.  They argue that the potential for reputational damage to a 
particular cell line as a result of its widespread use by public sector researchers poses 
a barrier to its uptake by the large pharmaceutical corporations who are most likely 
to invest in the development of clinical products.  Over time, the identity of the 
UKSCB has evolved to reflect, in addition to its primary ethical mandate, a 
predominant support for ‘research’, but although there has been express willingness 
and certain adaptations by the Bank to take into account commercial interests, there 
has been no movement on the exclusivity question.  Any further impediment to 
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commercial activity is unwelcome in a field already encumbered by the huge upfront 
costs of cell line derivation and clinical trials, uncertainty as to the outcomes of 
developmental research, an absence of reliable precedents for risk assessment of cell-
based products, and the improbability of patentability of cell lines, techniques and 
products in Europe.  The example of the UKSCB therefore serves as an ideal 
platform upon which to begin an enquiry into a set of core and as yet unanswered 
research questions about how these multiple fields of influence on scientific and 
technological development can be managed.  Although this thesis begins with the 
example of the Bank, its primary aim is to address the much broader set of questions 
that are in play. 
Accordingly, my thesis does not provide an analysis of the UK Stem Cell Bank per 
se, but uses this case study as a way to address these broader questions.  The Bank 
provides an example of a situation in which the proposition of the sharing of 
resources for the enhancement of research has the potential to inhibit the industrial 
development of the proprietary outcomes that the research aims to advance.   
Questions 
My questions are:  
1.  What is the relevance of appealing to openness for modes of governance that 
attempt to facilitate the production of public goods such as therapeutic stem cell 
treatments?  
2.  How might the concept and functions of ‘openness’ be reconceived in light of 
recent changes - the proprietisation of public science, the integration of science and 
technologies and organisational diversification - as a foundation for the construction 
of effective means of facilitation of ‘scientific technologies’? 
3.  If the governance of scientific technologies is not dependent upon a concept of 
openness rooted in traditional distinctions between ‘public’ science and ‘private’ 
technology, what are the consequences of a reconceptualisation. 
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Method and approach 
My thesis is largely based on desk-based research dealing with primary and 
secondary literature.  Part I of the thesis addresses Governance: the UK regulatory 
framework for human stem cells, challenges and policy choices related to the 
provision of public goods, and my understanding of ‘facilitative governance’ as 
decentred, purposive and reflexive.  In Part II, I examine the literatures pertaining to 
the ‘traditional’ models of open science and industrial technology, in an attempt to 
identify the functions of openness in those enterprises, independent of one another 
and the issues raised by the intensification of the relationship between them in recent 
history.  My observations in regard to their origins, objectives and ethos shed light on 
the functions of openness, exclusivity and the interplay between them in each of 
these systems.  These observations inform my analysis and conceptualisation in 
Chapter 6 of ‘scientific technology’ as we see it today.  This is where the essence of 
the original contribution of this thesis lies.  I consider that facilitation should be 
undertaken on the basis of an understanding of the whole, rather than a set of isolated 
components, necessitating an integrated conceptual framework that encompasses 
public and private sector involvement, scientific and technical research, commercial 
development and industrial production.  In Part III, I use my integrated conception of 
scientific technology to assess collective strategies for governance that might have 
relevance for the facilitation of biotechnologies.  Finally, I consider the implications 
of my perspective on scientific technology for stem cell technology and the UK Stem 
Cell Bank, thereby completing the circle of this thesis from concrete example 
through a reconceptualisation and a return to examine the consequences of my 
contribution. 
Contribution 
My main contribution is the proposition of an integrated conceptualisation of 
‘scientific technology’ that does not reflect the dichotomy between the public system 
of open science and private industrial technology.  The purpose of my 
conceptualisation is to provide an accurate representation of the modern environment 
that encompasses scientific and technological objectives and activities, as a basis for 
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devising effective means of facilitation of both research and productivity.  I contend 
that the discourse around facilitation in governance of biotechnologies is inhibited by 
the perpetuation of oppositional value-laden caricatures of science and technology 
based on clear fault lines - between public and private, open and exclusive, 
communal and proprietary – that are not reflected in reality.  These caricatures 
reinforce polarised perspectives that obscure the real problems and permit the 
prioritisation of science, openness and the public domain over technological utility, 
property and the market.  Unfortunately, as a consequence, and in any policy 
environment they prevent the equal promotion and facilitation of all aspects of 
scientific technology that is necessary to ensure not only the advance of knowledge 
but its expression in tangible goods and products that provide highly sought after 
social benefits.   
My integrated conceptualisation of scientific technology overcomes this polarisation.  
It is integrated by the synergy between science and technology, research and 
innovation resulting in new knowledge, the utilisation of resources, and a domain of 
interactivity and exchange across the public and private sectors.  Resources are 
available and accessible in the domain of exchange, subject to the legal and social 
norms that shape them.  Terms of access replace ‘openness’ and are negotiated 
between actors by all means, from commons arrangements to contracts, in complex 
networks of exchange of knowledge or technology.  The ethos of this system is 
determined by the attitudes, policies and negotiations of the institutions, formal or 
informal, that govern the activities of actors in the system.  By construing scientific 
technology in this way, the interests of all actors in the production of public goods 
may receive equal consideration, value and encouragement.   
I submit that my conception of scientific technology and the public domain of 
exchange is preferable to the current appeals to a concept of openness that is of 
limited use outside of a narrowly defined traditional conception of open science, and 
advocate its adoption in order to instigate a move away from polarised and political 
posturing around openness.    
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PART I: GOVERNANCE  
Introduction to Part I 
In this Part, I define the scope and nature of the governance enterprise.  Chapter 1 
describes the existing regulatory framework for the production of stem cell lines and 
therapeutic stem cell-based products in the United Kingdom, as well as the informal 
system established for additional oversight of the ongoing use of human embryonic 
stem cell lines.  Although the main features of the Stem Cell Steering Committee and 
the UK Stem Cell Bank are set out in some detail, I do not provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the oversight mechanism, or make any specific recommendations for 
improvement of the governance of the banking of embryonic stem cells.   The UK 
Stem Cell Bank nevertheless plays an important role in my thesis.  By providing me 
with an opportunity for examination of its structure and functions, it enabled me to 
identify the practical and conceptual tensions within it, which gave rise to my key 
questions about openness and exclusivity in the governance of biotechnologies.  I 
found it necessary to formulate these questions broadly - in relation to the production 
of public goods such as stem cell therapies, a reconception of ‘openness’ in light of 
changes in the proprietisation and integration of science and technologies, and the 
consequences of such a reconceptualisation for ‘scientific technologies’ – in order to 
address the underlying relationship between open science and proprietary 
technology.   
An understanding of openness and exclusivity in science and technology was 
intended to be a preliminary step toward the development of a specific model or 
conceptual framework for the assessment or design of governance structures in order 
to facilitate stem cell technology.  Instead it became the main contribution of my 
thesis: the formulation of an integrated conceptualisation of ‘scientific technology’, 
which is foundational to such models or frameworks.  which may be devised for use 
with respect to a wider range of technologies than just stem cell technology.  It will 
serve, outside the scope of this thesis, as a platform for the evaluation and 
development of the USKCB, but also provides a conceptual basis for designing and 
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devising structures and functions for the facilitative governance of other emerging 
technologies.  
In Chapter 2, I define the problem of governance as the provision of public goods.  
As the overarching policy goal is the delivery of the health benefits associated with 
clinical stem cell therapies, I construe the enterprise of governance as not simply the 
governance of the use of stem cell lines, but the facilitation of the public good of 
health.  Health is not only a complex public good, but a global public good, 
comprising other goods and services and involving multiple social actors, public and 
private, with national and international implications.  Provision of such public 
benefits requires the ability to deal with the innate resistance of public goods to 
commercial production and the complex coordination problems that arise at many 
levels.  
In Chapter 3, I conceptualise the type of ‘governance’ equipped to facilitate the 
provision of health benefits as decentred, purposive, and reflexive.  It contemplates 
purposive attempts to shape social behaviour, but recognises that such initiatives do 
not originate solely with the state and that informal arrangements can be an effective 
means of tailoring solutions to problems that government alone would have difficulty 
addressing.  Decentred governance also enhances reflexivity: the capacity for 
continual reassessment and adaptation of its own means and methods, an attribute 
that is highly relevant in the context of rapidly changing technologies.  I adopt this 
conceptual foundation as appropriate for the design of innovative arrangements to 
solve certain problems of emerging technologies, including the need to facilitate 
disclosure and exchange of information, data and materials among researchers in 
conjunction with the private production of commercially viable products. 
By the end of this Part of the thesis, the reader will have an appreciation of the 
complex legislative and informal regulatory environment governing the use of stem 
cell lines in the UK, the overarching enterprise of governance for the facilitation of 
public goods, and my conceptualisation of the type of governance that is sought for 
the purposes of facilitation of emerging technologies such as stem cell therapies.  
This prepares the reader for Part II, in which I analyse the concept of openness, and 
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how it relates to facilitative governance, in the context of scientific technologies in 
the modern context. 
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Chapter 1. STEM CELLS IN THE UK   
1.1 Introduction 
The governance of embryonic stem cell lines in the UK is undertaken through formal 
legislative frameworks which address quality, safety and production of goods, as 
well as the informal oversight mechanism implemented by the Stem Cell Steering 
Committee through the UK Stem Cell Bank.  The political legitimacy of the non-
statutory authority adopted by the Steering Committee is not addressed as such in 
this thesis, but the objectives and functions of the UKSCB, and their evolution over 
time, raise questions regarding the efficacy of this particular form of governance, 
which is implemented by both state and non-state actors.   
There is, in particular, a demonstrable imbalance in the public interests promoted 
through the Bank: the assurance of public confidence in the use of the products of 
embryos, and support for basic medical research, are prioritised in relation to the 
promotion of a commercial environment suited to sustainable product development.  
The value judgments that subordinate commercial activity to that which is scientific 
or social are problematic for my conception of ‘scientific technology’, which I 
describe in Chapter 6 as a synergistic undertaking that is reliant upon the 
complementary strengths of science, social perceptions and the marketplace.  To 
understand the nature of this tension within the Bank, I first set out the properties of 
stem cells, and the prospects and problems that they offer.   
Stem cell technology 
Stem cells, which reside within many adult tissues, have unique properties: they are 
unspecialised as to tissue type, they have the capacity to proliferate in this state for 
long periods, and they are able to generate specialised cells and tissues through a 
process of differentiation.  The value of this technology lies in the characteristic 
pluripotency evidenced by stem cells in the earliest stages of human embryonic 
development, by which they are able to differentiate into all of the various tissues of 
the human body.  Techniques that enable scientists to isolate and manipulate 
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pluripotent cells of embryonic origin, and more recently to induce a state of embryo-
like pluripotency in cells obtained from adult tissue, creates the potential for 
cultivation of most cell types in the human body and treatment of a wide range of 
diseases and conditions including Alzheimer’s, Duchenne’s muscular dystrophy, 
stroke, heart disease, diabetes, and arthritis.  Given the capacity of human embryonic 
stem cells (hESCs) to replicate indefinitely,1 and current developments resulting in 
increasingly reliable methods for directing cell differentiation, there is potential for 
scalable manufacturing of therapies for repair or replacement of tissues impaired by 
damage or disease.2    
The fact that the embryo does not survive the disaggregation of the blastocyst is a 
source of irresolvable social debate,3 despite the fact that embryos used in UK 
research are donated with informed consent, are surplus to the needs of the donor in 
relation to the fertility treatment for which they were created, and would otherwise 
have been permitted to perish.  The induction of pluripotency in adult or ‘somatic’ 
cells does not entirely address the ethical problem for, although they instil greater 
social confidence than their embryonic counterparts, induced pluripotent stem (iPS) 
cells are capable of generating germ cells that can produce new embryos which could 
serve as a further source of stem cells. 
Pluripotent stem cells are capable of significant contribution in three main areas of 
work: cell differentiation, the testing of new drugs, and the creation of cell-based 
                                                
 
1 For a useful stem cell science primer, see US National Institutes of Health and US Department of 
Health and Human Services, ‘Stem Cell Basics’ in Stem Cell Information, available at 
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/, accessed 8 August 2012. 
2 Ibid.  
3 Hall ZW (2009) ‘Stem Cell Research in California: The Intersection of Science, Politics, Culture and 
Law’ 10 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology 1;  Bruce A and Harmon SHE (2009) ‘Discursive 
Typologies and Moral Values in Stem Cell Politics, Regulation and Commercialisation: Some Preliminary 
Observations’ 6:2 Journal of International Biotechnology Law 61; De Lacey S (2006) ‘Embryo Research: Is 
Disclosing Commercial Intent Enough?’ 21:7 Human Reproduction 1662; Devolder K (2005) ‘Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research: Why the Discarded-Created Distinction Cannot be Founded on the 
Potentiality Argument’ 19:2 Bioethics 1467; Caulfield T and Brownsword R (2005) ‘Human dignity: a guide 
to policy making in the biotechnology era?’ 7:1 Nature Reviews Genetics 72; ‘Jones D (2005) ‘Dunstan, The 
Embryo and Christian Tradition’ Triple Helix 10; Brownsword R (2003) ‘Bioethics Today, Bioethics 
Tomorrow: Stem Cell Research and the Dignitarian Alliance’ 17 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public 
Policy 15;  Muscati SA (2002) ‘Defining a New Ethical Standard for Human In Vitro Embryos in the 
Context of Stem Cell Research’ 26 Duke Law and Technology Review 1; Holm S (2002) ‘Going to the Roots 
of the Stem Cell Controversy’ 16:6 Bioethics 493; 
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therapies.  First, an understanding of cell differentiation is fundamental to advanced 
knowledge of human development and the invention of techniques for direction of 
the process; more research in this area is needed to provide information about how 
diseases arise4 and to suggest new strategies for therapy.  At present, scientists know 
that cell division and specialisation are controlled by molecular and genetic signals, 
and have identified some of the specific growth factors, such as the cytokines of 
hematopoietic (blood) stem cells,5 which give rise to these signals.  Current research 
seeks to identify more of these factors, to understand precisely how signalling directs 
cell development, and to devise appropriate techniques for safe introduction of the 
factors into the cells in order to facilitate predictable control of cell proliferation and 
differentiation.  Significant advances have been made in the control of stem cell 
differentiation into specialised cells including cardiomyocytes (heart cells),6 
hepatocytes (liver cells),7 neural (nerve) cells8 and pancreatic cells.9 
                                                
 
4 Lengerke C and Daley GQ (2009) ‘Disease Models from Pluripotent Stem Cells’ 1176 Annals of the New 
York Academy of Sciences 191.  
5 Ogawa M (1993) ‘Differentiation and proliferation of hematopoietic stem cells’ 81 Blood 2844. 
6 Lian X, Zhang J, Azarin SM, Zhu K, Hazeltine LB, Bao X, Hsiao C, Kamp TJ and Palecek SP (2013) 
‘Directed cardiomyocyte differentiation from human pluripotent stem cells by modulating Wnt/β-catenin 
signaling under fully defined conditions’ 8 Nature Protocols 162; Ou D-B, Zeng D, Jin Y, Liu X-T, Teng J-
W et al (2013) ‘The Long-Term Differentiation of Embryonic Stem Cells into Cardiomyocytes: An 
Indirect Co-Culture Model’ 8:1 PLoS ONE, available at 
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0055233, accessed 7 May 
2013; Kumar D, Kamp TJ, LeWinter MM (2005) ‘Embryonic stem cells: differentiation into 
cardiomyocytes and potential for heart repair and regeneration’ 16:2 Coronary Artery Disease, 111. 
7 Zhou W, Hannoun Z, Jaffray E, Medine CN, Black JR, Greenhough S, Ross JA, Forbes SJ, Wilmut I, 
Iredale JP, Hay RT, Hay DC (2012) ‘SUMOylation of HNF4α Regulates Protein Stability and Hepatocyte 
Function’ 145 Journal of Cell Science 3630; Pernagallo S, Tura O, Wu M, Samuel K, Diaz-Mochon JJ, 
Hansen A, Zhang R, Jackson M, Padfield GJ, Hadote PWF, Mills NL, Turner ML, Iredale JP, Hay DC, 
Bradley M (2012) ‘Identification of a pro-angiogenic and anti-thrombotic synthetic biopolymer able to 
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2013; Zou Y, Chiu H, Zinovyeva A, Ambros V, Chuang D-F and Chang C (2013) ‘Developmental decline 
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http://www.stembook.org/node/879, accessed 7 May 2013; Shi Y, Kirwan P and Livesey FJ (2012) 
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7 Nature Protocols 1836; Baharvand H, Mehrjardi N-Z, Hatami M, Kiani S, Rao M and Haghighi M-M 
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Secondly, the ability to direct the differentiation of stem cells into specialised tissues, 
and to cultivate stable populations of terminally differentiated cells, provides a 
reliable basis for the toxicity and efficacy studies involved in the discovery and 
development of new drugs.10  The use of stem cells in the cultivation of tissues not 
only complements, reduces or replaces animal testing, but ensures that a nuanced 
range of human tissue can be produced.  The differentiation of stem cells into a 
variety of bodily tissues expands the number of tissue types available for testing, but 
further diversification occurs as a result of advances in the generation of iPS cells, 
which enable scientists to derive the stem cells from normal or diseased tissue 
recruited from an array of patient or disease cohorts that exhibit specific genetic or 
phenotypic characteristics.  The result is the performance of drug screening on a 
broad spectrum of tissue types, which permits the development of pharmaceuticals 
that are targeted to specific diseases and patient cohorts, thus enhancing drug 
efficacy and the potential for delivery of personalised medicine.11  Support for such 
diversity and the availability of iPS cells to facilitate research is reflected in the 
recent EU call for proposals12 for establishment of a European Bank for Induced 
pluripotent Stem Cells (EBiSC), which will be funded by joint undertaking of the EU 
Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI) and the European Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA).  The call requires that the 
winning consortium is to create a financially sustainable vehicle for delivery of a 
diverse collection of iPS cells, and bespoke cell services, through one centralised 
facility, to meet the needs of the iPS community in Europe and beyond.13  
Thirdly, stem cells can be used as basic materials in cell-based therapies for human 
application that may alleviate the demand for donation of transplantable organs and 
tissues and expand the arena of treatable conditions.  To achieve these ends, 
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scientists must be able to manipulate cells to ensure that they differentiate into the 
desired cell type, survive transplantation without rejection, integrate into surrounding 
tissue, and function appropriately without harming the recipient.  The use of stem 
cells as materials in the development of therapies is fundamental to the practice of 
regenerative medicine (RM) as I discuss in the next section.   
Regenerative medicine  
Stem cell research is closely aligned with the field of regenerative medicine, which 
emphasises the use of whole human cells, as distinct from small chemicals, larger 
biological molecules or medical devices.  The therapeutic use of cells began over 50 
years ago with transplantation of bone marrow and haematopoietic (blood) stem 
cells, but its scope has expanded dramatically with advances in ‘classic tissue 
engineering’ of skin, bone and cartilage14 and tools for cultivation of hESCs.  The 
objective of RM is the replacement, regeneration15 and possibly repair16 of human 
cells, tissues and organs by provision of cells - particularly cells that can stimulate 
wider regeneration - to restore or establish normal function.17  Pluripotent cells can 
be used as ‘pure’ therapies, but RM generally delivers cells in conjunction with other 
technologies, including stem and progenitor cell therapy, tissue engineering, 
materials science and genetics.  It may also use non-cellular materials such as soluble 
molecules and gene therapy as vehicles for transference of therapeutic material to 
patients.18  It is the combination of technical approaches, often stimulating and 
                                                
 
14 Martin P, Hawksley R and Turner A (2009) The Commercial Development of Cell Therapy – Lessons for the 
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15 Daar AS and Greenwood HL (2007) ‘A proposed definition of regenerative medicine’, 1 Journal of Tissue 
Engineering and Regenerative Medicine 179, 181; the authors define RM on the basis of points of consensus 
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16 Mason C and Dunnill P (2008) ‘A brief definition of regenerative medicine’, 3:1 Regenerative Medicine 1, 4, 
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18 Daar AS and Greenwood HL (2007), 181.  
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supporting the self-healing capacity of the body, that takes it beyond traditional 
transplantation and replacement therapies.19  
At present, two therapies incorporating embryonic stem cells for human application 
have reached Phase 1 clinical trials.  Geron began trials in 2010 in relation to a 
hESC-based treatment containing oligodendrocyte (nerve) progenitor cells (OPC), 
which was injected into four patients with complete thoracic spinal cord injuries.  
Although no serious adverse events were indicated in the Phase 1 (safety) trial,20 
Geron decided in 2011 not to proceed with Phase 2 (efficacy) testing, citing ‘capital 
scarcity and uncertain economic conditions’ as the reason for its move to sell the 
embryonic stem cell aspect of its business, and focus on other work.21  The Geron 
work has not been completely abandoned however; in Jan 2013, BioTime 
Acquisitions Corp (BAC) reportedly entered into formal arrangements with Geron to 
acquire the embryonic stem cell program, including more than 400 patents and 
Geron’s Phase 1 clinical trials for treatment of acute spinal cord injury.22 
The second embryonic stem cell therapy to reach Phase 1 trials is a therapy 
developed by Advanced Cell Technology Inc (ACT) for the treatment of two types of 
macular eye disease - the leading cause of blindness in the developed world.23  Based 
in Massachusetts USA, ACT has initiated three Phase 1/2 clinical trials (two in the 
U.S. and one European trial), to test the safety and tolerability of transplantation of 
hESC-derived retinal pigment epithelial (RPE) cells.  The first two trials were 
commenced at the University of California in Los Angeles (UCLA) in November 
2010 and January 2011, respectively, each involving the treatment of a single patient 
                                                
 
19 Ibid.  
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May 2013.   
23 Schwartz SD, Hubschman J-P, Heilwell G, Franco-Cardenas V, Pan CK, Ostrick RM, Mickunas E, Gay 
R, Klimanskaya I, Lanza R (Jan 2012) ‘Embryonic stem cell trials for macular degeneration: a preliminary 
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in a single cohort (or group), the first with Stargardt’s disease or macular dystrophy, 
and the second with age-related macular degeneration.  In January 2012, preliminary 
results of the U.S. trials indicated that cells had attached and continued to persist 
without hyperproliferation or abnormal growth.24  Further patients have since been 
added to these trials to make up a complement of four cohorts of three patients, each 
receiving increasing dosages of cells: the first cohort received 50,000 cells, the 
second 100,000 cells, the third 150,000 cells and the final group/cohort will receive 
200,000 cells.  The third ACT trial, involving 12 Stargardt patients, starting in March 
of 2012, and based at Moorfields Eye Hospital in London, follows a similar regime.  
The seventh patient (first in the third cohort) in this European trial has now received 
treatment, and NHS Lothian in Scotland has been approved as a further clinical site 
for the ACT European trial.  The U.S. trials have also been expanded to include a 
new cohort (2a) for patients with better vision, established at Wills Eye Institute in 
Philadelphia.25  
Cell therapy industry  
Stem cell technology and RM have not developed in a commercial vacuum, but in 
conjunction with the cell therapy or ‘CT-RM’ industry that began in the 1990s with 
the establishment of firms developing blood therapies, diabetes treatments and first 
generation tissue engineering.  After initial disappointment,26 there was a shift in 
2002-200627 toward second generation stem cell-based RM, new disease targets and 
a new focus on translation, resulting in growth in sales, numbers of patients treated, 
products in development and staff employed.28  The industry is now capable of 
                                                
 
24 Ibid. 
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26 Lysaght MJ and Hazlehurst AL (2004) ‘Tissue engineering the end of the beginning’ 10:1/2 Tissue 
Engineering 309.  
27 Martin P, Hawksley R and Turner A (2009), 9. 
28 Ibid, 10. 
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producing a wide variety of cell-based applications29 including permanent cell-
replacement therapies, immuno-modulation cell therapies, transient cell therapies 
that disrupt the natural progression of diseases, ‘organoids’ and ‘primordia’.  Despite 
advances, however the industry is still encountering challenges to commercial 
viability and corporate investment.30  The difficulty in establishing an evidence base 
for clinical utility, lack of clinical uptake and poor sales creates a significant risk of 
market failure for most stem cell-based therapies.  Effective therapeutic production 
requires closer collaboration with clinical end-users, funding for clinical studies, 
more regulatory certainty, clearer reimbursement policies and reduction of costs 
through development of ‘enabling’ technologies.31  
1.2 Regulatory context  
The highly complex UK regulatory system governing stem cell research and 
manufacture32 has developed organically, in response to technical advances and 
social debates, and is aimed primarily at ensuring quality and safety at every stage, 
from basic research to product development, manufacture and marketing.  It is based 
on three main legislative regimes, each administered by a statutory authority.  The 
use of reproductive tissue in fertility treatment and embryo research is governed by 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA);33 quality and safety in 
the handling of ‘other’ human tissue, including stem cell lines intended for human 
application34 is regulated by the Human Tissue Authority (HTA);35 and pre-market 
authorisation of medicines and healthcare products is governed by the Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA).  Together the HFEA, HTA and 
MHRA administer UK legislation that implements European Directives in relation to 
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30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 As illustrated by the Interim UK Regulatory Route Map for Stem Cell Research & Manufacture published on the 
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13 August 2012. 
33 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 c. 37, as amended by Human Fertilisation and Embrylogy Act 
2008 c. 22. 
34 The Human Tissue (Quality and Safety for Human Application) Regulations 2007 No 1523. 
35 The Human Tissue Act 2004 c. 30. 
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tissues and cells36 and medicinal products for human use.37  Although a restructuring 
of the tri-partite system was on the political agenda38 at the point of submission of 
this thesis, the government has since decided, following  a public consultation during 
2012,39 that the HFEA and the HTA will not be dissolved, nor their functions 
transferred to the Care Quality Commission (CQC) or the new Health Research 
Authority (HRA), as originally proposed in its review of public bodies.  Instead, the 
HFEA and HTA will be subject to further assessment with a view to the feasibility of 
a merger, the streamlining of their activities, or the sharing of membership or 
leadership functions.40  In the meantime, these three regimes converge when the 
cultivation of human stem cell lines results in development of a therapeutic product 
with potential for human application.   
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All activities related to research involving human embryos41 in the UK are licensed 
and monitored by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority.  Authorisation 
for derivation of human stem cell lines from embryos can only be obtained in 
conjunction with embryo research, under the terms of an embryo research licence.42  
As a result of the plurality of approaches to the status of the embryo within the 
European Union, rules on embryo research are left to the discretion of individual 
Member States: some countries prohibit or restrict it, while others such as the UK 
permit it on the basis of carefully constructed criteria.  The EU does not prohibit the 
destruction of embryos in the course of research, but the lack of consensus prevents it 
from financing the derivation process because it causes the demise of the embryo.  It 
will however finance the ‘subsequent steps’ of research and development in order to 
make use of the cells, a decision that might have been vetoed by the eight Member 
States opposed to embryo research, but which passed by reason of the concession of 
Germany, Italy and Slovenia.43 
HTA 
Embryos donated or created for stem cell research remain under the remit of the 
HFEA until the point at which the blastocyst is disaggregated and stem cells 
harvested.  Thereafter, the process of cell line purification and tissue differentiation 
is governed by the Human Tissue Authority.  Research grade cell lines remain under 
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the auspices of the HTA, whereas those cultivated with an intention for human 
application are governed by the HTA only until there is a reasonable expectation of 
clinical utility in a medicinal product.  
MHRA/EMA 
At that point, clinical grade cells may be classified by the MHRA either as an 
Investigational Medicinal Product (IMP or ‘medicinal product’),44 which must 
comply with MHRA pre-market criteria for manufacture, clinical trials and approval, 
or an Advanced Therapy Medicinal Product (ATMP)45 which is subject to a 
centralised procedure for marketing authorisation conducted by the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA).46  The ATMP classification is a recent development that 
accommodates innovative therapies, including cells that have been substantially 
manipulated by a manufacturing process, that typically fall somewhere between UK 
medicinal products and devices. The MHRA, as the Competent Authority for 
medicinal products in the UK, discharges national responsibilities for ATMPs, but if 
the regulatory status of a product is unclear, determination of classification will be 
jointly made by the EMA and MHRA.  Absence of the requisite degree of 
manipulation implies that applications such as cell or tissue grafts are not ‘products’ 
and remain within the scope of the Human Tissue (Quality and Safety for Human 
Application) Regulations 2007.  
1.3 Non-legislative oversight  
In the midst of this tri-partite regulatory regime, the Steering Committee for the Stem 
Cell Bank and for the Use of Stem Cell Lines (‘Steering Committee’) and the UK 
Stem Cell Bank (UKSCB) provide a further level of non-statutory oversight.   
                                                
 
44 EU Directive 2001/83/EC, Article 1, as amended. 
45 See http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=/pages/home/Home_Page.jsp&jsenabled=true, 
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46 The EMEA was established by Regulation (EC) 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 31 March 2004.  The European authorisation procedure involves a single scientific evaluation 
of quality, safety and efficacy that will be conducted by a specialised Committee for Advanced Therapies, 
reporting to the Agency’s Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use. 
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Rationale  
The primary objective in the establishment of the Bank was and is to promote social 
confidence in the regulatory regime47 for embryo (rather than stem cell) research by 
ensuring ethical conduct in the ongoing use of the products of embryo research - 
human embryonic stem cell lines (hESCs).  Although the Bank is capable of 
accommodating stem cell lines that vary as to cellular origin, geographical origin and 
intended use, and the widest participation is encouraged by the Steering Committee, 
there is no formal obligation on those handling non-embryonic stem cell lines in the 
UK to deposit them in the Bank or to comply with the Code of Practice.   
The system was established specifically to address concerns about the regulation and 
use of embryonic stem cell lines.  In 2001 there was a need to determine how human 
embryonic stem cell lines should be maintained, and to what degree they should be 
regulated, if at all.48  There was an absence of any legislation governing the use of 
any human tissue created outside of the human body, the stem cell lines in question 
were of embryonic origin of debatable status, and the public was of divided opinion 
about embryo research. 
Legislative Gap 
The immediate problem confronting policymakers in 2001 was a legislative gap in 
the UK regarding the status of embryonic stem cell lines as human tissue.  The 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 had authorised the Authority to grant 
licences for fertility treatment, storage and research,49 and set out in Schedule 2 to 
the Act activities for which such licences could be issued.50  Embryos could be 
created in vitro, and kept and used, under licence for treatment services51 or for 
purposes of a project of research52 specified in the licence.  Under the 1990 HFEA 
Act, licences could only authorise research involving the use of embryos if the 
                                                
 
47 HL Select Committee Report on Stem Cell Research 2002, Conclusions, sections 11 and 14. 
48 Report of the HL Select Committee on Stem Cell Research, 2002, paragraph 8.22. 
49 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s.11, and Schedule 2, para 1(1).    
50 Ibid, Schedule 2.  
51 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, Schedule 2, paras 1(1)(a), (b) and (c).   
52 Ibid, paras 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(b).   
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Authority found such research necessary and desirable53 for promotion of the 
treatment of infertility,54 increasing knowledge about the causes of congenital 
diseases55 or miscarriages,56 the development of more effective techniques of 
contraception57 or detection of genetic or chromosomal abnormalities in embryos 
prior to implantation.58  The invention, in 1998, of the technique to isolate stem cells 
from human embryos prompted new HFEA Regulations in 200159 to expand the 
scope of research involving embryos.  In addition to activities for the reproductive 
purposes contemplated by the HFEA Act 1990, the Regulations 2001 enabled the 
Authority to authorise research that would: 
• increase knowledge about serious disease or other serious medical 
conditions;60  
• use such knowledge to permit development of treatments for serious 
disease;61 and  
• increase knowledge about the development of embryos.62 
The authority of the HFEA in 2001 did not, however, extend to the stem cells 
isolated from the disaggregated embryo, and no rules had been promulgated in 
relation to the use of established embryonic stem cell lines.  The Human Tissue 
Authority did not exist, let alone govern stem cell lines, prior to the enactment of the 
Human Tissue Act 2004.  In 2001, legislation governing human tissue was 
fragmented and limited in scope, addressing for example the removal and use of 
body parts from deceased persons,63 post-mortem examinations,64 transplantation of 
organs,65 corneal tissue66 and anatomy.67  Even when the Human Tissue Act 2004 did 
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come into effect, consolidating existing legislation and establishing the Human 
Tissue Authority, it did not apply to human stem cell lines as they are ‘created 
outside the human body’,68 but only to material taken ‘from a human body’.69  The 
governance of quality and safety of cells cultivated in vitro was not addressed until 
2007, when Section 14 of the Human Tissue Act 2004 was amended by the Human 
Tissue (Quality and Safety for Human Application) Regulations 2007 to include 
within the remit of the Human Tissue Authority activities (‘procurement, testing, 
processing, distribution, import or export) related to tissue and cells intended for 
human application’.70   
Embryonic Origins 
The problem of the legislative vacuum was exacerbated by the embryonic origin of 
human stem cell lines and outstanding questions related to their moral and legal 
identity which, unlike that of embryos, had not been subjected to parliamentary 
debate.  It was not clear whether an embryonic stem cell line is to be irrevocably 
identified with the embryo from which its progenitor cells were extracted, or whether 
it is transformed by derivation, purification and cultivation into a different thing: a 
source of living human tissue comparable to a reservoir of blood.  The potential for 
cultivation of stem cells in perpetuity raised questions about the nature of the consent 
that should be obtained from the donor of the embryo, and how far the terms of that 
consent might affect ongoing research activities.   
Although a House of Lords Select Committee on Stem Cells71 (HL Committee) later 
decided that hESCs are not embryos and do not therefore need special regulatory 
treatment, the concern at the time was to adopt a policy approach, whether or not it 
involved legislative measures, that would favourably inform public perception.  As 
public awareness was heightened and opinions were divided over embryo research, 
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priority was given to the definition and communication of government policy on the 
further handling of the products of such research.  The pressing task was to decide 
how these ‘slightly worrying things’72 should be dealt with, and to do it more quickly 
than could be done through the legislative process.   
Steering Committee  
The twenty-six member Steering Committee is appointed by and reports to the public 
Medical Research Council and works closely with the Department of Health (DH), 
HFEA and the MHRA.  Its informal mandate is the governance of the use of cell 
lines in the UK generally, and of the activities of the UK Stem Cell Bank.  To this 
end it produces a Code of Practice for the Use of Human Stem Cell Lines (‘Code of 
Practice’ or ‘Code’)73 through which it provides guidance for best use of established 
stem cell lines in the UK.  The Code is intended for a community of users of cell 
lines that extends beyond those who deposit cell lines in the Bank.  Deposition and 
compliance with the Code are recommended to users of all types of human stem cell 
lines, but are mandatory for those who have derived embryonic cell lines under 
licence in the UK.  The role of the Steering Committee is primarily to oversee the 
activities of the Bank and of its users with a view to ensuring compliance with rules 
of ethical conduct.  The role of the Bank is in the custody and banking of cells and 
their technical qualification and standardisation for purposes of quality and safety. 
HL Select Committee Report  
The early discussions about governance of the use of hESC lines resulted in a 
proposal by the UK Department of Health (DH) that a stem cell bank be created and 
that the MRC be invited to lead its establishment.  The proposal was endorsed by the 
HL Committee, which had been convened to address issues of human cloning and 
stem cell research arising from the Human Fertilisation (Research Purposes) 
Regulations 2001.  In its 2002 Report on Stem Cell Research (Report)74 it affirmed in 
                                                
 
72 Comment of participant in Roundtable discussion, University of Edinburgh, 2010.  
73 HL Report, para 6.1. 
74 HL Report. 
 31 
principle75 a need to establish a stem cell bank governed by a steering committee that 
would act as a means of providing oversight for the use of hESC lines and facilitate 
ongoing research in the field.  In addition, the Report made clear that the rationale for 
the oversight was not to impose on hESC lines a level of formal regulation beyond 
that which applied to other human tissue, but to strengthen public confidence in the 
conduct of embryo research and the use of its products.76  This is an important point 
from the perspective of the type of governance that I advocate in Chapter 3, because 
it underscores that the recommended ‘oversight’ was not intended to address matters 
of quality and safety in the handling of hESC lines, and suggests that there is scope 
for variation in the means that might be used to achieve public confidence.   
Status: Human Tissue 
The status of hESC lines, according to the HL Committee, is that of ordinary human 
tissue.  Embryonic stem cells, cultivated in vitro and established as a cell line, are no 
longer embryos, and do not require special regulation of the sort applied to embryo 
research under the HFEA.77  The HL Committee did not address whether they have 
an innate ‘special’ status, the nature and extent of the respect that should be given 
them, or the point at which stem cell lines should be considered ‘biomaterials’.  It 
found that despite the particular sensitivities that attach to certain (embryonic) 
material, no special arrangements need to be made for embryonic cell lines beyond 
those, such as informed consent, that apply to the use of other human material.   
Ethical ‘Oversight’  
Notwithstanding the status of hESC lines as human tissue, the HL Committee felt 
that some level of oversight of ongoing research was necessary to demonstrate the 
integrity of the public management and ethical conduct of stem cell research.  It 
recommended that a bank be ‘responsible for the custody of stem cell lines,78 which 
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would reduce the ‘ethical impact’ of such research in three ways.  Secondarily it 
would provide support for research.   
First, the availability of stem cell lines to researchers through a bank would minimise 
the number of embryos destroyed in research by preventing unnecessary creation of 
additional cell lines.  Consolidation of existing cell lines in one physical location 
would also make it easy for researchers and the HFEA to ascertain whether there 
were any lines suitable for use in newly proposed projects.  The HL Committee was 
‘especially concerned’ throughout its deliberations ‘to minimise the need to generate 
new embryonic stem cell lines, while not impeding scientific and medical progress’79 
and suggested that ensuring access to stem cell lines would over time ‘reduce the 
need for research on early human embryos.’80  
Secondly, a stem cell bank would facilitate traceability and guarantees of 
provenance.  Provenance referred to both the ethical and technical history of the cell 
lines, and was aligned with purity in reference to guarantees in more than one place 
in the 2002 Report.81  How mechanisms for cell line purification and guarantees of 
provenance would function in practice was not addressed; it was proposed however 
that it be left to a steering committee to establish rules governing deposits in and 
withdrawals from the bank to ensure the maintenance of records related to the source 
of the stem cells, donor consent, and a full history of their storage and handling under 
good laboratory conditions.82    
Thirdly, custody by a bank was considered to enable the monitoring of ongoing 
use,83 presumably by acting as gatekeeper with capacity to regulate access by 
potential users to the banked cell lines.  The Report provides little insight into 
monitoring systems, or the types of use that it might seek to deter.  The decision as to 
the status of hESCs as ordinary human tissue implies that the proposal for oversight 
was not based on any particular concern about the capacity of hESC lines to 
                                                
 
79 HL Report, 8.24. 
80 HL Report, Summary of Conclusions, no. 14. 
81 HL Report, 8.29; Summary of Conclusions, no. 14.  
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differentiate into germ cells and thus generate embryos, with the potential for 
prohibited reproductive cloning84 or unauthorised in vitro fertilisation.  On the 
contrary, the Stem Cell Steering Committee in its Code of Practice attributes the 
decision to the fact that ‘[u]nlike human embryos, embryonic stem cells do not have 
the potential to become a human person and do not therefore have the moral status of 
human embryos’ (italics added).85  It also points out that new legislation in regard to 
cell lines for human application86 has since established that research involving stem 
cell lines will not be regulated to the same extent as embryo research under the 
HFEA.  In any event, the ‘oversight’ contemplated by the HL Committee would 
reserve to the steering committee a means of monitoring activities of the bank and its 
users, with discretion to pre-empt and intervene on ethical – and indeed any - 
grounds it should see fit.  The recommendation that the steering committee should 
establish codes of conduct for the use of hESC lines obtained from the bank or from 
elsewhere’87 leaves room for development of a substantial regulatory role.  
Support for Research  
Finally, as a secondary matter, it was considered that together with these functions a 
bank would support research by providing cell lines that were not only ethically 
sourced but of guaranteed technical purity.88 It was felt that by disseminating the 
purified cell lines widely to both British and overseas scientists,89 thus providing 
them with ready access to quality-controlled embryonic stem cell lines,90 such a bank 
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should have the effect of facilitating research as well as the ability to minimise 
embryo use91 (italics added).  
Further, the emphasis of the discussion as to custody and regulation92 was on cells 
for use in basic research, as distinguished from cells that might ultimately be used 
for therapeutic purposes.  The 2001 HFEA Regulations that the HL Select 
Committee had set out to critique were concerned only with research purposes for the 
use of embryos, and deliberations that extended to the use of stem cell lines in this 
context remained very much in the ‘upstream’ end of the research and development 
process.93  Regulation of cell lines intended for the treatment of patients was left to 
one side, on grounds that therapeutic applications were still some way off94 and that, 
when they did come about, they were likely to be subject to existing controls 
including those operated by the Medicines Control Agency.95  This was clearly a 
prioritisation of issues, and not intended as a principled or permanent exclusion of 
oversight for cells with potential for clinical use.   
It is not surprising therefore that the separate chapter of the Report devoted to 
commercial interests96 simply notes that the Report concentrates largely on scientific 
and ethical issues arising from stem cell research, and that the HL Committee had 
had before it only a limited amount of evidence concerning commercial interests in 
the field.  It was acknowledged that commercial interests could, and to some extent 
already did at that time, play an important part in the development of stem cell 
research.  The HL Committee was, however, unable to do more than identify issues 
that had come to its attention, even while recognising that these would have 
considerable significance for the legal and regulatory control of stem cell research, in 
which certain companies would have an obvious interest.  These issues related 
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entirely to the patenting of research findings and stem cell lines, on which the HL 
Committee was not in a position to make a firm recommendation, though it 
cautioned against the restriction of stem cell technologies by overly broad patents.  
Admitting that it had drawn only tentative conclusions from a sketchy picture, the 
HL Committee suggested that the industry was still at the basic industry stage, and 
that corporations trying to position themselves for future profits were still facing 
uncertain research prospects, let alone uncertain therapeutic possibilities.97   
In summary, ‘oversight’ as first articulated, reflected a desire on the part of relevant 
authorities to build public confidence in the regime for regulation of embryo 
research.  The emphasis was on public responsibility in the procurement of stem cell 
lines, facilitation of transparency related to their technical and ethical origins, 
delivery of quality and safety assurances, and maintenance of some sort of 
surveillance over their ongoing use.  The stated objectives were to minimise the 
number of embryos used in research, to guarantee the ethical and technical 
provenance of embryonic stem cell lines, and to monitor their use through methods 
of record keeping and codes of conduct.   As I note later, the oversight function of 
the Steering Committee remains but takes a lower profile in relation to the role of the 
Bank in the support of research.  
1.4 UKSCB: functions 
Research support  
The UK Stem Cell Bank was established to provide a repository of human 
embryonic, foetal and adult stem cell lines as part of the UK governance for the use 
of human embryos for research.  Its role is to provide quality controlled stocks of 
these cells that researchers worldwide can rely on to facilitate high quality and 
standardised research.  It is also ready to prepare stocks of ‘clinical grade’ cell lines 
as seed stocks for the development of therapies.98  
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Under the Steering Committee and its Code of Practice, the motivations for 
‘oversight’ of hESCs as products of embryo research remain largely as envisioned by 
the HL Committee, but the whole endeavour is framed much more clearly in terms of 
support for research.  The Code aims to provide ‘confidence and reassurance to 
professionals and the public alike that stem cell research in the UK is performed to 
best practice and is conducted within a transparent and ethical framework’.99  To this 
end, it provides guidance for those working with stem cell lines, specifies oversight 
mechanisms for research involving human embryonic stem cell lines, and governs 
the activities of the UK Stem Cell Bank.100  The primary aim of the Bank is to act as 
a research resource centre: to enable researchers to access stem cell lines derived 
from adult, foetal and embryonic sources for the study of stem cell biology and 
related research and development.101  These functions together support research that 
will help improve understanding of human development and disease and aid the 
generation of strategies and therapeutic interventions102 for the treatment of serious 
disease.103  
A comparison of the various versions of the Code of Practice indicates that ideas and 
models for oversight developed and evolved as plans for their implementation were 
worked out.  The use of stem cell lines had not been debated at any length in the HL 
Committee and the scope of authority of the proposed steering committee for 
regulation of such use had not been defined.  Whether the responsibilities ultimately 
assumed by the Steering Committee reflect ‘mission creep’ or the conscious or 
unconscious adoption of an expanded policy approach, such development is in 
keeping with the nature of the Code, which is regarded as an evolving document to 
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be revised and updated in line with practice and relevant legislation104 and has 
undergone several revisions since its inception.   
The shift in emphasis from ethical oversight to support for research is evident in a 
number of subtle changes from HL Committee Report to the Code of Practice.  The 
objective of confidence building is extended by reference to practitioners as well as 
the public.  The language of ‘ethical monitoring’ is replaced by the elaboration of 
specific systems for record keeping, quality management and audit. The Code 
contemplates support for both basic and clinical research, anticipating a wider role in 
the banking of clinical grade cells suitable for development of therapeutic products.  
It also envisions custody of human stem cell lines from all tissue sources (adult, fetal 
and embryonic) and geographical origins including those outside of the UK on a 
single site.  Most significantly, quality control through characterisation and 
purification of stem cell lines to a consistent standard has become a significant 
feature of the Bank.  For this purpose, the National Institute for Biological Standards 
and Control (NIBSC) was given responsibility for all aspects of the day to day 
operation of the Bank and for any breaches in operating standards, procedures or 
quality control arrangements.  The Bank was established at the NIBSC premises in 
North London in January 2003 with public funding from the MRC and the 
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC).  
A connection between the support for research and facilitation of sharing of stem cell 
lines is drawn only loosely.  The Code asserts that by facilitating sharing of quality 
controlled stem cell lines by the clinical and research communities105 it supports 
research, but the main benefit of sharing is perceived as a reduction in the need for 
individual research teams to generate their own stem cell lines and thus a 
minimisation of the use of human tissues (embryos) in research.106  Although it is 
mentioned, there is no elaboration of the idea that sharing of cell lines may enable 
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different researchers to work on identical material so that direct comparisons may be 
made between studies.107   
Whatever the effect of the sharing of cell lines through the Bank may be, the system 
was clearly not constructed with the view to streamlining the translation of scientific 
and technical understanding into commercial products.  The objective of the Steering 
Committee was to negotiate social confidence in embryo research and its products, 
and to provide practical support for research.  As I explain in later chapters, these 
objectives play a role in my assessment of the functions of the Bank as a governance 
mechanism and its failure to promote equally of all aspects of the stem cell 
technology endeavour.  
Custody 
The custodial role of the Bank ensures that a single body is responsible for the 
banked stem cell lines.108  That it should function as a physical repository, rather than 
a directory, has several implications.  First, the taking of physical custody sends a 
positive message of capability and control to the public.  Secondly, it permits the 
repository host - the NIBSC - to manipulate the cell lines in its own laboratory 
facilities and so ensure their characterisation as to technical quality and safety, in 
accordance with national and international standards.  Thirdly, centralised custody by 
a single body provides the Steering Committee with a one-stop shop for determining 
whether there are suitable cell lines available for proposed research projects, prior to 
granting its approval.  The approvals mechanism derives from Steering Committee 
adoption of the HFEA legislative approach to authorisation of research involving 
embryos,109 which requires that such activities appear to be ‘necessary and desirable’ 
and in accordance with specified purposes, as I discuss below.     
Although not all cell lines in the UK will necessarily be deposited, the aspiration was 
that the Bank should become a national and international resource for researchers as 
well as a primary resource for the HFEA.  Most importantly, physical custody 
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affords the Bank control over terms of deposit and access by others to the stem cell 
lines.  It enables the Bank to control its relations with depositors and their rights in 
the deposited cell lines through imposition of standard MTAs, and to screen potential 
users and impose terms of ongoing use.  
Monitoring 
The somewhat misleading language of ‘monitoring’ used in HL Committee Report 
translates, in the Code of Practice, to the assurance of an ethical framework for 
research that is transparent to the public and is in keeping with HFEA regulations.110  
These objectives are realised by the Steering Committee through systems for tracing 
the ethical (and technical) provenance of stem cell lines, the adoption of criteria for 
withdrawal and use of stem cell lines from the Bank, and the reservation of a right to 
audit ongoing research where necessary.  The Steering Committee also reserves to 
itself a power of veto by requiring application and prior approval of,  among other 
things, deposition, withdrawal, ongoing research, and commercial use agreements.   
Traceability: Ethical Provenance  
The requisite ‘ethical provenance’ of a hESC line is that it is derived from an embryo 
that was donated with the informed consent of the donor, in accordance with rules on 
consent to the use of embryos in research, detailed in Schedule 3 of the HFE Act 
2008.  A consent to the use of any embryo must specify the purpose (or purposes) of 
the use111 as relating to: provision of fertility treatment services (either to the 
consenting person112 or another person113); technical training in embryological 
techniques;114 or a project of research.115  A consent to the use of any embryo may 
also specify conditions, subject to which the embryo may be so used.116   
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The gametes or other cells of a person must not be used to create an embryo in vitro 
unless he or she consents to the use of an embryo so created for one of the stated 
purposes.117  An embryo created in vitro must not be received by any person118 
unless an effective consent is given by each ‘relevant person’ in relation to the 
embryo119 for the use of the embryo for one of the stated purposes;120 nor is it 
permissible for such embryo to be used for any purpose121 unless the consent from 
each relevant person specifies that purpose, and the embryo is used in accordance 
with those consents.122 
Before a person gives consent123 he or she must be given an opportunity to receive 
proper counselling about the implications of taking the proposed steps,124 be 
provided with relevant information125 and be informed of the right, if any, to 
withdraw the consent.126  The terms of the consent may be varied, or the consent 
withdrawn,127 by notice given by the consentor to the person keeping the embryo to 
which the consent relates.128  Subject to limited exceptions,129 however, consent to 
the use of any embryo cannot be varied or withdrawn once the embryo has been used 
in provision of treatment services,130 training131 or for the purposes of any project of 
research.132  Schedule 3 of HFEA 2008 also specifies consent requirements, and 
criteria for exemption, in relation to the storage of gametes133 and embryos.134  
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Under these rules it is technically permissible for donors to limit their consent by 
reference to particular types of research or development,135 and thus impose 
conditions on use of the embryo that could affect future use of the stem cell line 
derived from it.  In practice, this creates legal and administrative difficulties for 
present and future research, especially in light of the ‘immortality’ of the stem cell 
lines.  The practice of the HFEA is therefore to permit derivation of hESC lines only 
from embryos donated under informed consent that places no specific constraint on 
their future use.136 The policy is reflected in the HFEA standard terms of consent, 
which require a broad form of consent, and in the Code of Practice for stem cell use, 
which requires that the donor couple have given ‘in principle’ consent to the use of 
embryos in research.137  
It is the responsibility of the Stem Cell Steering Committee to ensure that the 
necessary embryo donor consents, approvals, licences and authorisations are in place 
for all hESC lines deposited in the Bank, and for all projects receiving such cell lines 
from it.138  To ensure traceability, copies of these are lodged with the Secretary of the 
Committee and maintained in strictest confidence.139  Information regarding donor 
identity is revealed to neither the Steering Committee members nor Bank staff. 
Criteria for Use: Embryo Purposes  
A further means of oversight by the Steering Committee is its adoption of criteria, by 
reference to specific purposes for which stem cell lines may be used, to define the 
scope of permissible research.  Despite recommendation by the HL Committee that 
they be regulated no differently than other human tissue, the Steering Committee 
applies to hESCs what are largely the requirements of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act for authorisation of embryo research, in which the activities 
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involved in ‘keeping or using embryos’140 must appear to the Authority to be 
‘necessary and desirable’141 for one of the ‘principal purposes’ set out therein.142   
The Steering Committee states that it ‘expects that hESC lines are only used by bona 
fide research groups for justified and valuable purposes that reflect the requirements 
of the law in this area’143 being:  
‘a. research which increases the knowledge about the development of embryos, or 
has the long term goal of helping to increase knowledge about serious diseases and 
their treatment (as set out in the 1990 HFE Act, as amended by the HFE Act 2008); 
b. basic cell research which underpins these aims (as recommended in the House of 
Lords Report 2002); and 
c. development of cell-based therapies for clinical trials in respect of serious human 
diseases.’144   
With the addition of the specification of cell-based therapies as a means of treatment 
of serious disease, these are essentially the purposes identified in the ‘HFEA 
regulations’145 as criteria for authorisation of embryo research.146  The Code applies 
to approval of hESC research147 virtually the same criteria as are applied by the 
HFEA in the licensing of embryo research.148  
This application of the embryo regulations to hESC lines is defended by the Steering 
Committee on grounds that there was extensive parliamentary debate, during the 
passage of the HFE Act and its amendments in 1990, 2001 and 2008, over the use of 
embryonic stem cells in research.  Even though no statutory change was brought 
about to extend the HFEA provisions to stem cell lines, the Committee holds to the 
view articulated by Parliament that hESC lines should not be used for trivial 
purposes.149  The political legitimacy of the self-assumed regulatory role of the 
Steering Committee is not the focus of my thesis, but I raise its intervention in the 
research agenda here to indicate that there remains some scope for a change in the 
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perspective of the Steering Committee in favour of treatment of stem cell lines as 
‘ordinary’ human tissue. 
Criteria for Use: Commercial and Clinical Purposes  
Restrictions on commercial activity in relation to hESCs are most evident in the early 
versions of the Code of Practice.150  These expressly prohibited sales by requiring the 
agreement of depositors under the Materials Deposit Agreement (MDA) and users 
under the Materials Access Agreement (MAA) that cell lines would not be sold ‘for 
financial gain’.  In subsequent versions of the Code,151 the Steering Committee began 
to address how the arrangements for deposit and access may be made more 
commercially friendly without relinquishing control over deposited stem cell lines.  
Although the prohibition has since been removed from the Code, the standard 
Research Use Licence still prohibits the use of hESC lines obtained from the Bank 
for any undefined ‘commercial purpose’ without the approval of the depositor, the 
Steering Committee and the Bank.152  The distinction is preserved, not to prevent 
commercialisation per se, but to protect the intellectual property of the depositor of 
the banked cell lines in the event that the user should foresee a potential clinical 
application or other opportunity for commercial gain during the course of ongoing 
research.  In such circumstances, the Steering Committee requires that the parties 
negotiate terms for allocation of potential intellectual property directly between 
themselves in the form of a commercial use licence.  The main problem is that prior 
approval must always be obtained from the Steering Committee, giving it a veto over 
any proposed research activity, and increasing the administrative burden on the 
applicant.  
The categorisation of research purposes as commercial or non-commercial is also 
difficult to sustain.  The more cogent distinction on which to base assessment of 
potential for commercial gain is the difference between clinical and non-clinical 
research.  Cell lines intended for the clinic are usually directed toward commercial 
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product development and can be identified on the basis of technical grade: unlike 
research grade cells they must be cultivated to the higher technical specifications of 
good manufacturing practice (GMP).  Nevertheless, this distinction too can be 
problematic, as the grade of the cell line is not determinative of its commercial 
prospects.  Laboratory grade cell lines can in some circumstances can be upgraded or 
converted to meet GMP standards, clinical grade lines may be used in basic research 
without expectation of any clinical product development, and occasionally medicinal 
products are developed and approved for clinical use without entering the 
commercial market.153 For the purposes of devising models of collaborative 
governance, which I address in Chapter 7, a main objective is to minimise barriers in 
order to encourage the conduct of all types of research, thus facilitating tangible 
innovations as well as the advance of knowledge. 
Compliance: Audit 
Also related to ethical oversight is the fact that the Code of Practice contemplates the 
possibility of a minimal policing function for checking up on the conduct of research 
by users of stem cell lines withdrawn from the Bank.  The Steering Committee 
reserves the right to seek ‘periodic independent audit’ of the research carried out by 
UK and overseas researchers ‘in order to assure compliance with relevant regulations 
and permissions’.154  Such regulations and permissions refer to specifically 
prohibited activities such as reproductive cloning, and activity outside of the terms of 
the research licence, if any.  Enforceability is limited.  Evidence of non-compliance 
with or deviation from appropriate licences, authorisations and formal procedures 
will result in ‘immediate action’ such as withdrawal of the cell line from the Bank, 
exclusion of the offending researcher from future use of the Bank, and notification of 
the non-compliance to the host institution, funder or national regulator of the 
researcher.155  No other structure is established for this function. 
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Quality assurance  
Stem Cell Steering Committee oversight extends to governance of quality and safety 
through the establishment of systems for traceability of technical provenance that are 
separate to those for donor consent.  The establishment of the Steering Committee 
and the institution of its informal oversight regime were not necessary merely for 
quality and safety purposes, as technical standards are already established by 
European Directives and UK legislation, as set out above in section 1.2.  
Nevertheless, the expertise of NIBSC is an undoubted asset for their implementation 
in the day to day operations of the Bank.   
Traceability of Technical Provenance 
Guarantees of technical provenance, and assurances of quality and safety are 
achieved in two ways: firstly through careful recording and documentation of all 
technical processes carried out in the Bank, in compliance with the UKSCB Quality 
Management System (QMS)156; and secondly through cultivation and standard 
characterisation of the cell lines, in accordance with international standards, in the 
NIBSC laboratory at the Bank.  
Cell Characterisation  
The standardisation157 of quality and safety of stem cell lines is crucial for the 
ultimate recipient of a cell therapy, but is also important for the conduct of effective 
scientific research.  The job of ensuring that cell lines available for research are of 
‘guaranteed purity and provenance’158 is undertaken by the National Institute for 
Biological Standards and Control159 whose mission is to provide quality assurance 
related to biological medicines.  The NIBSC asserts that stem cells are ‘potentially 
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one of the most important emerging biotherapeutic medicines’160 and that provision 
of ‘consistent, quality-assured and defined cell lines’161 to accredited researchers 
through the UK Stem Cell Bank is the key to the success of this new technology. 
The technical role of the NIBSC is to guarantee consistent ‘characterisation’ of the 
deposited cell lines in accordance with international standards in order to facilitate 
the controlled differentiation of a pluripotent cell line into the desired tissue.  
‘Characterisation’ involves reliable identification of stem cells, their isolation from 
heterogeneous populations, and their safe expansion in vitro to produce genetically 
stable colonies of cells without altering their potential for differentiation.   
NIBSC is well suited to the task, being the world leader in the supply of (95% of) 
the World Health Organisation International Standard biological reference materials.  
These are used as benchmarks for measurement of biological activity or potency in 
vaccines, most biotechnology products in therapy and many other biologicals 
worldwide.162  NIBSC scientists work to optimise culture conditions, culture media 
and assays, technologies and platforms for cell characterisation.  Only after cell lines 
are characterised to NIBSC standards are they made available for release to 
qualified users approved by the Steering Committee.  
Quality Management System 
The system for documentation of technical provenance of banked cell lines is 
governed by the Human Tissue Authority, and implemented through the UKSCB 
Quality Management System.  The QMS covers all licensable activities identified in 
the HTA Directions,163 in compliance with the Human Tissues (Quality and Safety 
for Human Applications) Regulations 2007, implementing the EU Tissues and Cells 
Directive.164  The QMS is a document management system established for the proper 
control and archiving of all relevant records regarding policies, procedures, 
                                                
 
160 NIBSC website http://www.nibsc.ac.uk/spotlight/uk_stem_cell_bank.aspx 
161 Ibid, NIBSC website http://www.nibsc.ac.uk/spotlight/uk_stem_cell_bank.aspx  
162 Ibid.  
163 Code of Practice 2010, 4.2.1. 
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samples/users, quality control and training etc relating to the processes conducted in 
the Bank.   
Records are maintained for each cell line, providing evidence of procurement, 
processing, testing, storage and release in accordance with the procedures described 
in the QMS.165  This information is held in a Cell Line Master File, along with the 
original application form, the Materials Deposit Agreement and any information on 
the cell line provided by the depositor.166  Each cell line is identified by a unique 
identifier traceable to the accession number given it upon deposit in the Bank.167  
This is linked to the unique application number held by the Steering Committee,168 
which means that donor anonymity can be maintained while permitting the 
possibility of tracing the line from donor to recipient or vice-versa in the event of 
medical necessity.169  All of these systems go to the quality control functions of the 
Bank, rather than any particular aim to stimulate accessibility to the stem cell 
resources.  As I suggest in the last Part of the thesis, one of the adaptations that 
would have to be made, if the Bank was to consider conversion into a global stem 
cell research commons, would be to identify some sort of biological marker, rather 
than a paper trace, to ensure traceability of stem cells through differentiation into 
tissues, and facilitate wider dissemination.  
International facility 
Another aspiration for the role of the Bank was that it might act not only as a national 
asset but as an international hub for stem cell research.  The HL Committee asserted 
that the bank would ‘undoubtedly become the preferred source of embryonic stem 
cells for British scientists’,170 would make stem cell lines available to the widest 
possible range of reputable researchers,171 and should ‘use its best endeavours’ to 
import hESC lines generated overseas and facilitate distribution of UK lines to 
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overseas scientists.  Clearly stem cell research is not a purely domestic issue; 
scientific research and its commercial exploitation operate on a global basis, both of 
which are ‘sensitive to differences in the regulatory environment’.172  Further, 
international instruments and declarations govern some aspects of stem cell 
research.173  The Bank presently has a strong international leadership role in the 
provision of guidance regarding harmonisation of standards and practices in the 
banking and qualification of stem cell lines.  Glyn Stacey, director of the UKSCB, 
coordinates the International Stem Cell Banking Initiative, involving 106 
collaborators, which in 2009 published consensus guidance for banking and supply 
of hESC lines for research purposes.174   
The international character of the field has implications for governance mechanisms 
such as the construction of a global research commons, as I discuss in the last Part of 
the thesis, to facilitate communication and cooperation among scientists, 
standardisation of procedures, and exchanges of materials, information and data.  
Although it is outside the scope of this thesis, a further study might undertake an 
analysis of the host of legal and practical issues associated with opening access to 
human cell lines across national borders.  This project would require an examination 
of international trade law related to living biological materials, issues in international 
intellectual property, and questions of international development, including access to 
medicines and the international human right to access the benefits of science and new 
biotechnologies. 
1.5 UKSCB: organisation 
The organisational structure of an initiative affects the type of governance that it 
delivers.  In Chapter 3, I set out my conceptualisation of the type of governance that 
is appropriate to encourage facilitation of stem cell technology: it will be decentred 
                                                
 
172 HL Report, 7.1. 
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174 International Stem Cell Banking Initiative (2009) ‘Consensus guidance for banking and supply of 
human embryonic stem cell lines for research purposes’ 5:4 Stem Cell Review 301. 
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(involving state or non-state actors), purposive and reflexive.  With this approach in 
mind I look to the organisational features of the UKSCB.  
The organisation of the Bank is unusual in that it is a public initiative without being a 
statutory creature.  Participation is voluntary for some and not for others.  
Voluntariness of participation is important in the discourse related to the design of 
collaborative or commons approaches to the promotion of innovation.  Governance is 
neither legislative nor determined by the actions of the participants.  The organisation 
of the Bank is determined by the Steering Committee through the use of the Code of 
Practice and material transfer agreements (MTAs) which are in part standardised and 
in part open to negotiation between depositor and user.    
Deposition 
The UKSCB is loosely connected to the UK legislative framework governing the use 
of embryos by the standard condition imposed by the HFEA on all embryo research 
licences issued in the UK.  The licence is conditional upon deposition of a sample of 
each stem cell line derived thereunder in the Bank, and compliance with the terms of 
its Code of Practice.  Once the stem cell line is fully cultured to ensure uniform 
characteristics, a sample of it must be deposited in the Bank.175  Deposition is 
therefore mandatory in relation to lines derived under UK licence, even though the 
mandate is non-statutory.  Deposition is also strongly recommended by the Steering 
Committee for stem cell lines of other cellular or geographical origins, but 
participation is purely voluntary and in the absence of a legal enforcement 
mechanism the Code of Practice is not binding upon them unless they opt into the 
banking system.176 Funding may however have a determining role, as public sources 
will normally require compliance with the UKSCB banking regime.  The 
significance of the licensing condition is that it brings all users of the Bank, whether 
                                                
 
175 Code of Practice, 3.3.  Originally the conditional requirement was to deposit to a cell bank; see for 
example the licence issued to Roslin Cells: HFEA Licence R0136-3-B Platform Technologies 
Underpinning Human Embryonic Stem Cell Derivation. 
176 Ibid, Foreword. 
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mandatory or voluntary participants, under the Code and the legal obligations it 
mandates through the standard material transfer agreements.  
Contractual construction   
In addition to good practice, the Steering Committee, through the Code of Practice, 
defines the legal infrastructure of the Bank.  There is no indication that the HL 
Committee considered the appropriate legal and institutional infrastructure or design 
of the Bank: contractual arrangements, the nature of property rights, permissible 
transactions in banked cell lines, or the allocation of intellectual property rights in the 
event of patentable inventions from the use of banked cell lines.  The Steering 
Committee defines the terms of deposit and withdrawal for ongoing research use that 
frame the legal rights of depositors, users and the Bank in relation to the banked 
materials. 
The MTAs177 impose contractual obligations that shape the organisation of the 
Bank.178  The Steering Committee defines two main banking routes: one for 
laboratory or research grade stem cell lines, and one for clinical grade hESC lines 
that meet the requirements of the EU Tissues and Cells Directives (EUCTD), as 
implemented by the HTA, for human application.  
Laboratory Grade Cell Lines 
The laboratory or research grade route, which applies to cells derived in the UK or 
overseas, requires a standard research grade Materials Deposit Agreement (MDA) 
between depositor and Bank and, upon dissemination, a standard Research Use 
Licence (RUL) between depositor, Bank and potential user.  The RUL restricts the 
user to research uses of the banked material, but - in the event of an unanticipated 
opportunity for commercial use - the user may, with the approval of the Steering 
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Committee enter into a private Commercial Use Licence (CUL) with the depositor.  
The RUL constitutes the grant from depositor to user of a non-exclusive royalty-free 
licence to use the banked material179 in ‘laboratory-based, non-commercial in vitro 
preclinical’ research pre-approved by the Steering Committee.180  It does not define 
‘commercial’ or ‘non-commercial’ use, but the user agrees that it provides no right or 
licence to sell or make other commercial use of the banked materials or any 
derivative materials or products made from them.181  In later chapters I raise the fact 
that the creation of a distinction between commercial and non-commercial use in a 
field such as stem cell technology is both undesirable and fraught with difficulties, 
and that the UKSCB would be advised to avoid this.   
The depositor retains intellectual property rights in the banked material;182 the user 
owns any intellectual property arising from use of the cells obtained from the Bank, 
but agrees to grant a non-exclusive royalty-free licence (without right to sublicence) 
back to the depositor and NIBSC to use any intellectual property or results or 
discoveries or inventions or derivative materials, whether patentable or not.183  The 
user also agrees to obtain the prior permission of the depositor regarding any 
publication reporting on the research, such permission not to be unreasonably 
withheld or delayed.184  
EUTCD (Clinical) Grade Cell Lines 
The clinical grade route applies to hESCs derived within the UK, and is more 
complex, as it entails a UKSCB due diligence process that is not currently spelled out 
in the Code of Practice.  Upon application to deposit, along with a standard clinical 
grade Materials Deposit and Distribution Agreement (EUCTA-MDDA) between it 
and the Bank, the depositor must supply a Quality Agreement (QuA) assuring that 
the cell line meets EUTCD requirements as implemented by the HTA, as well as a 
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Due Diligence Initial Assessment Form (DDIAF) upon which the UKSCB carries out 
a panel review of EUTCD compliance prior to recommendation of acceptance of the 
cell line as EUTCD grade.  Upon dissemination of the cell line the potential user will 
enter into a standard clinical grade Material Access Agreement (EUTCD-MAA) with 
the Bank as well as a separate private Materials Use Licence (MUL) or CUL with the 
depositor, for research, clinical or commercial use, depending on the type of use 
anticipated for the cell line. 
The EUTCD-MAA specifies that clinical grade cells obtained from the Bank are to 
be used strictly for a project or ‘programme of work’ approved by the Steering 
Committee, with express prohibition of attempts to identify the donor (of the 
embryonic source) of the hESC cells,185 and of reproductive cloning.186  If the 
banked material is intended to be used in a clinical trial or work leading to a therapy, 
the user must ensure its traceability, and instigate procedures for potential 
notification to NIBSC of any serious adverse event or any reaction during clinical 
application that may be linked to the quality or safety of tissues or cells.  The 
EUTCD-MAA prohibits the transfer of banked materials to third parties without 
Steering Committee approval, and grants no right or licence to make clinical or 
commercial use of the banked materials.  Any such licence, to be negotiated directly 
between depositor and user, should define intellectual property rights, and is to be 
annexed to the EUTCD-MAA.  The Bank disclaims any liability for the 
merchantability or fitness of the banked material for any particular purpose of the 
user, declines to warrant that it is free from contaminants, and cautions the user to 
satisfy itself that it the cell lines are not hazardous or infectious.  
Property 
Under these arrangements, personal and intellectual property in a cell line in the 
custody of the Bank ostensibly remains with the depositor, even though a hESC line 
deposited under the mandatory HFEA licensing condition cannot be withdrawn 
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thereafter.  It is arguable that because the derivation of stem cell lines is at present in 
the UK almost solely funded from public sources, that property in all of the banked 
material ought to transfer to the MRC or the Health Protection Agency or some other 
relevant body to constitute a publicly-owned resource, but this is not the case.  Legal 
property in the material obtained from the Bank and any progeny that it generates 
passes directly from the depositor to the authorised user.  The sample can then be 
used by the recipient to cultivate a master stock of undifferentiated cells to ensure a 
perpetual supply.  Neither the Code nor the MTAs address personal property rights in 
the tangible materials, but focus on allocation of intellectual property created by the 
user during the course of downstream research involving the banked material and its 
derivatives. 
So, the Bank has custody of banked cell lines on something like terms of bailment, in 
which it acts as a trustee or intermediary for their qualification and dissemination to 
third parties.  No common property among depositors or ‘owners’ of the banked cell 
lines is created as might constitute a ‘common pool resource’ or ‘controlled 
commons’187 established by and for the benefit of a community of users.  Although 
presently public ‘derivation centres’ do not heavily contest the requirement to deposit 
a sample of each of their hESC lines in order to create a common resource for 
research, they anticipate the need in future for private investment in both cell 
derivation and development of products and the need for delivery of cells in scalable 
quantities for the sustainable manufacture and production of stem cell therapies.  In 
that scenario they argue, private investors will be deterred by an inability to obtain 
and maintain the exclusive control of the genetic cell line that is necessary to avoid 
potential reputational damage due to unreliable practices or results arising from the 
work of other researchers.  The deposition of any portion of a particular line (defined 
by its genome), thus making it available to others, is a permanent relinquishment of 
exclusivity.  These developers would prefer something other than a ‘one-size fits all’ 
system in the Bank, to permit them to retain exclusive control over certain lines of 
their choice, and to deposit others.  There is now provision for a limited (two year) 
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embargo on the release of a cell line from the Bank, giving the depositor a small 
window of exclusive control.    
1.6 Conclusions 
The system of informal oversight of the use of human stem cell lines in the UK sits at 
the centre of a complex regulatory framework governing the conduct of embryo 
research, quality and safety in the handling of human tissue, and the manufacture of 
clinical products.  Despite clear guidance from the House of Lords denying that 
hESC lines require regulation of the sort applied to embryos, the effect of the system 
is to treat hESC lines more restrictively than other types of human tissue for human 
application.  The broad non-statutory powers of the Stem Cell Steering Committee 
permit it to act as a gatekeeper to the use of banked hESC lines, through the 
specification of permissible research purposes and standard terms of deposit and 
access.     
The primary objective of the Steering Committee in the oversight system is to 
demonstrate that research involving the stem cell products of destructive embryo 
research is being conducted within a transparent and ethical framework, for the 
support of research that will ultimately generate therapeutic treatments for serious 
disease.  The primary role of the Bank is to provide a practical resource to support 
this research, which it does by ensuring the traceability of technical and ethical 
provenance of cell lines, and the provision of outstanding facilities for quality control 
and international leadership in stem cell banking and cell characterisation.  All of 
these functions are intended to build social confidence in the process of embryo and 
stem cell research and to provide public resources for research.   
While many of the features of the UKSCB are valuable and useful for the promotion 
of stem cell research, there remain real questions about the relevance of the original 
rationale for establishment of the Bank, and its limitations as a vehicle for the equal 
promotion of all aspects of ‘scientific technology’, as I describe it in Chapter 6, 
including encouragement of industrial development of stem cell products through the 
institution of appropriate incentive structures.  Although I cannot provide a full 
analysis of the Bank within the scope of this thesis, nor identify specific 
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recommendations for optimising its facilitative capacity, I do in Chapter 8 make 




Chapter 2. PUBLIC GOODS  
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I laid out the informal system of ‘oversight’ of human stem 
cell lines in the UK and the features of the UK Stem Cell Bank.  In this chapter, I 
construe this system as governance of the use of human stem cells, which contributes 
to an overarching process for the production of public goods.  It has a role to play in 
the process of research and development that generates stem cell treatments, which in 
themselves constitute a type of public good, and the therapies are antecedent goods 
in the wider social enterprise for the production of health benefits for individuals and 
the general population.  I include this chapter first because the field of stem cell 
technology is invested in the pursuit of public goods; secondly to bring some clarity 
to a muddy area in which there are various grounds for designation of goods as 
public goods and different actors who produce them; and thirdly because the public 
goods raise various issues for governance, from the allocation of public support, to 
the design of environments conducive to the private production of public goods, to 
the complex coordination of multiple actors in the broader global playing field.  The 
production of public goods such as stem cell therapies requires the promotion of 
scientific understanding, technological utility and the productivity of the commercial 
market, and the task of governance is to work out how to promote them all equally. 
In Chapter 3, I set out my conceptualisation of the type of governance that is best 
suited to the achievement of the delivery of public goods such as stem cell 
treatments.  If upstream research and downstream production and delivery are to 
interact with one another in a mutually supportive framework, models of governance 
will have to take into account the whole trajectory of the industry, starting with the 
procurement of human cells and ending with the sustainable delivery of treatments in 
the clinic.188 
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2.2 Policy goal: health  
The overarching policy goal of UK public support for stem cell technology is to 
facilitate public health benefits by delivering stem cell therapies to the clinic.189  The 
UK Stem Cell Bank affirms that its objective is to facilitate improvements in public 
health’190 and that this agenda is not limited to the UK national system of healthcare, 
but has global dimensions.  The health goal is primary, despite secondary motives 
and agendas that take advantage of the policy support and public image of health.  
International leadership in stem cell research, for example, attracts foreign 
collaborators and investment and enhances economic growth; nevertheless in the 
absence of the drive for medical advances and public health, there would be no 
economic gain to promote, and no political benefit to be achieved.  Multiple and 
diverse policy agendas, like opportunities to advance private interests, coalesce 
around health, and together make up the multi-dimensional mix of actors, interests 
and vehicles that characterise the production of global public goods. 
A public good such as health is not a single good, but an effect with complex 
antecedents made up of a set of complementary goods (private and public) and 
different types of social actors.’191  Health is a complex of goods that generates a 
social effect valued by the whole world, and arguably exhibits the intrinsic properties 
of an economic public good.  In Chapter 6 I set out my conceptualisation of scientific 
technology, which enables the governance of the production of public goods through 
interactivity and mutual arrangements within a domain of exchange populated by all 
manner of public and private resources and actors across the public and private 
sectors.  From the public perspective, what matters is that products get to the clinic.  
It does not matter why a particular arrangement or model is used, as long as everyone 
is happy with it.  The tool that is used will have different benefits for different 
parties.  This broadening of perspectives on the means that might be used to achieve 
public goods is central to the main contribution of my thesis.   
                                                
 
189 Comment of participant, SCRIPT Roundtable Workshop, September 2011. 
190 UK Stem Cell Bank, Research Use Licence (January 2012), Annexed to the Code of Practice for the 
Use of Human Stem Cell Lines, section 3.4. 
191 Drahos P (2004) ‘The Regulation of Public Goods’ 7:2 Journal of International Economic Law 321, 323.  
 58 
2.3 ‘Public goods’ 
 
In economic theory a pure ‘public good’ is one that is not capable of production in 
the market, on the basis of innate economic properties.  These properties distinguish 
it from socially valuable ‘public goods’ that are in ‘the public interest’ or for ‘the 
public good’.  Most economic public goods are not however ‘pure’ public goods, 
providing wide scope for policy choice in the determination as to whether or to what 
extent public support will be provided for public goods, and to what extent there is a 
role for private involvement in production.  
Economic public goods  
Any good has certain intrinsic properties that determine its ability to be transformed 
into a marketable product for the purposes of commercial transactions.  The 
properties that are critical to commercial activity - the sale of goods - are 
excludability and rivalness.  A public good lacks these features, being intrinsically 
‘non-excludable’ and ‘non-rival’ in its consumption, meaning that users cannot be 
prevented from accessing it, and multiple consumers can use it simultaneously. The 
following table sets out the conventional categorisation of goods according to their 
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The classic example of a public good is a lighthouse, which emits light from which 
no passing ship can be excluded.  Even if all shipowners were to jointly contribute to 
the building of the lighthouse, its operation is unsustainable as a commercial 
enterprise.  As the provider has no means of excluding users from receiving the light 
it cannot collect payment in exchange for the good, and users will not pay for what 
they can obtain for free.  Without revenues to cover the costs of operation the would-
be provider cannot remain in business.   
Excludability 
A good is ‘excludable’ if it is possible to prevent someone from having access to it, 
thereby making it possible to collect payment for it.  Exclusion occurs when potential 
users can be denied goods or services unless they meet the terms and conditions of 
the vendor.192  No one would buy a cinema ticket, for example, if it is possible for 
anyone to walk into the cinema without paying.  The economic idea of excludability 
is aligned with the legal concept of appropriability193 or transferability of property 
rights.  If a good is excludable, payment can be traded for ‘access’ which involves a 
transfer of legal rights.  Capacity for transference of legal rights makes a good 
capable of being sold, exchanged, licensed or lent.  Whereas commerce requires that 
a product be easily appropriable, a public good is non-appropriable or difficult to 
appropriate.  
Rivalness 
A rivalrous or ‘rival’ good is one for which consumers must compete.  Its use by one 
consumer prevents anyone else from using it at the same time.  A good that is non-
rival can be enjoyed by an unlimited number of consumers, at the same time, without 
being depleted.194   Its consumption by one consumer does not prevent simultaneous 
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consumption by others.  Most examples of non-rival goods are intangible.  A public 
television broadcast, for example, can be viewed by one consumer without 
preventing the neighbour next door from watching the same television programme.  
The television itself is a rival good, because if you have that particular television set 
in your home I cannot have the same one in mine; the broadcasts themselves are non-
rival, unless a subscription is required in order to access the broadcast in which case 
it will be considered a ‘club’ good because non-rivalry extends only to members of 
the club of subscribers.  Other non-rival goods include a scenic view, clean air, street 
lights and public safety systems.  Most intellectual property is non-rival.  It may be 
‘anti-rival’ if it becomes more valuable as more people use it.   
Beyond jointness of use or consumption,195 the implication for non-rival public 
goods is that their production costs are fixed.  This does not mean that the total 
production costs are low, but that the marginal production costs are zero.  Once the 
good is produced, the cost of an additional (marginal) individual accessing it is zero.  
After the initial investment, there is no cost involved in replicating it for delivery to 
more consumers.  The engagement of a meteorologist and air time on the radio are 
necessary for delivery of a weather report, for example, but once the upfront costs 
are met any number of people can access it.  My personal receipt of that piece of 
information, and its receipt by everyone else who turned on their radios today, adds 
no further cost to the production of the weather broadcast.   
Market Failure 
Together the features of public goods – non-excludability and non-rivalry – deter 
potential producers and prevent the production of public goods in a competitive 
market.  In simplistic terms, a pure public good will not be produced by the market.  
The failure of the market is due to the fact that there is no incentive for consumers to 
pay for a public good.  In markets driven by individual self-interest, people will not 
pay for what they can get without paying.  In economic language ‘competitive 
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markets provide poor incentives for the production of a public good, because 
potential producers cannot appropriate the benefits derived from use.’196  Non-rivalry 
combined with non-excludability makes the complete transformation of a public 
good into a commodity impossible, and business in public goods unsustainable.  As a 
result, a free market will under-provide these kinds of goods and if they are to be 
produced at all they must be provided by a non-market source.   
Contingency 
‘Pure’ examples of the various categories of goods are rare, because rivalness and 
excludability are not absolute characteristics, but are subject to contingencies.  Goods 
normally exhibit these properties by degrees, along a continuum or spectrum of 
rivalry and excludability.  Non-rivalness in consumption of a good can be affected by 
various circumstances.  The air we breathe, for example, is not normally a rival good, 
but may be rival in a confined space.  Rivalry in consumption can also emerge at 
different times with, for example, congestion on a road or the Internet: use is non-
rival up to a certain capacity, after which the speed of everyone on the road (or 
Internet) reduces with each additional user.  Knowledge assimilated to  ‘information’ 
is conventionally considered the quintessential public good,197 but becomes rival if 
publications are not easily accessible.   
Non-excludability of a good is even more apparently contingent.  The exclusion of 
people from access to certain goods may be difficult or costly in economic or social 
terms rather than entirely impossible.  The degree of non-excludability of a good is 
affected by social norms and technologies, and determines where it sits at any point 
in time on the public goods continuum.  Many classic public goods, such as the 
lighthouse example, could with some difficulty be made excludable by law.  The UK 
authorities have for example collected payment for lighthouse services based on the 
routes followed by ocean-going vessels.  Street lights too could be made excludable 
by technical means if light were to be broadcast only in infrared and special goggles 
issued to take advantage of it.  A legal solution would be ‘streetlight licences’ for 
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purchase only by those who go out after dark.  In many cases the answer is an 
economic one: it may be cheaper to make a good such as light universally available 
than to make it excludable, either by technology or by law. 
On the basis of its intrinsic properties it may therefore be difficult to determine 
whether or not a good is a public good incapable of market production.  With the 
privatisation of scientific research for example, the view of science as a public good 
is becoming increasing untenable.198  If science is a public good it does not need 
protection from market forces, but requires support because the market is not 
sufficiently interested in it.  If it is not a public good then it should be marketable.  If 
it is a ‘quasi-public good’ market failure is not absolute, but some support to cover 
transaction costs is required to ensure its stability in the marketplace.  
Scholars are currently revisiting the textbook economic theory of public goods, with 
a view to adjustment of the concept of public goods to present political and economic 
realities.199  It has been said that ‘historically and by definition, it is very difficult to 
determine a stable range and extent of public goods.’200  The properties of non-
excludability and non-rivalry are, for example, considered poor predictors of 
publicness, of questionable suitability to provide critical benchmarks for modern 
decision makers201 and inadequate to deal with the globalisation that many public 
goods have undergone: either as a result of the national reduction of barriers to 
international trade and cross-border policy harmonisation, or because national public 
domains have been exposed to cross-border externalities and policy choices made in 
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other countries or by global nonstate actors.202  Further, the concept of publicness as 
availability of a good for all to enjoy is refuted by the suggestion that although some 
public goods may meet with wide public appreciation, preferences for public goods 
vary according to factors such as geography, socio-cultural context, and income 
level.203  Given that democratic societies determine what goods and services the 
public should support or be involved in providing,204 it has been suggested that 
economists should approach public goods from the perspective of political economy, 
declaring values rather than pretending complete independence from them and being 
aware of the objective implications of the values on which a policy rests.205 
 
‘Global public goods’  
The economic focus on allocation of resources to public goods has expanded to 
include issues relating to the provision of ‘global public goods’, such as global public 
health and the protection of the environment, which have ‘benefits that extend to all 
countries, people, and generations.’206  The concept thus combines high social value 
and a multi-faceted economic ‘good’ with the added dimension of international 
public interest.  ‘Global public goods’ are desirable to the world as a whole, 
encompass a wide range of physical commodities, services, technologies, and 
information, and are likely to demonstrate the attributes of economic public goods: 
once it is provided no one can readily be excluded from access to it, and 
consumption by one party does not prevent anyone else from consuming it.207 
 
The concept of health in the literature of global public goods is focused largely on 
issues related to international development,208 such as the prevention of pandemics 
through transmission of infectious disease.  Emerging medical technologies should 
not however be excluded from the concept of health as a global public good on 
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grounds that they are being pursued primarily in developed countries, or because it 
will be some time before they are transferred to less developed states.  Issues of 
equitable access to the health benefits of medical treatment are part of the portfolio 
of policymakers involved in facilitation of provision, distribution and uptake of 
global public goods.  
 
Like national public goods, these properties imply a lack of commercial incentive to 
produce the goods.  The situation is exacerbated in the international context, as there 
is no global government to regulate or enforce production and limited harmonisation 
of normative regimes across transnational boundaries.  The ‘regulatory context’209 in 
which public goods – and especially international public goods - are situated 
increasingly includes governance by global standards and non-state actors as well as 
states.  While governments are still essential in providing public goods nationally and 
internationally, private actors including for-profit (firms) and not-for-profit 
(foundations, civil society organisations, households and individuals), also come into 
play.210   
 
The central question is therefore how to ensure provision and the distribution and 
uptake of benefits, which in some cases happens automatically (for example clean 
air) and in others does not (technical knowledge).211  My conception of facilitative 
governance set out in the next chapter affirms a ‘decentred’ approach to regulation, 
which encompasses a variety of state and non-state actors and legal and non-legal 
norms, as most likely to be capable of producing strategies for dealing with problems 
related to the supply and maintenance of public goods.  
 
Criticism of conventional public goods theory also extends to an analysis of 
provision,212 particularly the emphasis on market failure and provision by the state in 
the international context.  The focus on government provision is challenged on 
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grounds that the defining criterion of a public good is collectiveness in consumption, 
and that provision of public goods today tends to be a multi-actor process, both 
nationally and internationally.213 The emphasis on market failure neglects the 
potential for state failure to provide public goods due to governmental limitations 
particularly in relation to delivery of goods outside of the national sphere.214  Further, 
out-dated assumptions underpinning public goods theory arguably result in efficient 
but insufficient provision: public goods now result from public-private partnerships 
and that regional and global public goods may require national as well as 
international level interventions.215   Lastly, the standard presentation of public goods 
says nothing about international cooperation, funding and institutional arrangements 
for the production of global public goods.216 On the basis of this criticism, certain 
scholars217 propose a new sub-discipline of ‘global public economics’218 which 
focuses on the public goods themselves, rather than on the role of the state, and 
addresses them in an integrated fashion, covering both national and international 
aspects of their provision.219 
Social public goods  
Even if health is not an economic good per se, there is no serious debate or challenge 
to the idea that health is in ‘the public interest’ and for ‘the public good’ despite the 
fact that these concepts are not yet well-defined in law or elsewhere.  Of all social 
goals, the protection and promotion of health is arguably most fundamental to the 
welfare of human beings and remains a top priority for the public as well as for 
medics.  
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2.4 Public choice 
The contingency and complexity of public goods creates possibilities for government 
authorities to makes choices about whether and to what extent they will be involved 
in the supply of public goods.  Most public goods cannot be described as pure public 
goods, but are supported as public goods as a matter of policy choice.220  Some 
choices are based on public interest grounds, as discussed earlier.  It has been argued, 
for example, that science is not in economic terms a public good, but is rival and 
appropriable/excludable to a greater or lesser extent, depending on ‘strategic 
configurations into which it enters’.221  This is not a function of intrinsic properties 
but of choices.  Society wants to view science as independent.  The treatment of 
science as a public good to ensure its protection as a sui generis activity222 is justified 
on strong public interest grounds.  
With the recognition that most of the real economy operates ‘in the messy world of 
impure public goods’,223 there is also room for extensive political debate over the 
resources to be devoted to the delivery of public goods and the extent to which 
markets and non-market systems should be involved in the process.  Just because 
markets do not spontaneously generate a public good does not imply that states must 
do so.  The focus of economic debate has therefore shifted from ensuring 
governmental provision of public goods and services, to determining who should 
provide them, and finding ways of organising the public economy to enable the 
market to play a greater role in provision.    
2.5 Challenges   
 
The complexity, contingency and increasingly global nature of public goods, and 
health in particular, creates serious problems for provision.  The main challenge for 
public ‘provision’ is to find ways of addressing complex coordination problems, 
permitting production of public and private goods and services and the involvement 
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of a variety of social actors including public agencies and private suppliers.  
Government cannot simply ‘provide’ the final public good of ‘health’ - or stem cell 
therapies for clinical use - which requires production of a host of complementary 
public and private goods and services, including the generation of scientific and 
technical knowledge, stem cell lines, RM therapies and healthcare services.  
Governance 
Provision of public goods therefore requires some rules regarding consumption to 
ensure sustainability.  These have typically been provided by state regulation through 
legislative structures and sanctions.  These measures may not however be adequate to 
handle the coordination problems associated with the complex public good of health, 
as will be discussed in the next chapter.   
The alternatives are not however limited to government regulation and completely 
unlimited use of public goods.  If consumers can be organised to act as ‘collective 
consumption units’224 then alternatives may be available for the provision of public 
goods and services, including private suppliers and governmental agencies serving as 
suppliers.  The difficulty is that consumers cannot be expected to organise 
themselves through the establishment of large voluntary organisations on the basis of 
consensual arrangements for the pursuit of public goods, unless there is a separate 
individual benefit of sufficient magnitude to make the effort worthwhile, or they can 
be coerced to pay a share of the costs of production.225  It is difficult, but possible, 
for individuals to overcome the problem of collective inaction by a choice of 
constitutional rules to provide some organisational structure that will order future 
collective decision-making.226  This type of organisation is the basis for the commons 
approaches to governance that I discuss in a later chapter.  
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Private Production of Public Goods 
On the provision side, the difficulty for private suppliers is that private delivery of 
public goods is a different matter than the private delivery of private goods.  The 
private producer of public goods must understand the public economy in order to 
successfully pursue opportunities within its constraints. Public goods are not like 
marketable commodities.  Characteristically it is difficult to measure their quantity 
and quality; they are ‘indivisible’ into saleable units from which consumers can be 
excluded; they are consumed jointly and simultaneously, and supplied unilaterally 
without consumer choice as to either consumption or kind and quality of goods.  
Payment is not closely related to demand or consumption and allocation decisions 
are made primarily by political process.227 Such problems of appropriation can deter 
private suppliers of public goods. 228   
Globalisation 
Global public goods have their own problems, as outlined above, including the fact 
that standard public goods theory may fail to consider the international dimensions of 
global challenges.  In science and technology there is increasing need for 
international collaboration and communication, standardisation of policies and 
procedures, exchanges of materials, information and data.229  Organisational 
structures for governance should take into account the transnational nature of these 
networks.   
2.6 Conclusions 
 
My inclusion of this short description of public goods is intended primarily to raise 
the awareness of the reader in relation to the complexity and contingencies related to 
the definition and production of public goods, including health, and the fact that 
significant choices confront policymakers regarding their provision.  ‘Health’ is, in 
                                                
 
227 Ostrom V and Ostrom E (1977) Public Goods and Public Choices, 7. 
228 Drahos P (2004) The Regulation of Public Goods, 325. 
229 Audretsch DB and Stephan PE (2002) ‘The Economics of Science and Technology’, 27:2 The Journal of 
Technology Transfer 155, 183-4. 
 
 69 
public goods terms, a complex ‘effect’ that encompasses the production of 
antecedent public and private goods, and a multiplicity of social actors.  It is a public 
good both in the sense that high social value is placed on it by individuals and 
governments, and by the public choices made to provide economic support for its 
provision.  Public goods pose serious problems for provision, because the intrinsic 
economic properties that make them available for the benefit of everyone 
simultaneously makes them incapable of sustainable commercial production.  These 
properties are however present in most goods to a greater or lesser degree and there 
is therefore room for public deliberation in regard to whether and to what extent 
governments will ‘provide’ the desired public good and how they might encourage 
private actors to become involved in aspects of the process.  Such deliberations are 
an aspect of decentred governance in which public authorities are able to adopt 
policy choices to facilitate the production of stem cell lines and promote private 
investment in the development of stem cell technology.    
 
In the next chapter I set out my conceptualisation of facilitative governance that is 
best suited to the type of challenges presented by the provision of public goods 
including stem cell products and their health benefits.  
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Chapter 3. FACILITATIVE GOVERNANCE  
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the policy enterprise as one of provision of public 
goods, and health in particular.  I also identified the distinctive features of public 
goods and the main problems that they pose for production.  In Chapter 3, I place the 
discussion of public goods within a regulatory context by proposing a 
conceptualisation of ‘facilitative governance’ that is capable of fostering complex 
life sciences technologies and the provision of public goods for health.  This view of 
facilitative governance accords with my conceptualisation in Chapter 6 of ‘scientific 
technology’ in a domain of interactivity and exchange that is conducive to design of 
strategies for facilitative governance in the life science technologies. 
In Part II, I consider the concept of ‘openness’ in science and technology, and ask 
how and to what it extent it might enhance the objectives and functions of facilitative 
governance that I propose here.  
My conception of governance is broad in scope.  It is de-centred: not centred on state 
activity, but encompassing the actions of non-state entities as well as government in 
the shaping of social behaviour.  It construes governance as purposive, contemplating 
positive attempts to achieve a broadly defined outcome.  It encourages reflexivity, the 
continual reassessment and adaptation of methods by all actors in the system to avoid 
adverse impacts of their actions on one another.  Inclusive of a diverse range of 
perspectives, reflexivity is considered the key to ‘second order governance’ that 
facilitates activity in environments potentially bogged down by complexity and 
heterogeneity.  It is horizontal and participatory, rather than hierarchical; it is the 
collective negotiation of complementarity among actors, rather than an authoritative 
imposition of one perspective.  Reflexivity is an ‘open’ process. 
Finally, my abstract value-laden conceptualisation of facilitative governance 
provides a standard against which specific instruments or systems may be tested.  It 
is not merely an observation of the world, but is intended to inspire practical 
discussions about governance and how it might be improved.  In Part III, I propose 
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an analytical framework: preliminary steps toward strategies for the governance of 
stem cell technology, with potential application to other fields.  I test that framework 
against the features of facilitative governance that I set out here as well as the UK 
arrangements for oversight of stem cell lines.  
3.2 Terminology 
I start with a note about terminology.  The phenomenon that I refer to as 
‘governance’ could equally be called ‘regulation’ and I use the terms interchangeably 
for self-explanatory purposes in certain contexts.  The plethora of definitions and 
understandings of regulation and governance makes it impossible to adopt a name 
that does not have a pre-established definition or loaded connotation.  In the field of 
medicinal products, for example, ‘regulation’ connotes a specific body of detailed 
legislative rules administered by the MHRA for the assurance of quality and safety 
through the conduct of phased clinical trials.  ‘Regulation’ is associated with onerous 
hurdles en route to pre-market approval and delivery of a pharmaceutical product.  
The terms ‘governance’ and ‘new governance’ are equally problematic.230  The 
recent appreciation of social activity as opposed to state measures in shaping 
behaviour is referred to by political scientists as a shift from ‘government’ to 
‘governance’, and by regulatory theorists as a move to ‘smart’ or ‘decentred’ 
regulation.  The absence of a common nomenclature is daunting to the reader231 and 
requires scholars to continually reinvent the definitional wheel. 
Concepts 
Being led by a policy goal that prioritises facilitation of public goods for health, the 
significance of the conceptualisation of governance is not so much what it means232  
but what it can do, or what we can do with it.233  There are strong connections 
between an understanding of governance, its functions and the normative principles 
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or values that are applied to it.  With this in mind, I understand ‘facilitative 
governance’ to be inclusive of a wide range of actors and activity, purposive in 
direction and capable of reflexivity and adaptability.  Its function is to negotiate 
solutions to problems that inhibit activity essential to the provision of public goods.  
3.3 Decentredness 
The foundation of my conception of facilitative governance is its broad scope, 
inclusive of a wide range of actors.  I adopt the view that ‘public goods problems are 
best understood within a concept of governance that political scientists, as well as 
regulatory and social theorists would refer to as ‘decentred’.234  ‘Decentredness’ 
describes a departure from traditional state-centred concepts of government, as 
distinct from ‘non-centred’ models of governance that admit very little if any role for 
the state.  Both ‘decentred’ perspectives and non-centred ‘network governance’ 
theories of regulation are responses to an alleged ‘failure’ of state-centred regulation.  
They are different responses to the limitations of the traditional structures of liberal 
democracy, and the shortcomings of the two orthodoxies of ‘regulation’ and 
‘deregulation’.  Decentred concepts of governance have become the dominant 
paradigm of regulatory scholars,235 falling somewhere between restrictive concepts 
of government regulation and models of ‘network governance’ that admit only 
informal social activity. 
Government  
The conventional notion of ‘regulation’ is that of governmental ‘command and 
control’:236 a body of legal rules backed by enforceable sanctions.  Proponents of the 
inclusion of a wider range of institutions in concepts of governance describe 
regulation as ‘hierarchical, state-centric, bureaucratic, top-down and expert-
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driven’.237  It is exemplified by the US consumer protection and environmental 
regulation of the 1970s238 and the British ‘Westminster model’239 of state-centred 
control; it is epitomised by attempts to micro-engineer solutions to societal problems 
through a series of fragmentary, piecemeal, and highly prescriptive regulatory 
interventions, producing an impossibly complex and tangled web of rigid, uniform 
one-size-fits-all rules.240   
Quite apart from academic attempts to broaden the scope of ‘regulation’ to include 
non-state organisations, the political perspective on regulation is narrow and 
simplistic,241 not solely because its methods are rigid, but because government treats 
it merely as part of economic management.242  Regulation is considered a necessary 
but regrettable means of correcting market failures, and as a second best option for 
social organisation, as juxtaposed not against non-state means, but against the free 
market, which is considered preferable because it in principle provides economic 
freedom and consumer choice.  This limited political view of regulation arises from 
the fact that quintessential regulatory bodies have been involved with public utility 
services such as water and energy, where problems of natural monopoly prevent 
markets from operating freely on their own.243  
Networked governance 
At the other end of the spectrum is what I refer to as ‘networked governance’ that 
denies any authoritative role for government.  Rooted in the network theory of RAW 
Rhodes, it construes governance as informal, self-organising, inter-organisational 
networks that are supplementary to, and autonomous from, the formal authority of 
government.244  On the basis of patterns of social order in policy-making, Rhodes 
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asserted that formal and informal institutional links between governmental and other 
actors, such as the professions, trade unions and big business, are structured around 
shared interests in public policymaking and implementation.  These networks were 
described as characterised by interdependence and continual interaction among 
organisations, involving resource exchange, mutually beneficial negotiation, and a 
significant degree of autonomy from the powers of the state.  They were also 
considered complementary to markets and hierarchies, and inclusive of government 
as one of the informal participants, without being accountable to the state.   
The idea was that the growth of ‘network governance’ had ‘hollowed out’ the state 
by reducing the ability of the core executive to act effectively,245 making it less 
reliant on a command operating code and more reliant on diplomacy.246  In this 
‘private government of public policy by closed policy networks’ the formal authority 
of government was considered at best residual.  Initially, a small role was admitted 
for central government in (indirectly and imperfectly) ‘steering’ networks,247 but it 
was later concluded that the use of central steering as a set of tools for managing 
governance was incompatible with a concept of governance as constructed through 
contingent and continuous networks.248  Rhodes later revised his theory however in 
response to the academic criticism mentioned below.  
‘Decentred’ governance 
If the ‘command and control’ conception of governance pays too little attention to 
the ‘complex causality of regulatory effects’,249 a decentred construction recognises 
the wide range of causality in the actions of state and non-state actors and legal and 
non-legal norms.250  Between the models of ‘government’ and non-centred ‘network 
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governance’, are many forms of ‘decentred’ governance perspective.  What they 
have in common is that while they acknowledge that regulation can come from 
sources beyond the activity of the state, they do not deny government a role.  They 
remain distinct from completely ‘non-centred, privatised forms of civic action’251 
that would deny any effective role to government.  What distinguishes the variants of 
decentredness is the degree to which they view non-state regulatory activities as 
connected to the state.  In many theories of ‘decentredness’, non-government forces 
are simply innovative methods of public administration.  ‘New governance’252 is 
described as a break from the old style of government to promote new and superior 
methods of public governance; scholars assert various public techniques253 for 
harnessing non-state actors in order to create hybrid mechanisms for furthering 
policy objectives.  These innovative methods of public administration are described 
as ‘more collaborative, multi-party, multi-level, adaptive and problem-solving’.254  
They are ‘open-textured, participatory, bottom-up, consensus-oriented, contextual, 
flexible, integrative and pragmatic’.255  There are many variants on the ‘new 
governance’ type of decentredness theory: ‘smart regulation’ suggests multiple rather 
than single policy instruments and a broader range of regulatory actors;256 the 
‘regulatory arrangements approach’ would impose some constraints on the ‘almost 
infinite’ number of options for smart regulation by reference to national policy style, 
policy arrangements and the effects of adjoining policy arrangements;257 a principles-
based approach258 favours replacement of detailed rules in legislation and codes of 
practice with principles, as a means of providing the target audience with expanded 
discretion in decision-making.   
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Other proponents of ‘decentred’259 theory do not presume that regulation is tied 
exclusively, or even predominantly, to the state but suggest that it is ‘diffused 
throughout’ society.260  This sort of decentredness is not understood as innovative 
public administration per se, nor does it constitute a complete denial of an effective 
role of government, but it accepts that some patterns of order found in society may 
be ‘regulatory activity’ or ‘governance’, whether or not they are harnessed in any 
direct way by the state.  This theory of decentredness does not abandon the concept 
of an role of an active state in a democracy,261 nor try to replace conventional, 
sanctioned approaches in all contexts;262 it promotes an alternative to entrenched or 
failed government structures without attacking the state as a whole.263  This concept 
of governance or regulation suggests that to identify activities that are significant for 
systems of control being exercised in society it is necessary to think about non-
governmental as well as state-centred activity.  Without a broad analytical 
framework we might fail to recognise the acts of non-state entities as a significant 
regulatory force, or be ill-equipped to make sense of them.  A ‘decentred’ analysis 
looks for patterns of social ordering or control in society that may or may not 
emanate from the state. 264   
Affirmation for this type of ‘decentring’ is found in the fact that Rhodes himself now 
claims to have adopted it, following substantial criticism265 of his theory of network 
governance.  The limits to networked governance266 have been given specific 
consideration in the field of the new life sciences, where scholars have noted that ‘the 
emphasis on networks in the governance literature tends to ignore the continued 
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importance of hierarchy’.267  They suggest that future governance of the life sciences 
should incorporate the most useful aspects of governance-based approaches and 
reconcile them with government initiatives in a way that does not exclude key 
stakeholders – including the pharmaceutical industry – from the policy debate.’268  
Rhodes now argues in favour of decentredness as an ‘alternative way to 
conceptualise the institutions, actors and processes of change in government’.  
Without abandoning his foundations in network theory, he agrees that the state can 
act in a decisive way, and that the centre coordinates and implements policies as 
intended at least some of the time, even if too little importance is attached to 
unintended consequences that erode effectiveness.269  
So, the broadening of the concept of regulation to one of decentred governance is a 
welcome270 development, but it has its limitations.  The shift from state versus 
market to the inclusion of non-state actors and non-economic rationales makes 
governance ‘an all-pervasive phenomenon that cannot be isolated from broader 
social theory’.271  ‘Governance’ could include virtually every system of social 
control, social norms and culture, in addition to the formal government functions of 
law and administration.  The scope of the broadest conception of governance could 
be unwieldy and incoherent as a framework of analysis, or cause a loss of focus.272  It 
is necessary therefore to define the activities understood as governance within limits 
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A definition 
My definition of governance is, therefore: 
Governance is the sustained and focused attempt to alter social behaviour according 
to defined standards or purposes, with the intention of producing a broadly identified 
outcome.  
This is an adaptation of the definition of ‘decentred’ regulation established by 
Black273 and provides an appropriate lens through which to approach the regulation 
of the life sciences technologies.  It is an abstract definition, independent of context, 
making it susceptible to application or adaptation to new circumstances.  It refers to 
both the fundamental elements and the functions of governance.274  Its scope is 
neither under- nor over-inclusive.  It is not so narrow as to be rigid or exclude non-
governmental controls and reflexive processes, but not so inclusive of non-state 
social ordering that it becomes incoherent.  A ‘sustained and focused attempt’ is 
purposive or goal-oriented, can take many forms, and can be undertaken with the 
participation of a multidisciplinary contingent of actors in both national and 
international contexts.  By focusing on intentional problem-solving, impersonal 
forces such as ‘culture’ and ‘the market’ are eliminated from the concept.  No 
purposes are excluded per se, as long as they are defined, which permits commercial, 
social and even certain personal interactions, for the benefit of individuals, 
collectives or publics.   
My conception of governance corresponds to the definition of regulation proposed by 
Julia Black, except that it omits the tasks she includes to exemplify what might be 
involved: standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification.  
These are drawn from the field of cybernetics275 and provide specificity, as examples 
of important functions of regulatory systems, but I exclude them for two reasons.  
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First, two of them seem redundant.  If regulation is conducted ‘according to 
standards and purposes’, it will presumably involve a mechanism for standard-
setting.  Likewise, if regulation is defined as an attempt to alter behaviour, the 
creation of a mechanism for behaviour-modification seems implicit in the definition.  
Perhaps these mechanisms have significance for the field of utility regulation, of 
which Black has experience, but it is not immediately apparent what they add, for my 
purposes, to the core definition.  Secondly, the concern expressed by Black - that 
without mention of these exemplary tasks, ‘regulation’ could be construed too 
narrowly through the tendency of interpreters to focus heavily on one or the other of 
them276 – is open to question.  In any event, the articulation of possible mechanisms 
for expression does not change the core definition.  I have therefore dropped all 
three, including information–gathering.  The core definition proposed by Black 
nevertheless provides a strong foundation on which to build a regulatory approach to 
the use of stem cells. 
3.4 Purposiveness   
Governance, as I conceive of it, is action undertaken with a purpose and a goal.  It 
involves intentional, systematic attempts at problem-solving.  Policymakers and legal 
scholars differ from social scientists in the adoption of this positive approach.  
Lawyers cannot be content with the observation and analysis of social phenomena; 
our mandate is to find ways of addressing contemporary problems.  We want to 
understand not only how regulatory forces function, but how they might work 
‘better’ in order to achieve certain objectives.  A conception of governance as 
‘purposive’ recognises a degree of human ‘intentionality’ (whether or not linked to 
government) thus distinguishing it from other systems of social control and ordering.  
A purposive approach will look to the subject (technology) for the goals of 
governance.  There is a clear relationship between the goals of the enterprise and the 
goals for governance of the enterprise, in that they each address the same set of 
circumstances.  Medicine and healthcare seek solutions to problems as a means of 
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promoting practical health benefits; the objectives of stem cell research and 
innovation are to develop therapeutic treatments that will eventually become 
routinely available in the clinic and so improve human life.  The objective of 
governance is to facilitate, directly or indirectly, the achievement of these goals, 
which it does through purposive measures: the design, construction or coordination 
of mechanisms or arrangements.  Purposiveness is not to be confused with the 
authoritative imposition of measures, or a static approach to problem-solving.  The 
point of the purposive construction of innovative governance strategies, such as those 
I consider later in this thesis, is that they should have built into them capacities for 
second order reflexivity, which is an important tool of facilitation.  Purposiveness in 
this sense differs from the purpose-oriented substantive law described by Teubner as 
programmes of action implemented through regulations, standards and principles, 
which he distinguished from both formal (rules-oriented) and reflexive (procedure-
oriented) types of legal rationality.277        
3.5 Reflexivity  
Rational problem-solving  
In the literature of governance,278 conventional approaches to regulation are 
associated with systems of rational problem solving, and their failure to provide 
procedures for identifying and addressing the unintended consequences of their 
actions.  The concept of reflexivity that I adopt as a component of facilitative 
governance differs from, but has been influenced by, Teubner’s theory of reflexive 
law,279 which draws upon ideas about ‘responsiveness’ that originated in mechanisms 
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of legal enforcement.280  The enforcement-based concept of responsiveness was 
expanded to encompass broader notions of deliberative democracy and restorative 
justice281 which informed the Teubner ideas on reflexive law,282 as well as more 
recent formulations of ‘really responsive’ regulation.283  Teubner suggests that 
reflexive law, instead of ‘taking over responsibility for the outcomes of social 
processes’, ‘restricts itself to the allocation, correction and redefinition of democratic 
self-regulatory mechanisms.’284  His ‘reflexive law’ a. is justified by the desirability 
of coordinating recursively determined forms of social cooperation;285 b. facilitates 
decentralised integration of semi-autonomous social systems by structuring and 
restructuring their internal discourse and methods of social coordination; and c. has 
an internal rationality that is not based on precisely defined formal rules or 
substantive principles, but tends toward procedural norms that regulate processes and 
organisation and the distribution of rights and competencies.286  In my thesis these 
aspects of reflexivity are features of a decentred conceptualisation of governance, 
rather than law, and function to remedy difficulties associated with problem-solving 
approaches to regulation, without necessarily involving the authority of state or 
government regulators.   
Regimes of ‘rational problem-solving’ are systems of optimal rules for a specific 
environment that can be implemented through sophisticated methods of intervention 
and control.  The aim is to eliminate uncertainty and uncontrolled influences by 
concentrating on a specific slice or dimension of a complex reality – selecting 
relevant elements, using linear constructions of cause and effect, placing goals in 
hierarchical order, and allocating responsibilities.  This ‘productive reduction of 
complexity’287 is behind ‘modern science’, technological development, bureaucratic 
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organisation, policy making and other patterns of social organisation in a variety of 
fields.288  Its power is said to lie in the fact that it constructs specialised world views 
that permit formulation of narrowly targeted objectives and the concentration of 
capacities for action and control over processes within the defined boundaries of the 
system.289  The rationalist approach has achieved tremendous technological 
developments, sophisticated patterns of social regulation and a high economic 
efficiency of production.290  
In spite of its strengths, however, rationalist problem-solving fails to address 
important dynamic features of complex systems.  The more the process is focused on 
its specialist perspective and disengaged from the ‘full messy intermingled natural 
reality’,291 the greater the failure to take account of embeddedness and 
interdependencies within the complex environment.  The more effective it is in 
achieving its particular instrumental purposes, the greater the impacts of the 
unintended consequences of its actions.  To third party recipients, these effects are 
referred to as ‘externalities’, and to the original problem solver they are the ‘side 
effects’ or ‘repercussions’ of its actions.  
Second order reflexivity 
Reflexivity is the capacity of a system to address the consequences of rationalist 
problem-solving: to continually reassess its own effects and methods in situations 
that exhibit multiplicity, complexity and uncertainty, where the unanticipated 
consequences of first order governance create ‘second order’ problems.  Reflexive 
governance is not an attempt to foresee scientific advances,292 nor anticipatory 
governance that predicts future developmental pathways as a means of enhancing 
public administration.293  Theorists describe it as concerned with itself: it treats its 
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own systems as part of the dynamics that need to be governed.294  They suggest that 
reflexivity happens at two levels.  ‘First order’ reflexivity addresses self-induced 
problems: it is the confrontation of the implications and side-effects of the 
‘instrumental rationalities’295 through which governance mechanisms undertake 
problem-solving.  This can be understood as a function of modernity or development: 
societies grow in cycles, producing problems and solutions to these problems, which 
produce new problems.296  
Through ‘second order’ reflexivity, governance reflects on and reconstructs its own  
methods of ‘rational problem-solving’.  It addresses not only the problems that are 
self-induced, but also its own ‘working, conditions and effects.’297  Second order 
reflexivity is ‘analysis’ or ‘critical reassessment’ rather than ‘problem-solving’, 
because reference to a ‘solution’ implies an unambiguous problem that may be 
isolated and ‘solved’ in a deliberative manner.  Second order analysis is a procedural 
approach, which interrupts the routine problem-solving processes of first-order 
reflexivity, and may lead to new methods and processes of handling problems that 
are more ‘open’, experimental and oriented to learning.298     
Second order reflexivity therefore adds a dimension to governance that enables more 
nuanced approaches to complex problem-solving than are possible through direct 
first order attempts alone.  I construe it as the means of addressing problems of 
method or process that are ‘interstitial’ to first order issues.  It facilitates an 
understanding of specialisation of methods, and the interdependencies and aggregate 
effects that arise through application of specialised concepts and strategies.  
Sophisticated understanding of a complex of relationships enables integration 
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through the establishment of connections, organisation of  communications and 
promotion of interaction.299 
Scholars understand the processes of reflexivity, and their implication for 
governance, in a variety of ways, and recognise that reflexivity is itself an aspect of 
governance properly subject to reflection.  Some see it as a mode of ‘steering’ by 
which actors are encouraged to examine and adapt their assumptions, institutional 
arrangements and practices.’300  Others construe it as ‘partnership in governance’, 
which is dependent upon a culture of trust, communication, deliberation and 
interaction, to which actors bring an attitude of receptivity to new ways of framing 
problems and potential solutions.301  I consider it a process of negotiation of 
compatibility and complementarity among actors that resolves problems or reduces 
barriers to the respective undertakings contributed by individual actors to the 
production of complex public goods.  It is the foundation of facilitation, which I 
discuss separately below. 
Although reflexive strategies may take different forms in different contexts 
according to the objectives, problems and actors involved, a number of fundamental 
functions or capacities of reflexivity have been identified: integration, assessment, 
anticipation, coordination and adaptation.  These capacities are all in essence 
designed to augment recursive feed-back dynamics between actors and the system of 
governance, in ways that address complexity, uncertainty and the ‘path dependence’ 
that first order governance can produce.  At the root of each of these functions is 
wide participation, interaction, and communication.  
Reflexive functions  
Integration 
The integration of different perspectives is a fundamental element of the facilitation 
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of multidisciplinary activity.  Integration occurs through joint problem solving in 
situations typified by heterogeneous origins or elements.  Communication is the first 
step toward treatment of problems in a complex situations: it should expand the 
understanding and perspectives of the actors concerned, with implications for their 
actions. There is a growing literature dedicated to the conceptualisation of 
‘transdisciplinary knowledge production’ or ‘new knowledge production’, across the 
disciplines of science and technology, with application to a number of fields 
including education, environmental science and organic agriculture.302  Integration is  
a theme both in governance and (as I discuss in Part II) in new paradigms of 
scientific technology based on the erosion of the distinction between public and 
private.  
Integration is not the institution of one perspective over others, but permits the full 
recognition of different perspectives in the system.  It is argumentation among 
participants, and exchange of views as to the appropriate actions and processes of 
governance.303  Theories of regulation apart from reflexivity converge on similar 
concepts of procedural openness as a means to integration.  Called by a variety of 
names: ‘proceduralisation’, ‘civic science’, ‘scientific proceduralism’, or 
‘democratisation’, they share in common the desire to open up the decision process, 
to deny any one voice authority in that process, and through the integration of views 
and perspectives to arrive at accepted solutions to intractable problems.  
There are many metaphors for integration.  It is a bridge that connects and unites, 
facilitating communication instead of isolation.  It is also a doorway that permits 
movement in both directions and enables interaction between parties and activities in 
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different rooms of a house.  Governance designs appropriate structures, institutions 
and systems to achieve integration: the architecture does not spring up automatically.  
It is built. 
Anticipation 
Anticipation is the exploration of possible outcomes and long-term systemic effects 
of actions, and can occur at many points in a reflexive system.  The significance of 
anticipation is in its avoidance of ‘path dependency’.  If effects can be assessed in the 
early stages of technological development, adaptation of social and institutional 
structures can take place before they become entrenched within their contexts.  
Future developments and impacts may be unknown and not formally predictable at 
this stage, but scenario foresight methods can usually enable anticipation of 
alternative paths and possible impacts. [cite]  
Assessment 
Assessment is necessary to gain a prerequisite understanding of existing practices or 
production structures, their real as well as anticipated consequences, the possible 
alternatives to the status quo and strategies for their implementation.  The key is the 
broad participation of all affected social actors in assessment and goal formulation.  
Articulation of the full range of values, and respective perceptions of the problems 
represented within the affected constituency constitutes a basic condition of 
reflexivity.  Participatory assessment of present processes as well as aims and 
alternatives is therefore seen as fundamental to facilitation of change through 
coordination and adaptation.304   
Coordination 
Coordination addresses the problem created by the distribution of capacities for 
control among a heterogeneous group of actors.  Restructuring of the relationships of 
actors to one another is not easily achieved within institutionalised hierarchies, but 
can take place through interactive networks for strategy development, which 
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facilitate the sharing of perceptions, interests and knowledge of the various 
stakeholders.  Coordination of control through second order reflexivity may also 
contribute to first order system restructuring, depending on other exogenous factors 
and circumstances. 
Adaptation 
Mutual adaptation takes place through the participatory processes described, in 
which actors are forced to articulate and defend their analyses, goals and strategies 
for handling problems.  Anticipatory interaction permits the development of 
strategies intended to preempt problems, rather than dealing with them in real time, 
through trial and error.305  Due to inherent uncertainty about long-term dynamics and 
systemic effects, strategies as well as cognitive, institutional and technological 
structures need to be adaptive in order to allow for error and learning.  This entails 
the need for capacities to respond to unexpected effects and developments.  
Strategies should feature experimentation, monitoring and evaluation in order to 
systematically work with new experiences, altered interpretations and changed 
circumstances. The result is more robust patterns of governance than individual 
steering approaches contrived by separate actors.306   
Reflexive governance 
‘Reflexive governance’ is shaped by the interplay307 between first order governance 
and first and second order reflexivity on its effects and processes.  ‘Governance’ 
includes the actions of individual actors that impact on others, and mutual actions to 
manage such actions.  It incorporates first order solutions that address problems after 
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the fact, and the second order ability to balance specialisation and integration in the 
ongoing modulation of developments.  It benefits from rational problem-solving, but 
is limited by the constraints of the complex context in which it is embedded.  It is 
characterised by continual learning, rather than an aim to attain complete knowledge 
or maximisation of control.308   
Reflexive governance can therefore be expected to produce better results than 
conventional approaches.  It offers platforms for deliberation that complement 
conventional political decision-making, enabling better definition of problems, 
mutual adaptation among stakeholders for rectification and prevention of unintended 
consequences, and ultimately a more effective means of achievement of societal 
aims.   
Problems related to decentred and reflexive governance however include questions 
of political legitimacy regarding the assumption of roles of authority by non-state 
actors, as well as the absence of any value structure to guide it, or criteria by which 
to assess its effectiveness.  Protagonists of reflexivity agree that the dominance of 
any one actor in the system is problematic and assert that the effectiveness of 
reflexive governance is dependent upon the engagement of a diverse range of 
perspectives in the interaction process, as well as the prevention of domination by 
any one actor or group of actors that would suppress challenges to its own 
perspectives and strategies.   
The normative values and principles of governance at the level of second order 
reflexivity are those of the actors in the system.  Some regulatory theorists regard the 
determination of principles for governance of social matters to be problematic, 
because they are either left to the ‘whim’ of politicians or to social norms.309  This is 
regulation from a political perspective, in which ‘good governance’ is defined in 
procedural terms, economic matters are dealt with by principles that promote or 
mimic market forces, and there is no easy way to identify appropriate principles or 
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standards for regulation of social matters.  From the perspective of decentred and 
reflexive governance, important public interest issues such as safety are properly 
addressed by government through first order legislative instruments; within those 
parameters, second order reflexivity negotiates the collective values of the interested 
actors.  This is a beauty rather than a drawback of the system, as it facilitates the best 
representation of the values and interests of all involved rather than an approximation 
imposed by an external authority.  
The need for evaluative criteria has been posited by both proponents310 and critics311 
of reflexive governance.  Reflexive processes are susceptible to misuse, as 
participatory mechanisms permit opportunistic behaviour and power struggles among 
stakeholders as well as constructive debate and cooperative interactive strategy 
development.312  The pragmatic approach to what is ‘working’ is likely to be 
inadequate, given that in any complex social situation it will be difficult to determine 
what is relevant, let alone effective.   Evaluation should therefore extend to the 
dynamics of reflexivity as well as its results, on the basis of criteria that amount to 
more than a checklist of predefined outcomes.313  
As there is presently no empirical evidence of the effectiveness of reflexivity, it is 
difficult to discern when unreflexive first order instruments might be adequate to 
deal with challenges.  The clue to the appropriate role of reflexivity is that where 
unreflexive approaches appear to be credible, the challenge that they address is a 
relatively straightforward one.314  The contribution of reflexive instruments is their 
capacity to achieve outcomes in circumstances that are beyond the capacity of other 
approaches to engage.315   
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3.6 Facilitation  
It is said that ‘reflexivity ensures that regulation is not solely about control, but about 
facilitation.316  The concept of facilitation is not however synonymous with 
reflexivity. I want to say that ‘facilitation’ comprises both the means and the 
outcome - that something has not been facilitated unless it is achieved - but that is 
not quite the case.  To ‘facilitate’317 an action or process is to make it easy, or easier.  
The term shares its origins with the adjective ‘facile’,318 meaning ignoring the true 
complexities of an issue, or (of a person) having a superficial or simplistic 
knowledge or approach.  The object of facilitation is an action or process.  It is 
directed toward a fixed goal, but it affects the dynamic process, whether or not the 
outcome is successfully achieved.  To facilitate technological advance is to make it 
simpler and easier for players to undertake their individual tasks, thus easing the way 
to the mutual achievement of societal goals. 
I construe the nature of this reflexive facilitation or easing process as one of 
negotiation rather than ‘cooperation’.  In later chapters I address the negotiation of 
degrees of openness through contractually constructed mechanisms of governance in 
relation to access to knowledge and materials.  Actors are by definition receptive to 
cooperation in the negotiation of governance, or they would not be at the table, but 
the process is not a soft one: it requires them to engage, argue, agree and adapt in 
order to proceed with activity that might otherwise have been inhibited.  Negotiation 
seeks mutual advantages by focusing on interests rather than positions, and sticking 
to objective criteria;319 actors are not prepared to compromise their essential interests 
and values in the process.    
For all these reasons, my conceptualisation of facilitative governance as decentred, 
purposive and reflexive is arguably well suited to facilitation of life sciences 
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technologies.  It is capable of addressing complexity among stakeholders and 
interested parties, fragmentation of knowledge and of power and control, 
interdependencies among social actors and government, autonomy and 
ungovernability of various actors, and the absence of a clear distinction between 
public and private.320 Strategies in these circumstances are likely to be hybrid 
(involving both government and non-governmental actors), multi-faceted (employing 
a variety of strategies simultaneously) and indirect (reflexive).321 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
The role of facilitative governance in the provision of public goods is to enable 
multiple actors to more easily fulfil their individual roles in the process, within the 
most complex and dynamic systems.  Decentredness and reflexivity are key features 
of a concept of governance that is suited to the task.  A decentred perspective 
recognises as ‘governance’ the impact of actions by both state and non-state actors 
on one another.  It permits reflexivity, or ‘second order’ governance by all actors, 
through continual reassessment of the effects of their actions, and their mutual 
adaptation, rather than an authoritative imposition of one perspective.  Theories of 
reflexivity emphasise themes of actor participation, integration of interests, exchange 
of knowledge across disciplines, and the negotiation of optimal arrangements for 
coordination and adaptation.   
The themes of inclusiveness, non-hierarchical participation and reflexivity in this 
concept of governance are indicative of ‘openness’.  All actors may have a voice.  In 
this context, openness means access to the processes or procedures of governance, 
rather than access to substantive resources or property, which is the subject of the 
next chapters on science and technology.  ‘Access’ is the invitation to participate in 
the interactive process: the engagement between the parties that generates innovative 
strategies for resolution of problems and avoidance of inhibitors of individual 
activity.  Openness enhances interactivity and the potential for innovation, a theme 
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that reappears in relation to the sharing of resources in science and technology.   
The paradox is that openness in reflexive governance facilitates closure.  Collective 
deliberation enables individual actors to proceed with further decision-making and 
activity, in pursuit of their own contributions to the provision of public goods.  
Interaction, cooperation and coordination in governance facilitates the exclusive 
activity of actors in the system.322  This juxtaposition of open and closed is another 
theme that reappears in the context of scientific technology, in which interactivity 
and innovation give birth to excludable and rival products.   
These first three chapters have set the stage for the central analysis of the thesis.  I 
suggest that the oversight and use of human stem cell lines is one element of a 
complex process culminating in the delivery of public goods, and that the 
achievement of the benefits of cell-based clinical therapies involves networks of 
scientific and technical innovation, commercialisation and exploitation, in a 
supportive social environment.  I adopt a purposive, decentred and reflexive concept 
of governance as appropriate to the task of facilitating strategies for the provision of 
public goods. In Part II, I consider the concept of ‘openness’ in modern scientific 
technology, and ask how and to what it extent it might enhance the objectives and 
functions of facilitative governance that I propose here.  
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PART II: OPENNESS 
Introduction to Part II 
 
In Part I, I described mechanisms for UK governance of human stem cell lines, and 
identified the provision of public goods as the policy objective behind the facilitation 
of production of human stem cell therapies.  I concluded that decentred and reflexive 
governance, which is in theory the system most capable of coping with complexity, 
is a form of procedural openness, in that it provides access to reflexive governance 
processes that facilitate the undertakings of actors that contribute to the delivery of 
public goods.  In this Part, I consider the extent to which ‘openness’ provides a 
means of access to resources for the facilitation of such undertakings.   
‘Resources’ for the production of stem cell therapies are those essential to science 
and technology: intellectual resources - data, information, knowledge – as well as 
tangible, material resources.  ‘Access’ to resources is not merely about control or 
consumption, but requires a level of engagement that facilitates the innovative as 
well as exploitative processes of scientific technology.  Vehicles of access should 
permit the direction of resources toward private ends, but also maximise opportunity 
for resources to be engaged, manipulated and reconfigured: to generate novel 
outcomes that are themselves available for ‘use and reuse’.  My objective is to assess 
the extent to which ‘openness’ exhibits these features and might therefore be useful 
in regard to strategies for the facilitation of delivery of stem cell therapies.   
I first look to the individual literatures of open science and industrial technology for 
characteristics of ‘openness’.  The conventional narratives construe science and 
technology as separate systems engaging in different modes of innovation that are 
oriented to the achievement of two different, but equally important, social goals: the 
production of knowledge, and the production of goods that deliver tangible social 
benefits.  My examination of these literatures sheds light on the meaning and 
functions of openness in these individual contexts that inform my understanding of 
how science and technology relate to one another – and the significance of openness, 
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if any -  in the current conduct of most research and development, which I construe 
as ‘scientific technology’.   
In Chapter 4, I find in the open model of science a public concept of openness in 
which results of scientific research are released into the public domain to facilitate 
rapid innovation in the generation of new knowledge.  It features disclosure of 
intellectual resources, communisation of property, and accessibility through the 
public domain.  Open science is supported as a public good, which permits the 
pursuit of new knowledge without regard for practical value, and the creation of a 
commonly held public resource.  The practice of public disclosure is facilitated by 
and reinforces a cohesive social system, driven by collaboration and competition for 
recognition of original work, rather than economic results, bound together by moral 
and social norms.  The ‘sharing’ of data and materials among scientists is not 
altruism, but a responsibility undertaken to fulfil specific functions, and adhered to 
out of a professional commitment to advance the interests of science.  
In practice, open science does not achieve unlimited access to scientific results 
through the ‘public domain’: the release of certain types of content may be restricted 
to protect public interests, published material is only as public as its readership, and 
access may be limited by the capacity of potential users to obtain and use it.   
In Chapter 5, I look for concepts of openness in the literature of industrial technology 
and find that while the ‘public’ concept of openness does not extend to technology, 
the common perception of technology as ‘closed’ is simplistic and misleading.  It is 
true that technology is distinguished from open science on grounds that it by 
necessity obtains exclusive control over resources in order to facilitate the production 
of economic products in a competitive market.  This exclusivity must however be 
read in the context of the whole enterprise of technical innovation and industrial 
production, which embodies two paradoxes of open and closed.   
The first paradox is to be expected: that from the openness of technical innovation 
comes closure in stable products.  Within an individual firm, the dynamic, chaotic 
processes of innovation are tempered throughout by exploitation, which produces 
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economic value and enables the concretisation of tangible products capable of 
commercialisation.  The goal of an industrial firm involved in technical innovation is 
to generate products with practical and social utility: it draws resources from a wide 
variety of sources, but having obtained them, maintains control over them in order to 
facilitate their ‘exploitation’ as they are transformed into commercial products.  The 
creative talents, energy and resources of the firm are funnelled into specific 
developmental pathways, from which all other interests are excluded pending the 
birth of the tangible product or invention.  The technology only becomes accessible 
to external actors upon public disclosure during application for patent, or when 
products are released onto the commercial market.  The limitations that this narrow 
focus imposes on the volume of innovative research and development of products is 
not in issue because the goal of a firm is not maximisation of technical innovation for 
the industry or society as a whole, but sufficient innovation to support production of 
enough intellectual property and tangible goods to meet the objectives and sustain 
the viability of the firm.  Optimal and efficient production is not reliant upon 
unlimited access to resources, nor on the practice of public disclosure of its own 
resources for use by others. 
The second paradox is less obvious: that exclusivity facilitates openness through the 
dissemination of products on the commercial market.  In industry, the value of 
technical innovation is captured by property rights, which render intellectual and 
tangible products ‘alienable’ or ‘transferable’ - capable of dissemination –- through 
legal and commercial transactions.  This means that technical resources, comprising 
intellectual and tangible property, can therefore be accessed through private 
commercial and non-commercial transactions.   
The notion of private access to resources as ‘open’ appears at first to contradict the 
concept of public openness associated with circulation of commonly held resources 
to a public domain of users.  The concept of openness as both public and private, is 
only problematic, however, if public and private correspond to open and closed, and 
open and closed are construed as absolute states.  The divisible nature of property 
rights ensures that arrangements for the transfer of some part of the full package of 
legal rights can be devised as a means of ‘sharing’ of proprietary assets.  Legal 
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instruments such as contracts and licensing regimes can therefore be used to create 
private ‘modules’ of openness, tailored to an appropriate domain of actors and 
defining the nature and extent of the rights of access and use being conveyed.  The 
negotiation of such transactions is in effect participatory governance of resources as 
discussed in Chapter 3, with the effect that individual or cumulative networks of such 
arrangements can amount to significant volume of ‘knowledge transfer’ or 
‘technology transfer’ conducive to further innovation.   
Moreover, public and private modes of openness come together when private legal 
instruments are used to structure arrangements that create common property, or 
facilitate the sharing of resources.  Some of the collective strategies lumped under 
the heading of ‘commons approaches’ that attempt to achieve degrees of access to 
common pool resources, do not create common property resources at all, but 
negotiate collective legal arrangements for the use of private resources that remain 
essentially under proprietary control.  I discuss some of these in Chapter 7.    
In Chapter 6, I consider how these public and private concepts of openness are 
situated in the reality of modern scientific technology, and to what extent they might 
be employed in facilitative governance.  In Chapter 5, I purposely avoid mention of 
the relationship between science and technology, in order to focus on the features of 
technology and the essential processes of innovation and exploitation within a firm.  
In Chapter 6, I recognise that the construction of ‘open’ science and ‘exclusive’ 
technology as two discrete systems is an inaccurate depiction of the modern reality of 
scientific technology, adherence to which inhibits the facilitation discourse.  In the 
absence of more integrated conceptions of science and technology, I propose one of 
my own.  It forms a basis for consideration of integrated approaches to openness, 
access, and facilitative strategies for advancement of scientific technology: 
arrangements and structures that create optimal conditions for innovative use and 
exploitation of resources. 
My conception of ‘scientific technology’ is based on increasingly strong technical 
synergy between science and technology, and a weakening of the institutional and 
social architecture that defines open science.  The literature of life sciences 
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governance reflects concerns regarding the breakdown of open science indicated by 
institutional and practical changes that erode the culture of openness.  The 
breakdown is attributed largely to progressive privatisation, patent problems, and the 
subversion of the scientific ‘ethos’ in favour of commmercial incentives and the lure 
of social benefits such as stem cell technologies and health.  These changes, which 
are widely reported but impossible to quantify are, I suggest, symptoms of stress on 
what has always been an artificial distinction between open science and commercial  
technology.   
The sociology of science literature recognises the open science model as a social 
construct, institutionalised following the Scientific Revolution to promote the rapid 
growth of reliable knowledge through the use of empirical methods and the 
circulation of results in a (non-market) ethos of collaborative competition.  The 
social organisation of open science supports the production of scientific knowledge 
as a public good, thus creating an edifice of largely publicly funded science within 
the predominant market culture.  Although the institutional structure of open science 
demarcated it from the surrounding environment, the substantive relationship 
between science and technology was not as well defined.  Science and technology 
have always been to some extent interconnected, because their different orientations 
- toward understanding and utility - inspire and support one other.  Given this natural 
relationship, and modern research methods, it is not surprising that closer and more 
reciprocal connections between them are evident in many fields of study.  In medical 
research, science and technology are as two sides of a coin, the explanatory power of 
science practically inseparable from its potential for technical utilisation.  
Understanding and utility are not different questions, but facets of the same question.   
This interdisciplinarity in fields such as medicine has gradually infiltrated the 
institutional, social and funding structures of open science.  Public support for 
‘science’ extends easily to technical research objectives in which science plays an 
integral or instrumental role in resolving practical problems.  Academic scientists 
patent their discoveries on the back of the technical methods and processes that they 
invent to enable them to answer scientific questions.  Similarly, it is an easy step for 
private industrial firms to employ scientists to provide direct and simultaneous input 
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to technical innovation, rather than waiting for scientific or policy agendas to 
generate answers to the relevant questions in their own time.   
With the intensification of dynamics between science and technology, and reduction 
in the ‘pure’ scientific agenda, one cohesive organisation of ‘open science’ is 
increasingly untenable.  As the ramparts start to crack, some ‘pure’ academic science 
is still generated as per the open science model, but actors inside and outside – 
including funders, policymakers, scientists and private firms - are able to mingle and 
engage in new and different forms of collaboration with one another.  What emerges 
is a piebald landscape of public and private actors in many different types of 
organisation.  The backdrop of the market environment is more easily visible, while 
the fortress of pure science is of smaller scope and has a less prominent profile.   
My conception of modern ‘scientific technology’ is of a meta-system that 
encompasses both ‘open science’ and proprietary activity, in which actors, public and 
private, are all participants in the enterprise of production of public goods.  
Facilitation of the enterprise of scientific technology, then, must encompass the 
whole network of dynamic activity: innovative scientific and technical research, 
collective approaches for resolution of bottlenecks and other problems, and 
proprietary commercial activity. 
In this landscape, I identify the concepts that integrate modern scientific technology, 
and reconsider the role of public and private modes of ‘openness’.  Outside of the 
institution of publicly funded pure academic science, the term ‘openness’ is of 
limited use in describing the types of social organisation that might govern the 
dynamic utilisation of resources.  Between the extremes of open and closed there is 
potential for collaboration and integration in which research and industry, innovation 
and exploitation, public and private, enhance one another.  Neither public access to 
nor exclusive control over resources can be taken for granted, but controlled access 
and use negotiated on mutually beneficial terms can achieve objectives that neither 
the public domain nor the market may be capable of.  The ‘domain of exchange’ 
permits all means of conveyance for provision of access to, and definition of the 
terms of engagement of, resources.   Different vehicles with different functions can 
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be mixed and matched in this domain of exchange, which integrates the concepts of 
the scientific domain of knowledge and the technological domain of commerce.  
Collective strategies can negotiate terms of shared use of pooled resources held in 
common, or establish private property regimes, such as non-exclusive licensing.  An 
ordinary contract of purchase and sale can also be considered a ‘module’ of openness 
constituting ‘knowledge transfer’ or ‘technology transfer’ capable of use in ongoing 
innovation, according to the agreed terms of access.  These vehicles for 
communication and transmission of resources create different ‘spaces’ - ‘channels’ 
and ‘pools’ - for exchange, tailored to collective or individual needs or problems.  
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Chapter 4. OPEN SCIENCE  
4.1 Introduction    
In Chapter 4, I examine the origins of modern science and the functions of openness 
in the model of open science that emerged in Europe following the Scientific 
Revolution. The narrative of ‘open science’, as it emerged from the ‘Scientific 
Revolution’ in the 17th century, reveals that ideas of openness in the pursuit of 
innovation are closely tied to concepts of ‘publicness’.  The literature describes a 
system, autonomous from technology, in which the practice of communication or 
disclosure of research findings323 links science to the public domain.  Openness is 
thus equated with publication, which fulfils several purposes in the advancement of 
scientific understanding.  The result is the cumulation of a body of reliable 
knowledge, which constitutes common property and an enduring public resource.  
The whole enterprise of science is a public good, sustainable only through the 
application of external resources, including public funding of research and its 
infrastructures.  ‘Publicness’ is a feature of the behaviours, institutions, funding, 
outcomes and recipients of science.   
Openness in this public sense is not however an unqualified good, but is subject to 
various types of limitation.  The lessons of history indicate that the function of 
publication may be dependent upon particular economic, social and cultural 
conditions.  Public and private interests restrict the types of research outcomes that 
are appropriate for publication, and delimit the scope of the public domain in which 
they are circulated.     
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4.2 Objectives 
Science is the pursuit of reliable knowledge about the natural world.  In conventional 
narratives, it attempts to understand the properties and functions of natural 
phenomena, which results in the ‘discovery’ or revelation of previously unknown 
truths.  Despite connotations of passivity, ‘discovery’ as demonstrated in this chapter 
is a highly strategic pursuit that engages a specific methodology promoted through 
an organised social system that magnifies individual efforts through collective 
coordination.  The formal enterprise of science is intent upon the generation of 
knowledge as an end in itself,324 without regard for its immediate or potential 
utility,325 but without implication that its outcomes are not useful.  The ability of 
science to observe, explain and understand is a powerful tool for technology, as I 
discuss in the next two chapters.  
4.3 Origins  
Scientific revolution  
Western science is rooted in a system of ‘open science’ that crystallised during a 
period of massive change that swept European society from the Middle Ages326 into 
the Modern era.  Although records of observations and experiments date back to 
classical antiquity, the dawn of modern science is thought to correspond to the 
‘Scientific Revolution’ that took place between roughly 1550 and 1700,327 toward the 
end of a wider cultural Renaissance that swept Europe between the 14th and 17th 
centuries.  It was a time of great social, political and intellectual upheaval, as well as 
great achievement, as traditional ways of thinking about society and the natural 
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world were critiqued, challenged and reformed.  The discovery of the Americas by 
Christopher Columbus in 1492 marked the beginning of European exploration and 
colonisation of the American continents, leading to new global exchange in 
commerce and trade.328  In the following century, a Protestant revolt against the 
Catholic Church, followed by a Catholic counter-reformation, caused a split within 
Western Christianity.  Challenges to orthodox thinking stressed intellectual 
hierarchies, creating an environment conducive to the questioning of scientific as 
well as religious doctrine, which fed into the Enlightenment movement of the 18th 
century. 
Historians disagree as to whether this period should be referred to as a ‘revolution’, 
which implies a radical discontinuity between it and the rest of history,329 and other 
processes of transformation have been postulated,330 but there is little disagreement 
about the significance of the new knowledge and methods that it heralded.   
Immense changes occurred across mathematics, physics, astronomy, biology, 
medicine and chemistry in the 15th and 16th centuries.  The most symbolic of these 
was the displacement of the earth from the centre of the universe by astronomer 
Galileo Galilei (1564-1642).  Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) had produced the 
first detailed theory of the movement of the earth around the sun (instead of vice 
versa) which Galileo confirmed through mathematics, experiments and telescopic 
observation of the heavens, thus contradicting Aristotle and the scholastic worldview 
that had been inherited from the Middle Ages.  Kepler (1571-1630) advanced this 
work by showing that the earth and other planets move in ellipses around the sun, 
rather than circles.  A general theory about mechanism and matter in the mid-17th 
century culminated in the 1687 publication by Isaac Newton (1642-1727) of a 
unified mathematical treatment of motion on earth and in the heavens that 
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demonstrated that elliptical orbits were the result of gravitational forces.  Important 
advances were also made in medical anatomy.  Andreas Vesalius from Padua used 
empirical methods to break away from the anatomical reports of Galen (129 – c 200 
AD) that had dominated Western medical science for nearly two millennia.  In 1543 
he published his seminal work De humani corporis fabrica (‘the fabric of the human 
body’) containing descriptions and illustrations of human dissections contradicting 
aspects of Galen’s work based on monkeys and pigs.  In 1628, William Harvey 
published a description of the circulatory system pumped by the heart.    
New methods  
Changes in the investigatory methods and philosophy that accompanied these 
advances were as important as the discoveries themselves: they are so fundamental 
that earlier methods are considered by many to be pre-scientific.  Formalisation of 
the methodology of experimental science that lays the foundation for modern ‘open 
science’ is attributed to British philosopher Sir Francis Bacon who published his 
ideas in his Novum Organum Scientarium or ‘New Instrument of Science’ as part of 
a larger work, in 1620.  The ‘Baconian’ or ‘scientific’ method of acquiring natural 
knowledge is a system of inductive reasoning based on the testing of hypothetical 
explanations of observations, which contradicted the Aristotelian method of 
deductive reasoning, unsupported by empirical evidence, which was predominant at 
the time.  The Baconian reformulation of natural philosophy is significant because it 
proposes a method of scientific innovation, or as Bacon described it the ‘invention’ 
of knowledge.331  This he distinguished from the method of ‘cultivation’ of 
knowledge associated with the received philosophy of the time, making it very clear 
that his philosophy would not interfere with those that ‘supplied matter for 
disputations or ornaments for discourse – the professor’s lecture or the business of 
life’.  He proposed (for the benefit of both) that there be ‘two streams and two 
dispensations of knowledge’, and similarly ‘two tribes or kindreds of students in 
philosophy - tribes not hostile or alien to each other, but bound together by mutual 
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services’.  In addition to his description of an inductive method of experimental 
research, which in itself held potential for the increase of knowledge through the 
work of individual scientists, Bacon advocated a collective approach to the enterprise 
of science.  He articulated an expectation that data and methodology should be 
documented, archived and made available for scrutiny, reproduction and verification 
by other scientists.332  This is the practice of disclosure that I discuss below, which is 
at the heart of the modern system of ‘open science’.  Moreover, he construed the 
scientific process as a community endeavour that required financial and 
philosophical support from institutions such as governments and universities,333 
suggesting that knowledge should constitute a public good available to all, and an 
input into the generation of additional knowledge.334   
Institutions 
The new systematic methods gave rise in Europe to a community of experimental 
scientists envisioned as an autonomous ‘Republic of Science’ or body politic,335 
with its own intellectual and organisational structure for the pursuit or ‘production’ 
of reliable knowledge.  Sociological and economic accounts of open science 
describe a cohesive and efficient system in which the advancement of science is 
predicated upon freedom of enquiry and the communication or disclosure of 
acquired knowledge, supported by socially enforced norms of behaviour that 
generate trust in the scientific endeavour.     
Widespread support for this ‘Republic’ was reflected in institutions across Europe.  
The private provision of funds to support individual scientists within universities 
was crucial to the creation of scientific research institutions for the advancement of 
the new methods and philosophy of science.  When Cambridge University was 
established in the 1200s, for example, its ‘Masters’ taught existing courses of 
                                                
 
332 Dick HG (ed) (1955) Selected Writings of Francis Bacon, Modern Library, New York. 
333 Ibid. 
334 Maskus KE and Reichman JH (2004) ‘The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the 
Privatization of Global Public Goods’ 7:2 Journal of International Economic Law 279, 283. 
335 Polanyi M (1962) ‘The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory’, in Mirowski P and 
Sent E (eds) (2002) Science Bought and Sold: Essays in the Economics of Science, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago and London, 465. 
 105 
study, but conducted no original research; it was only through the funding by royal 
endowment of several Cambridge and Oxford professorships in the 16th and 17th 
centuries that the recipients began to combine teaching with research, and the 
university became a place where new knowledge was generated.336   
In contrast to the universities, national scientific academies and professional 
societies that grew up across Europe, some of which created or retained links to 
universities, had the sole objective of fostering scientific research.  They played a 
critical role in promoting interactions between individuals across institutions 
through the organisation of meetings and the publication of peer-reviewed work.  
One of the earliest of these was the Royal Society of London, established in 1660, 
having begun as the Oxford ‘experimental science club’ following the methods of 
Bacon in 1648.  Official scientific societies were also chartered by the state to 
provide technical advisory expertise,337 offering the societies direct government 
contacts, state sponsorship entailing financial support and recognition, and the 
freedom to manage their publications, membership and administration.  Today 
there are many more institutions, including universities, national laboratories, 
government agencies, and corporations that provide physical space and support for 
scientific research. 
Defence of purity  
The formalisation of the system of open science achieved three important objectives.  
First, it made an economic public good of science in general and scientific 
knowledge in particular.  The support of government and private patrons facilitated 
the freedom of enquiry and accumulation of knowledge as a common resource in the 
public domain.  Secondly, it created a social organisation capable of enhancing 
knowledge production, in which disclosure or ‘openness’ has specific central 
functions.  Thirdly, it protected the purity of empirical science from pseudo-scientific 
medieval practices, antithetical philosophies, and more recently from the utilitarian 
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objectives of technology.  In total, the social construct creates a bastion of science, 
defended from the effect of the surrounding social, economic and technical 
environments.  While the objective of creating this special regime is to support 
scientists and their new methods of enquiry in order to maximise the intensity of the 
production of knowledge within it, the notion of ‘purity’ that has become fixed in the 
culture of open science is arguably overstated, even for its original purposes.  As I 
discuss later, the modern strain on the open model of science is in part because the 
institutional distinction between science and technology is not an accurate reflection 
of the relationship between science and technology.   
Rejection of Secrecy 
Historically, the revelation of discoveries provided fundamental protection for the 
enterprise of science conducted within a predominant culture of secrecy.  Modern 
science is said to have coincided with a rejection of the culture of medieval 
secrecy338 that prevailed in many areas of social and economic life during the Middle 
Ages.  The technological know-how of the craft guilds as well as geographical 
discoveries, maps and trade routes were kept guarded and outside of the public 
domain.  Political and religious views mandated that ‘peculiar’ or ‘occult’ knowledge 
should be withheld from ‘the vulgar multitude’ lest it impart powers over material 
things.339  Knowledge so ‘special’ as to be withheld from the public would have 
included ‘nature’s secrets’340 pursued through the practice of alchemy, which was 
influential through the 17th century. 
Antithetical Philosophies  
The rejection of secrecy by the ‘new scientists’ within this culture does not signify 
the evil of secrecy per se, but underscores the need for scientists to be able to see and 
scrutinise each others methods and results, and so distinguish and reject unreliable 
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practices.  This openness was important, because new scientists were in effect 
converted from among medieval natural philosophers and alchemists, and the 
transition to the new practices was not immediate.  Although Western alchemy may 
now be recognised as a ‘protoscience’341 that contributed to the development of 
chemistry and medicine, unlike modern science it also included principles and 
practices related to mythology, religion and spirituality.  Alchemists of the ancient 
philosophical tradition laid claim to profound magical powers, such as the ability to 
turn base metals into gold and silver, and to create the elixir of life conferring youth 
and beauty.  Rocks were seen as growing in a quasi-biological sense, and chemical 
reactions were indicated in astrological relationships between planets.  Alchemists 
had little incentive to disclose their secrets, and their practices persisted for centuries 
in parallel with those of disclosure and dissemination that were adopted by the new 
scientists.342  
The formulation of ‘new science’ was also a defence against Aristotelian 
philosophies and humanist theories that preceded and surrounded it.  Just prior to the 
Scientific Revolution, during the early part of the European Renaissance343 (1300-
1450) there was a period of scientific regression in which a reaffirmation of the 
worldview of ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle coincided with a reverence of 
Classical traditions and a new Italian ideology of humanism.344  Neither Aristotle nor 
the humanist cultural and educational reforms were conducive to advances in science 
or the scientific method.  The philosophy of Aristotle, carried over from about 350 
BC, bore little resemblance to modern scientific methods.345  Although his 
conception of formal logic and study of natural phenomena contributed much to 
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modern science, the Aristotelian method of study in fields that we would today 
regard as sciences - physics, biology and other natural sciences – was largely 
qualitative rather than quantitative.346  He held that scientific truth could be reached 
by way of authoritative argument: if sufficiently intelligent men discussed a subject 
long enough, the truth would eventually be discovered.  His results were deduced 
from unsupported observation and reason rather than measurement or mathematics, 
and as a result his work in the physical sciences became obsolete with the application 
of mathematics in the 16th century.347  
New philosophies of science were also a contradiction of the cultural and educational 
reforms of the early Renaissance period.  Inspired by the humanist movement of 
Florence and Naples, these reforms challenged the medieval system of scholastic 
education based on practical, pre-professional and ‘scientific’ studies.348   Scholars, 
writers and politicians sought instead to advance civic life through education in the 
humanities: grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry and moral philosophy.349  Citizens - 
male and female - were equipped with the ability to speak and write persuasively in 
order to facilitate community engagement and instigate action.350  Nature was 
considered an animate spiritual creation that was not governed by laws or 
mathematics.  As a result, physics and astronomy stagnated and natural philosophy 
declined, as logic and deduction were subordinated to intuition and emotion.351  
Nevertheless, by the second half of the 15th century the economic and political 
conditions in Europe were improving, and Renaissance culture provided the tools for 
further social change.  Peace and the decline of famine and the plague resulted in 
economic prosperity, as Europe began to recover from population losses to a Black 
Death pandemic of a hundred years earlier.  The printing press that emerged about 
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this time was a significant catalyst for intellectual exchange and expansion of 
Renaissance culture.352  Invented by Johannes Gutenberg around 1440, it had a huge 
impact on European society and was a particular asset to science, technology and 
academia in general.  The increased output and decreased cost of books made 
information available to a much larger segment of the population, stimulating lay 
literacy and democratising learning.  Printed copy provided a superior basis for 
scholarship by preventing the corruption associated with hand copying and 
facilitating access to texts preserved in standardised form.  Easy dissemination 
promoted faster propagation of new ideas and more reliable progress in critical 
studies and science.  The ‘information revolution’ initiated by the printing press was 
on a par with the effect of the Internet today.353  
Patronage  
It is not clear how the open ethos of science first arose and then persisted within an 
antithetical culture, and although it is possible to appreciate the functions of openness 
in modern science without understanding its historical evolution, one theory raises 
points that are relevant to my thesis.  Paul David argues that spontaneous emergence 
of openness is improbable, and that the new attitude is attributable not to its 
institution ab initio by some external agency354 but to its practical functions in the 
social and institutional contexts in which the new scientists were working.355  His 
research suggests that the social norms of disclosure grew out of the feudal system of 
aristocratic patronage prevalent throughout medieval Europe, under which political 
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elites, kings, princes and nobles provided conspicuous support for the intellectual 
and creative talents of skilled individuals with whom they surrounded themselves.  
If the theory is tenable, the collective benefits of intellectual exchange were 
discovered in circumstances of patronage, as might be expected, but that the support 
extended to a range of talents apart from those of scientists (including philosophers 
and mathematicians, artists, poets and musicians, engineers and architects) and was 
motivated by interests wholly unrelated to the advancement of the ‘clients’ that were 
supported.  The services of such individuals were elicited not only to meet the 
mundane needs of the court, but to make a ‘public display of magnificence’,356 
through disclosure of their intellectual, creative and inventive skills and expertise, 
thus currying ostentation and prestige and enhancing the esteem of the patron.  New 
utilitarian advances were often kept secret, but the ‘ornamental’357 function reflected 
upon the power and authority of the court, and was instrumental in securing a crucial 
public and political image.  The publicisation of the ‘marvellous achievements’ of 
the savants met the need for self-aggrandisement of the patron and rewarded the 
client with reputational benefits and the security of employment and status in the 
court in what would have otherwise been precarious economic conditions.  
David’s account also gives a plausible description of the evolution of a peer review 
mechanism for the verification of credentials.358  It suggests that with the advances in 
mathematical methods during the 16th century it became difficult for the patrons to 
evaluate the claims and reputations of their clients, giving rise to opportunities for 
fraud and the risk of embarrassment of the patrons.  The task of screening individuals 
for sponsorship, including the new type of scientist, was therefore delegated to 
informal networks of correspondents which later devolved into institutionalised 
communities of fellow practitioners and experts.359   
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The patronage theory suggests that the practice of revelation of knowledge arose to 
perform a particular function in a particular set of socio-economic, political and 
cultural circumstances, and was sustainable through the provision of external 
support.  That the disclosure of achievements advanced science was peripheral to the 
goal of pleasing the patron, suggesting that the capacity of openness to enhance 
intellectual exchange, and so advance knowledge, may be independent of the nature 
of the immediate incentive for the disclosure.  Further, although ‘clients’ presumably 
competed with their colleagues for patronage and were engaged by the patron on the 
basis of their ability to generate astounding things, they were free within the confines 
and protection of the court to engage in their chosen pursuits.  These features have 
parallels in the functions of disclosure in the organisation of open science, which I 
discuss below.  A further observation is that although the benefits of patronage and 
openness within the courts extended to a range of ‘clients’ including artists and 
technical advisors, it was the enterprise of science, as distinct from art or technology, 
that culminated in the social construct of open science.  
Utilitarianism  
It is not until the ‘Republic’ of open science is established in the institutions of 
Europe that a clear demarcation occurs between ‘pure’ science and the utilitarian 
aims of technology and the economic incentives of the market.  The emphasis of 
science on understanding motivated by intellectual curiosity360 or satisfaction,361 for 
the production of knowledge as an end in itself362 is distinguished from the 
technological focus on utility.363  Scientists were encouraged to ‘ignore all 
considerations other than the advance of knowledge’,364 and to focus on the scientific 
significance of their work, to the exclusion of its potential uses or social 
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repercussions more generally.  Practical applications might at the outset of the work 
be unforeseeable, a point commonly illustrated by Einstein’s theory of relativity, 
which had no apparent utility until the first atomic bomb exploded 40 or 50 years 
later.365  The process of scientific ‘discovery’ as formalised in the system of open 
science sought to generate and validate previously unknown truths.  There is a wide 
literature, which I cannot examine here, that considers the philosophical bases for 
determinations of ‘truth’, by which new findings or theories are accepted into the 
corpus of reliable knowledge.366  Despite debate about whether it is possible to make 
a positive determination that results are ‘valid’ or true’,367 the characterisation of 
science as a quest for understanding is not heavily disputed.368  
One of the themes of my thesis is that this institutionalised distinction between open 
science and proprietary technology does not accurately reflect the technical 
relationship between science and technology, and confuses the dialogue about 
facilitation.  As I discuss in Chapter 6, the ‘pure’ pursuit of knowledge does not 
imply a lack of conversance between science and technology.  Freely chosen fields 
of scientific enquiry may be inspired by technical advances; there is little debate 
about the explanatory value of science for technology; and the connection between 
the two in the eye of the public has a direct effect on public confidence in the 
enterprise of science.  In that chapter, I suggest that not only does the intersection of 
science with utilitarian interests pursued through private means not undermine the 
value or purity of science, but it has positive benefits that are ignored to the 
detriment of science and society.  The model of science as a public institution 
promotes the unfortunate perception that it operates within an impermeable bubble, 
susceptible to violation by forces that prevail in the surrounding market environment.  
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Science for technology  
History suggests therefore that the institution of open science serves to enhance 
production of knowledge by protecting the new methods from dilution, absorption or 
abolition by competing practices, philosophies and cultural systems.  Modern 
scientists hold to the notion of purity as a means of repudiation369 of non-scientific 
criteria for the acceptability or value of their work, and to defend the autonomy of 
science against control by other institutions – economy, state or religion - that might 
limit or threaten its continuance as a valued social activity.370  In practice, however, 
this ‘sentiment’371 of purity may be too emphatic: it has been critiqued as being more 
rigid than is necessary or beneficial, given that science does not operate in a social 
vacuum, but impacts upon and interacts with other spheres of interest and value.  
Merton goes so far as to suggest that the ‘pure science’ tenet has helped to prepare its 
own epitaph.372  
The desire that drove Bacon to produce his new methodology was that it might 
unlock scientific learning, rather than isolate scientists and scientific knowledge from 
society.  His objective was not to protect science from technology, but to promote it 
for technology.  Bacon saw the ‘real and legitimate goal of the sciences’373 to be ‘the 
endowment of human life with new inventions and riches’,374 and he aspired to 
‘improve philosophy by bringing in industrious observations, grounded conclusions 
and profitable inventions and discoveries’.375  Bacon admonished his readers to 
‘consider what are the true ends of knowledge’,376 and to ‘seek it not either for 
pleasure of the mind, or for contention, or for superiority to others, or for profit, or 
fame, or power, or any of these inferior things, but for the benefit and use of life’,377 
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(italics added) and to ‘perfect and govern it in charity’.378  The change that he 
instigated was not a move away from the utility of technology, but away from the 
Aristotelian school of natural philosophy that had long dominated the curriculum of 
medieval universities.379  He accused the schools of having ‘usurped a kind of 
dictatorship over the sciences’,380 so that philosophy and intellectual sciences were 
‘fruitful of controversies, but barren of works’.381 It was not Aristotle per se that 
Bacon disliked, but the ‘unfruitfulness of the way, and the idleness of the 
speculations’382 in the method of learning.  Bacon desired a new productive type of 
knowledge and the methods that could be used to achieve the knowledge.383  ‘His 
recurrent theme was one of progress as the acquisition of useful and beneficial 
knowledge through organised research’.384   
4.4 Ethos  
Against this historical backdrop, I examine the functions of openness in the ‘modern’ 
organisation of open science as it came to be.  What Bacon envisioned as methods 
and practices for the rapid increase of knowledge and ultimately technological 
advance are implemented through a complex social system, in which disclosure of 
findings among scientists has not only an intellectual role, but specific functions in 
the reinforcement of the social organisation itself.  This system or ‘ethos’ comprises 
a communal enterprise of science based on exchange of resources, competition for 
recognition, reputational rather than economic incentives, and a moral commitment 
to the advance of knowledge.  It is a public system embodying a public conception of 
openness.  An understanding of the functions of disclosure in this system of science 
is fundamental to an analysis of change, and the promulgation of new strategies to 
facilitate ‘science for technology’ in different circumstances.  Before addressing the 
specific functions of disclosure, I look to the sociology of science for a functionalist 
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perspective on the social structure and placement of science as a complex system.   
Functionalist approach  
Sociologists of science in the Mertonian tradition385 have, since the mid-twentieth 
century, characterised the structure of science in similar ways, emphasising the 
freedom of enquiry, a public domain of knowledge and the growth of knowledge - 
norms that are shared with academe more generally.386  Although some consider the 
‘old’ sociology developed by Merton to have been superseded thirty years ago, his 
approach to science as a whole social structure, his framework of imperatives or 
‘norms’ of science, and his description of the rewards and incentives that motivate 
individual scientists continue to provide a significant part of the foundation for 
contemporary work in the sociology and economics of science.  Unlike more recent 
work in the sociology of knowledge, the functionalist approach of Merton and his 
followers does not seek to explain in sociological and philosophical terms how 
particular scientific beliefs are justified; nor does it focus on internal processes as to 
how and why scientists draw specific conclusions of fact from their enquiries about 
the natural world.  It emphasises instead the organic unity of the elements or organs 
of a social system, each of which have functions necessary to its survival.387   
I consider this perspective on science as an appropriate platform from which to think 
about the reflexive tools or models of governance to facilitate modern science.  The 
functionalist approach is positivist and teleological in orientation.  Science is 
construed positively as a social construct, with an objective reality that can be 
subjected to empirical methods of study in a ‘disinterested’ search for the social laws 
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that govern it.388  The teleological perspective explains phenomena on the basis of 
their purposes or outcomes rather than postulated causes; theories, for example, are 
seen as ‘networks of predictive generalisations’.389  Although it may not always be 
appropriate, the teleological model is consistent in its own terms, and given my 
purposive conceptualisation of governance for the delivery of public goods, it is 
preferable to the alternative causal approach.390   
Imperatives  
The structure of social behaviour in scientific communities as described by Merton 
turns on four sets of ‘institutional imperatives’ that together comprise an open ‘ethos’ 
for the advancement of science.  I refer to these norms of ‘universalism’, 
‘communism’, ‘disinterestedness’ and ‘organised scepticism’391 individually below, 
as they pertain to the specific functions of disclosure.  The ‘ethos’ of science for 
Merton, however, is not simply a list of behaviourial rules.  It is the whole complex 
of institutional norms and social values that are internalised by scientists, shaping 
their conscience and forming a binding moral consensus regarding the ‘scientific 
spirit’.392 
Merton derives his imperatives or ‘mores’ of science from the goal and the technical 
methods (which he calls ‘norms’) of science.  The goal of science he characterises as 
the ‘extension of certified knowledge’.393  The methods to achieve it are ‘adequate 
and reliable empirical evidence’ (a prerequisite for sustained true prediction) and 
‘logical consistency’ (a prerequisite for systematic and valid prediction).394  These 
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technical methods give rise to Merton’s definition of knowledge, which is 
‘empirically confirmed and logically consistent statements of regularities (which are 
in effect predictions)’.395  Merton considers the methods to be both technical and 
moral prescriptions - that they have a rationale in methodology but are also morally 
binding – and that as a whole structure they implement the final objective of science, 
which is knowledge.   
The system that Merton describes is not merely a set of research methods backed by 
public support, nor a social organisation that is capable of implementing the 
methods, but a community galvanised by a ‘moral consensus’ about its mission.  I 
flag this up for future reference because, through his use of a moral rhetoric to 
describe the imperatives and ethos of science, Merton elevates the methods and 
practices advocated by Bacon to values and ideals of science, which serves to root 
them more deeply in the psyche and the narratives of the community.  For the 
purpose of strengthening the received model of open science, this entrenchment of 
values is wholly advantageous.  For the purpose of developing new models of 
governance for a changing paradigm of science, however, it is problematic because 
morally entrenched ‘ideals’ are less susceptible than ‘methods’ or ‘practices’ to 
challenge and change.  To design integrated conceptions of science and technology 
and new ways of governing them requires re-examination of existing conceptual 
frameworks, including values, in order to establish or reaffirm the foundations that 
will support them.  To hark back to the early formulation of empirical science, the 
vision that inspired Bacon would not permit any endorsement of slavish adherence to 
‘ideals and values’ that do not advance the production of knowledge, nor (I submit) 
to systems that stimulate knowledge production while choking off its technological 
uptake.   
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A model of freedom  
So highly regarded are the principles governing the community of scientists, that 
more than one commentator396 has generalised them (amidst political and 
philosophical debate) to society as a whole, using the system of science as a simple 
model that epitomises a society striving for unlimited human and social 
improvement.397  These pursuits and their benefits have been described as the ‘noble 
enterprise’398 of a free society bent on exploring every kind of self-improvement.  
Certain features indispensable to this model are said to characterise the ‘proper 
cultivation of science’, and are present in society as it pursues other kinds of truth.  
These are: continuity with the past, unlimited improvement in the future, and 
individual freedom in the present.   First, the freedom that that the model affirms is 
rooted in tradition, and rejects the idea that each generation might be self-
determining. The objective of freedom however is to cultivate radical progress 
through adherence to an ideal of unlimited self-improvement that is not confined to 
the pursuit of material or economic goals.  Self-improvement is unlimited, though 
freedom is not.  Freedom is not unlimited, but it is a ‘positive’ freedom, in which 
individuals are able to voluntarily pursue initiatives of their choice.  The pursuit of 
progress happens through the actions of individuals, aimed at disparate problems, 
and is not based on a concept of ‘popular will’ or the direction of endeavour toward a 
common social purpose.  The ‘public interest’ in this society, it is said, can only be 
known in a fragmentary way, through the outcomes of these individual initiatives.  A 
society defined by such features will arguably appear ‘conservative and fragmented, 
adrift, irresponsible, selfish, and apparently chaotic’,399 as the intellectual and moral 
endeavours to which society is dedicated expand in new directions and become ever 
more specialised.  These characteristics are likely to become more apparent as time 
goes on, because diversification of initiatives must occur as society progresses.400   
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Whatever truth there may be in this conception of scientific and social progress, a 
glaring flaw is that it fails to give equal regard to the private enterprise of the 
marketplace.  The main protagonist401 of the model states expressly that its principle 
of freedom is a higher principle of freedom, a principle that is reduced to the 
mechanism of the market when applied to the production and distribution of material 
goods.402  The model is therefore not only an extreme example of the elevation of the 
principles governing science, but demonstrates the way in which (over)emphasis on 
certain values or ideals can have a detrimental impact on others.  In this case, 
enthusiasm for the attributes of open science concretises the distinction between 
science and technology, and reinforces pejorative attitudes toward market-based 
enterprise.  
4.5 Disclosure  
Central to the ethos of science is the communication, publication or ‘disclosure’ of 
scientific findings, which gives rise to the ‘public’ conception of openness.  Like 
other behavioural norms,403 disclosure furthers the objective of science, which is 
knowledge.404  It has specific functions that are key to both the intellectual and 
organisational structure of science, each of which facilitates and enforces the public 
nature of science.  Disclosure involves the publication of research findings, which 
links the system of science with the public domain.  In its intellectual role, disclosure 
facilitates peer review and enables the rapid expansion of reliable knowledge.  In its 
institutional capacity, it facilitates individual efforts through the public recognition of 
discoveries that motivates and rewards individual scientists and facilitates a 
competitive collaboration in the community of scientists that maximises interaction 
with resources.  The result is a cumulative archive of reliable knowledge that 
constitutes a common resource accessible to all through the public domain.  This 
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public domain of knowledge is not however without practical limitations, which I 
address in a separate section.  
Intellectual functions 
Peer Review, Verification, Validation  
The first intellectual function of disclosure in the ‘invention of knowledge’ is to 
permit the scrutiny and verification of the results of scientific research by the 
colleagues or peers within the scientific community.  The innovation of scientific 
research is the generation of ‘original knowledge’, and ‘originality’ is of supreme 
value because it is ‘through originality, in greater or smaller increments, that 
knowledge advances’.405  The release of new contributions to a scientific peer group 
enables others to critique, replicate and test them in order to ensure that they are both 
genuine (that it is possible to obtain the results as purported) and original (that they 
are not already a part of the existing body of knowledge).  They can be rapidly 
discarded if unreliable, or validated and combined with other intellectual elements or 
existing bodies of reliable knowledge. 
The process corresponds to what Merton called organised scepticism,406 which 
emphasises the need for continual critical scrutiny of scientific contributions to the 
common stock of knowledge407 by the community of colleagues.  Polanyi suggests 
that this process is more than the verification of facts, and involves scientific 
interpretation based on fine value judgments that sift and reward, at various levels of 
merit, the contributions to science.  In his view, science is a system of facts, 
determined by scientific interpretation and accepted by ‘scientific opinion,408 in 
which science is what it is by reason of the constant elimination and acceptance of 
contributions to science under the ultimate authority of scientific opinion.  Such 
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opinion is essentially rooted in tradition, but it is a tradition that upholds 
originality.409  
Ongoing work in the sociology of science that arose in the 1970s emphasises the 
process by which scientists draw conclusions or determinations of ‘fact’ from their 
enquiries.  The ‘sociology of knowledge’ is wrapped up with philosophical questions 
about the study of nature and reality and how scientists engage with them.  The work 
differs from earlier approaches in that it moves beyond the structure of the scientific 
community as a whole and tries to explain in sociological terms how particular 
scientific beliefs are generated.  Some of this work emphasises the influences upon 
the internal process by which individual or groups of scientists ‘manufacture facts’410 
or establish scientific ‘truth’.  Other projects focus on the resolution of disputes 
within the wider community over the status of published scientific results.  My 
analysis is concerned largely with the use of published and validated knowledge, and 
not with the internal processes of endorsement by which scientific peers finally 
render scientific output ‘immune to challenge’,411 or how external scientific disputes 
over such things are resolved.  
Increase in Rate and Corpus of Knowledge  
In addition to assurance of reliability, disclosure enhances the potential for the 
generation of new knowledge, or scientific innovation, as well as the rate of its 
production.  Exchange of knowledge between scientist may increase the rate of 
production of more knowledge by reducing the duplication of scientific efforts within 
the community, and increasing the scope or domain for complementarities within the 
common pool of knowledge.412  Complementary connections are increased because 
knowledge is, in economic terms, ‘non-rivalrous’: it can be accessed by any number 
of users simultaneously and is never fully consumed.  The more scientists who can 
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access intellectual resources, the greater the likelihood of ‘fruitful conjunctions’, 
beneficial ‘spill-overs’ among distinct research programs413 and exponential rates of 
growth.  Equal access to knowledge in the public domain is not a formula for the 
equitable distribution of a static or finite resource.  Rather it maximises the scope for 
engagement with and manipulation of intellectual resources, which holds the 
potential for the creative connections or reconfigurations that are essential to 
innovation.  Wide sharing of resources puts knowledge into the hands of those who 
can put it to new uses requiring expertise, imagination and material facilities that are 
not possessed by the original discoverers and inventors.414  Advocates of open 
science and proponents of other forms of research ‘commons’ place particular 
emphasis on the necessity of this sort of access to, and interaction with, various types 
of resources as the key to the promotion of innovation.  Accessibility that permits the 
‘use and reuse’ of resources is a notion that is pivotal to innovation in many fields of 
study, and applies equally to technological innovation, which I address in the next 
chapter.   
Institutional functions 
Still within the ‘traditional’ narrative of open science, these intellectual functions of 
disclosure for the production of knowledge are augmented by its institutional roles, 
which reinforce the social organisation of science.  The distinction between these two 
sets of functions is important because institutional changes can impact on the 
intellectual functions and restrict the capacity of science to generate new knowledge.  
Economists hold that in the ‘institutional complex of modern science’,415 social 
norms increase economic efficiency as well as social utility.  The rationale relies on 
the efficacy of open inquiry and full disclosure as the basis for the cooperative, 
cumulative generation of predictably reliable additions to the stock of knowledge.416  
The features of openness that enhance the intellectual process - rapid validation of 
                                                
 
413 David P (2003) The Economic Logic of ‘Open Science’ and the Balance between Private Property Rights and the 
Public Domain in Scientific Data and Information: A Primer, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 
Discussion Paper No. 02-30, 4. 
414 Ibid. 
415 Ibid, 3. 
416 Ibid.  
 123 
findings, reduction in duplication of efforts and the availability of knowledge to new 
users - render the organisation of open science an efficient means of pursuing 
reliable knowledge.  The organisational functions of openness are played out through 
the recognition of individual achievements of scientists, as well as the facilitation of 
a collaborative and competitive community. 
Individual Efforts  
Disclosure is not extraneous to but an integral part of the social system that induces 
scientific effort.  Merton argued that science is misunderstood as the product of 
individual geniuses who break free from conventions and norms, and held that the 
norms of science encourage productivity, critical thinking, and the pursuit of 
continually improved understanding.  Paul David similarly asserts that openness is a 
discipline, rather than an ideology or ethical precept.417   
incentives and rewards. 
In the economic logic of open science, the conduct of science is dependent upon a 
specific nonmarket system of incentives and rewards for individual scientific effort.  
These rewards are based on peer recognition of claims to original work.418  The 
rewards of enquiry are mainly reputational: the recognition of originality and validity 
of individual work, the esteem of one’s peers, eponymous awards and other prizes.  
Sociological and economic analysis demonstrates that this system of rewards can act 
as an incentive for disclosure of scientific work.  It is agreed that there is ‘incentive 
compatibility’ between the norm of disclosure and the existence of ‘a collegiate 
reputation-based reward system grounded upon validated claims to priority in 
discovery or invention.’419  In the traditional construct of science, peer recognition 
based on originality and priority is the main incentive for individual contributions to 
the public body of scientific knowledge.  
 
                                                
 





A scientific work is only recognised as original if there has been no prior claim to 
it.420  This concept of originality in science is akin to the ‘novelty’ of patent law, 
which focuses on the relationship between the invention and the state of the art, as 
opposed to the ‘originality’ of copyright, which is concerned with authorship.421  
Recognition of original work as a reliable contribution to science also acknowledges 
its claim to priority, and is thus a means of allocation of individual credit for it, and 
accrual of reputational and career benefits to the responsible scientist.  
The ‘abiding emphasis’422 of science on originality and priority creates a strong 
incentive for scientists to exert claims and achieve collegiate esteem; and ambition in 
this regard is considered a crucial motivator rather than an expression of egotism or 
self-aggrandisement.  Further, the claimant need not be deterred by the process of 
peer review, for the norm of disclosure legitimates the practice of scepticism by 
creating an expectation that all claims will be so scrutinised, thus avoiding insult to 
the claimant.  In summary, the institutions of science press scientists to produce and 
publish original contributions to the common stock of knowledge, and reward them 
with recognition, acclaim, prizes and employment opportunity.  
Communal Collaboration  
facilitation of innovation. spontaneous coordination. 
                                                
 
420 The emphasis on priority can lead to unfortunate circumstances in which, for example, one scientist 
decides to delay publication until the completion of a comprehensive work, while another reveals 
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In addition to promoting individual efforts, disclosure fosters the community of 
science by facilitating a collaborative social infrastructure characterised by the 
sharing of information and property.  How disclosure facilitates collaboration in the 
‘Republic’ has been described as the ‘spontaneous coordination of individual 
initiatives’ of scientists,423 based on the analogy of individuals working on different 
parts of a large jigsaw puzzle.  Having access to all pieces of the puzzle, each 
chooses to work on a particular patch of it, the key being that each individual is able 
to work in sight of what others are doing.  This enables continual adjustments to 
individual work in accordance with developments occurring in other areas of the 
‘puzzle’,424 thus progressing efficiently toward the resolution of an emerging picture. 
personal disinterestedness. 
The theory of ‘spontaneous coordination’ emphasises the cooperative over the 
individual character of science.  It holds that the accumulation of scientific 
knowledge is a fundamentally social process that should not be inhibited by matters 
that are personal to individual participants.  The Mertonian norm of disinterestedness 
implies that the immediate personal interests of the researcher should not be allowed 
to impede or diminish the availability and reliability of new knowledge, regardless of 
the nature and import of the discovery, and so favours the handling of research 
agendas and findings by disinterested agents.  It is the conduct of scientific enquiry 
with ‘disinterestedness’ or objectivity that protects against bias and error.  Further, 
the norm of universalism emphasises that personal attributes of individuals should 
not prevent entry into scientific work and discourse, which is open to all persons of 
competence.425  
popular support. 
Finally, proponents of open science acknowledge that its perpetuation requires 
societal support.  The complete independence of scientists and the publicity of their 
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results, which jointly assure the coordination of scientific efforts throughout the 
world, can only be secured by popular respect for the authority of scientific opinion.  
Such respect can only be elicited by a strong and united opinion of members of the 
scientific community, imposing the intrinsic value of scientific progress on society at 
large.426 
Competitive Collaboration  
The enterprise of open science understood in this way is therefore characterised by 
both individual and communal efforts, through competition and collaboration.427  In 
the jigsaw puzzle illustration, the ‘mutual adjustments’ involved in the coordination 
of individual efforts have the potential for rivalries and oppositional responses428 due 
to the competition for recognition.  As recognition rewards originality and priority 
rather than diligence, it encourages rivalrous behaviour between individuals and 
research units in the race to establish priority.  In the traditional construct, scientists 
want to be the first to announce original discoveries and are concerned about being 
anticipated in this by another scientist.429 The evaluation and certification of 
knowledge is thus the result of competition or struggle,430 described in sociological 
terms as ‘competitive cooperation’,431 by which the products of competition become 
communal property, and esteem accrues to the producer.  The disadvantage of the 
system is that the traditional reputational incentives and rewards do not always deter 
scientists from practices of secrecy or failure to disclose, which have the potential to 
undermine the process.  Economists however continue to regard open science as 
uniquely well suited to the goal of maximising reliable knowledge, while 
acknowledging that uncooperative or deviant behaviours introduce a small amount of 
inefficiency into the system.432  
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The community of science is thus an association of independent initiatives, combined 
towards an indeterminate achievement, characterised by voluntariness of 
participation, freedom of choice as to subject matter and working methods, and 
access to materials and to other investigators.  Scientists, acting freely to choose and 
pursue problems on the basis of their own personal judgment, are in fact cooperating 
as members of a closely knit organisation.433  The system is disciplined and 
motivated by serving a traditional authority – the opinion of scientific peers - but this 
authority is dynamic; its continued existence depends on its constant self-renewal 
through the cultivation of originality of its followers.434   
4.6 Common resource  
Cumulative archive 
Further, disclosure facilitates the cumulative progress of science by creating in the 
public domain a public archive of knowledge or ‘intellectual commons’ that is 
accessible for future as well as immediate use.  In principle, openness makes 
resources available for an indefinite period of time.  The benefits of the foundation of 
prior work have long been understood.  In a twelfth century debate as to whether the 
‘moderns’ could since the Classical period, Bernard of Chartres is said to have 
affirmed that: 
…‘we can indeed see further because we are like dwarfs perched on the shoulders of 
giants, and thus we are able to see more and farther than the latter.  And this is not at 
all because of the acuteness of our sight or the stature of our body, but because we 
are carried aloft and elevated by the magnitude of the giants.’435 
Common property  
A distinctive feature of the ‘public’ concept of openness associated with open 
science is that it creates a commonly held resource, which in the language of the 
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commons strategies that I discuss in Chapter 7, is a ‘common’ or ‘common pool 
resource’.  Communication of important findings is the foundation of the norm of 
communism436 or communalism,437 the idea that scientific knowledge is ultimately a 
shared resource.438  The ideal of communalism requires individual relinquishment of 
claims to property, for the benefit of the community.  In the open model of science, 
publication establishes a work as the equitable property of the scientist, enabling 
others to use, cite and commend it to the scientific community.439  The findings of 
science are ‘assigned’ to the community, and as such they form a common heritage, 
in which the equity of the individual producer is severely limited.440  In the 
‘competitive cooperation’441 of the race for priority, the products of science are 
‘communised’, and the discoverer never takes exclusive possession of, or any special 
rights of use and disposition442 in, the outcomes of the work.  Scientists’ claims to 
intellectual ‘property’ in their discoveries are limited to recognition and esteem 
‘roughly commensurate with the significance of the increments brought to the 
common fund of knowledge’.443  The cumulative result is a ‘common stock of 
reliable knowledge’ or an intellectual ‘commons’, in which knowledge is augmented 
rather than diminished through use by others.  Unlike the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’,444 which postulates that a natural resource may be depleted through 
communal use, the intellectual commons creates a bigger more fertile field for 
science, not by scientific altruism, but through appropriate institutional 
arrangements.445  This treatment of science as property held in common is part of the 
social construct of the open model of science as a public good.  In the Mertonian 
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ethos, property rights are ‘whittled down to the bare minimum’ not by the law, but by 
‘the rationale of the scientific ethic’.446  
Copyright 
Although exclusive property rights in scientific results may be contrary to the ethos 
of science, they are not always contrary to law.  Copyright accrues automatically in 
certain literary works, including scientific publications, and in certain circumstances, 
patent law permits the grant of exclusive rights in relation to scientific discoveries. 
Intellectual property is not recognised in ideas or information per se, but original 
literary works, recorded in written or other material form,447 are eligible for 
copyright protection.  Copyright vests automatically in the author of scientific 
results, published or unpublished, giving the holder exclusive rights: to reproduce, 
distribute and rent or lend the work, communicate it to the public, adapt it, and 
authorise others to carry out these activities.  These rights do not prevent publication 
of the work, or access by others to its content.  On the contrary, copyright should act 
as an incentive for the author to release the published work into the public domain, 
thus making the data and information that it conveys available for engagement by the 
scientific community.    
Patent 
The law does not, in principle, grant patent rights to research outcomes defined as 
‘discovery’ of natural phenomena rather than invention.  In principle, they are the 
common heritage of mankind that should not be the subject of private property 
rights.  The finding of a substance freely occurring in nature is therefore, in principle, 
a discovery, and the substance identified in situ unpatentable.  The legal distinction is 
however increasingly difficult to sustain, as the acts of discovery and invention may 
each involve a considerable amount of time, effort, skill and labour.  With the 
advance of technology, therefore, the scope of patentability has been expanded to 
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include discoveries that occur in close conjunction with patentable inventions, such 
as bodily substances that have been isolated through a novel process.  The distinction 
has been minimised further, as demonstrated in the Relaxin448 case, in which the 
European Patent Office found in favour of patentability even though the isolation 
process was conventional and the structure of the substance identical to that of the 
natural element, on grounds of the utility of the product and the novelty associated 
with its isolation, which made it available to the public for the first time.   
The result is that scientists who commonly develop techniques to facilitate their 
research may be able in law to patent virtually the whole of their work, despite the 
fact that such practice diverges from the traditional incentives and ethos of science.  
Patent law does not discriminate as to the identity of the applicant.  These 
developments facilitate increased patenting practices by academic scientists and 
private researchers alike, leading to recent reports of ‘patent congestion’ and 
consternation in the life sciences and elsewhere.  Motivations and influences in 
relation to scientific patent policies and practices have long been source of debate: 
Merton suggested that some scientists patent defensively, in response to increased 
patenting by the private sector, taking advantage of the disclosure requirement of the 
patent process in order to keep their discoveries in the public domain, rather than to 
control exploitation.  This assertion is questionable, given that publication might be 
used to fulfill the same function without the creation of property rights.  This flags up 
however that different patenting policies may be adopted on the basis of different 
understandings of the role of patents.  I discuss the place of patents in technological 
enterprise and some of the problems associated with them in the context of modern 
research in next two chapters.  
Tangible Property  
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The focus of the narrative of open science is the pursuit of knowledge, the sharing of 
intellectual resources and the creation of a knowledge commons.  To the extent that 
property rights attach to the outcomes of research, they are intellectual property 
rights: copyright and rights of patent, which in law comprise ‘incorporeal personal 
property’.  Tangible goods, or ‘corporeal personal property’, in the open science 
model, have the role of tools and materials that are used or consumed in the conduct 
of basic research.  Such materials are not the goal of the enterprise: the resource or 
product that is to be generated, conserved or produced.  In economic terms, they 
constitute a cost of the conduct of research: they are significant for the ‘transaction 
cost’ that they represent for the development and transfer of knowledge.  In many 
fields of science such materials will be inexpensive and ubiquitous and their 
exchange not in issue.  In other fields, such as the life sciences, materials may be 
created for a specific research project, and replicability and validation of the work 
will require samples of the original material.  Some scientific journals now recognise 
this, and make publication conditional on the commitment of the author to supply 
samples of specialised materials to any who request them.  In practice, fulfilment of 
the requirement may be problematic: the material may have been fully consumed, 
supply might be insufficient to meet claimant demand, or it might impose an onerous 
or prohibitive cost to research.  The transportation and handling of sensitive living 
biomaterials creates further practical difficulties.   
Outside of ‘pure science’, in fields such as stem cell technology, the sharing of 
resources that constitute both research materials and basic materials for product 
manufacture can be even more problematic.  The situation is exacerbated when the 
materials in question, namely human stem cells, are highly specialised and very 
expensive to generate.  In this situation, the sharing of a genetically unique line of 
stem cells among researchers, under the auspices of open science, has more costly 
implications for the private biopharmaceutical company - who would like to obtain 
exclusive control over that particular cell line and place it at the centre of a 
commercial programme for therapeutic development - than it does for the publicly 
funded scientist who generates the cell line in the course of research.  This is the 
scenario encountered in the banking of stem cell lines with the UK Stem Cell Bank. 
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It is not science in the model of open science, but a conjunction of science and 
technology, which I refer to as ‘scientific technology’.  I set out my ideas about 
scientific technology in Chapter 6, after looking for concepts of openness in the 
process of technological innovation from the perspective of an industrial firm.  
4.7 Public domain  
Underlying my previous discussion of the functions of disclosure and the 
development of a knowledge commons is the ‘public domain’,449 which might be 
likened to a sort of space, in which resides a vast collection of resources that are 
unlimited as to accessibility.  In reality, the ‘public domain’ of knowledge is not 
defined in any geographical sense, but by the content that is placed in it, the means of 
publication, and the capacity of recipients to receive or access it.  The scope and 
content of the public domain is shaped by decisions of policymakers and those who 
create and deposit resources, as well as potential users.    
Content 
The content of the public domain is determined in part by the type of material that 
should be subject to peer review.  In principle, materials to be disclosed are those 
necessary to permit scrutiny and replication and verification of originality.  The 
literature however refers to release of ‘original knowledge’, ‘findings’, ‘important 
findings’ and ‘results’, without further specification.  If ‘original knowledge’ means 
broadly anything new that the methods of science have generated, as I think it does, 
then all datasets and information should be released for potential scrutiny and use by 
others.  Despite the practical issues associated with an inclusive approach, such as 
long term storage and management of vast amounts of data in the digital domain,    
this has to be the correct position.  All original data and information are potentially 
revealing, and contribute to the pool of intellectual resources available for use in 
ongoing research.  Raw datasets, together with any information and methodologies 
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associated with their production, are original material that – even if not immediately 
useful to the producer - may constitute a rich vein to be mined in the unforeseeable 
future.  If anything they are more useful, as a platform for ongoing research, than 
results that provide a more interpretive analyses of the data.  The release of negative 
as well as positive results is also important in that it prevents bias in a given subject 
area, particularly in the health field, where failure to disclose negative outcomes can 
pose a risk to public safety as well as future research.  Clearly some degree of 
discretion must be involved, but the fact that we are capable of generating huge 
volumes of reliable data should not in principle prevent attempts to make it 
accessible for use and reuse. 
The content of the public domain is not however unlimited, but is shaped by 
restrictions upon the release of certain findings, or categories of findings, on grounds 
of public interest.  These grounds include the protection of personal data, national 
security and public safety,450 each of which might form a field of separate study 
outside of the scope of my thesis.   
Publication  
Disclosure of scientific results for purposes of peer review is generally associated 
with their ‘publication’ through scientific journals, which connotes dissemination of 
material to all the corners of the earth, and unlimited access by every inhabitant.  In 
reality, the scope of the public domain is influenced by the medium of publication: 
its geographical reach, language, the size and nature of its readership and price of 
subscription, the timeframe for publication and allocation of intellectual property 
rights.  In the early institutions of science, academies and societies published their 
proceedings and the scientific works of their members, but many official journals 
published only infrequently, and it could take a scientific paper up to several years 
from the date of submission for review to reach publication.  Independent periodicals 
aroused interest in science in a more general public audience by publishing a variety 
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of reviews, abstracts, translations of foreign texts and reprinted materials, but most of 
these were published in the local language, which limited the spread of readership 
within continental Europe.   
Modern subscription-based journals cover production costs by imposing a fee on 
readers, and taking some interest in the copyright, an arrangement that restricts 
access to the journal to those who can pay, and limits the ability of the author to 
disseminate the work independently.  Moves to overcome these restrictions through 
‘open access’ publishing arrangements are however becoming more prevalent.  
Under ‘green’ terms of open access,451  journal publishers permit authors (backed by 
research funders who make funding conditional upon the arrangement) to publish 
peer-reviewed papers in open access online repositories, generally some months after 
the journal has issued,452 by which time the publisher has sold enough access to the 
paper to make a profit.  Researchers can also post pre-publication versions of their 
papers in institutional repositories. 453  
The ‘gold’ alternative is open access from the start.  It requires the author to pay in 
advance for publishing services, in order that the readers can obtain access for free.  
This is a dramatic change that shifts the costs of publishing to the scientists and 
research institutions, and alters incentives for publishers.454  It has nevertheless been 
recently embraced by the UK government, which announced in July of 2012 that it 
would require much of the national publicly-funded research to be published on an 
open access basis from April 2013.455  The European Commission has made a similar 
proposal, to open up €80 billion worth of work supported by its Horizon 2020 
research programme that will run in the EU from 2014 to 2020.456  It is urging its 
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Member states to do likewise, and hopes that 60% of all European publicly funded 
research articles will be open access by 2016.457 
Recipients 
Finally, the constitution of a public domain of knowledge as a useful resource 
depends in part upon the capacities of potential users to access it.  The accessibility 
of even ‘open access’ publications may require, for example, access to the use of 
Internet and other infrastructural resources.  The advance of science through the use 
of public knowledge is further dependent upon the skills and expertise of individuals 
to engage and manipulate it. 
4.8 Conclusions  
From this examination of the historic literature and traditional narratives I am able to 
make some observations about the nature of openness as it relates to science.  
1. My first main conclusion is that, in the philosophy of open science, the 
production of knowledge is not hostile to utility or technological enterprise.  The 
formalisation of empirical methods of scientific research was a response to a stagnant 
intellectual environment, during a period in history in which the received wisdom of 
natural philosophy was being taught or transmitted, but little new knowledge about 
the natural world was being generated.  The significance of the ‘scientific method’ 
advocated by Sir Francis Bacon was that it was to stimulate the ‘invention’ of 
knowledge through organised research.  He proposed an innovative process - a 
productive process focused on the advance of knowledge – but the production of 
knowledge was never envisioned as an end in itself.  Rather it was to be ‘for the 
benefit and use of life’, as a means to all sorts of discoveries and inventions that 
would enhance society.  The collective scrutiny of the work of the new scientists was 
to ensure the purity of the methods and the reliability of the product against the  
backdrop of an antithetical intellectual culture rather than a hostile economic 
environment.  Bacon recommends that the experimental sciences be sustained 




through external financial support, but does not anticipate the process by which 
technological advances would be generated from scientific discoveries, nor what the 
potential impact of a competitive economic market might be on the publicly 
supported community endeavour that he proposes. 
2. My second main conclusion is that the system of open science that emerged 
in 17th century Europe is a social construct, with three significant implications.  First, 
public support for the treatment of science as a public good underscores the value 
that society places on freedom of enquiry and knowledge, rather than any 
determinative assessment that it is a pure public good.  That the system of production 
of knowledge receives external financial support ensures that it is largely 
independent of the forces of a competitive economic market. 
Secondly, the construct of open science institutionalises the distinction between the 
public endeavour of science and the private enterprise of technology.  In the 
narrative of open science, the scientific ethos that perpetuates the generation of 
knowledge is separate from and incompatible with the exclusive, market-based 
private property regimes that are conducive to technology.  I address this in detail in 
other chapters.  Even in the traditional model of pure open science, however, there 
are inklings, primarily in its relation to the law of intellectual property and the use of 
materials, that the synergy between science and technology transcends the public and 
private distinction.  
Thirdly, the construct of open science creates a common property regime.  The 
archive of knowledge in the public domain, treated as the common property of 
mankind is, to use the language of the commons referred to in Chapter 7, a ‘common 
pool resource’ or ‘common’, ‘nested’ or situated within the predominant culture of 
the market.  The public type of openness that is reflected in the ‘uncontrolled’ 
common and the ‘unlimited’ public domain of accessible knowledge is one extreme 
in a spectrum of possible vehicles or approaches for the collective governance of 
resources.  In Chapters 5 and 6 I contrast this with the other extreme of exclusive 
rights or proprietary control, and in Chapter 7 I discuss governance strategies with 
diverse objectives that attempt to integrate the two through innovative arrangements 
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that attempt to control a common resource or limit exclusive rights in private 
property.  Here, I simply emphasise that the system of open science, although more 
extensive than most ‘strategies’ and institutionalised in western society, is essentially 
a social contrivance specifically designed to enhance the growth of knowledge 
resources.  
3. My third conclusion is that even the public conception of openness is not 
absolute.  Public interests and other practical limitations impose restrictions on the 
type of content that is released into the public domain, and the scope and 
accessibility of the public domain is limited by the means of publication and its 
recipients.  In public science therefore, as in private industry, publication is neither 
unstructured nor unlimited.  The disclosure, accessibility and innovative use of 
resources are the result of decisions that are influenced by legal, economic and social 
structures.     
4. My final conclusion is that the function of disclosure is embedded in a 
system.  The specific intellectual and organisational functions of disclosure are an 
integral part of the cohesive structure of open science, which is itself influenced by a 
set of social, economic and political circumstances at a particular time in history.  
The patronage theory of ostentatious revelation is another example of support for the 
act of disclosure through a social structure that depended upon individual incentives 
and rewards within a particular economic and social culture, not for the increase of 
knowledge, but to advance the reputation of the patron.   
In open science, disclosure is supported by social norms that reinforce the whole 
organisation or ‘ethos’, in which disclosure is not an optional act of altruism but a 
professional expectation of exchange within the community of scientists.  The norms 
are construed also as moral imperatives, which galvanises the community in its 
mission and entrenches its commitment to share intellectual innovations and 
denounce market incentives in the spirit of science.  This strengthens the system but 
makes it resistant to the re-examination of its deeply held beliefs in the face of 
changing circumstances.    
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The narrative suggests that the continuity of science requires not only the active 
participation of capable persons, but also certain cultural conditions, and implies that 
changes to its institutional structure might curtail, modify or prevent458 innovation in 
science.  Although we may attempt therefore to extract the meaning of openness 
from the open science model as it was articulated and institutionalised in the 17th 
century, we cannot expect that by invoking open methods in modern governance we 
will recreate the unique cultural ethos, institutional infrastructures or rapid 
innovation that characterised the original ‘Republic of Science’.459  The institutions 
of open science and the cultural ethos they have served to transmit may simply be 
legacies of European history’,460 resulting from a convergence of circumstances that 
occurred in western European culture in contrast with those that prevailed in other 
monolithic political systems.  China in an earlier epoch461 is a well-known example 
of ‘a society that clearly possessed the intellectual talents for great scientific 
accomplishments, yet failed spectacularly to institutionalise the practice of open 
science.’462  Attempts to create open methods and institutions should therefore 
proceed on the strength of an assessment of the functions they fulfil in the 
contemporary circumstances that they are confronted with.  
As science begins to come out of the box of ‘open science’ that has served it for so 
long, and we consider new strategies of governance, we need to regrasp the original 
vision of science for technology, reassess the systems that were established to 
advance it, consider which practices and values that have served those systems are 
still vital and assess whether and how they might be applicable in contemporary 
circumstances.  Nothing can or should be taken for granted in attempts to capture a 
new vision of science for modern technology that will be useful in mapping the way 
ahead.  It is not possible to stuff science back in the box, or even to extend the box to 
recapture science.  The door is open, and science is mingling with technology, in 
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public and private spaces.  I take this to mean that the method envisioned by Bacon 
has been so successful that it is now fulfilling his greatest aspirations for it.   
In the next chapter I look to the dynamic industrial processes of technological 
innovation for concepts of openness in private enterprise. 
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Chapter 5. INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the origins, ethos and functions of technology as a system of 
industrial innovation, with a view to identifying patterns of openness and exclusivity 
that facilitate innovation and exploitation in the delivery of goods.  My objective is to 
understand the elements of the technological process, in the absence of the effect of 
scientific inputs that may enter into it, which I come to in due course.  Technology is 
commonly distinguished from open science on grounds of exclusivity: that it obtains 
exclusive control over resources and withholds the results of its research from the 
public domain to enable it to generate goods in a competitive market.  Here I show 
that ‘exclusivity’ must be understood in the context of the technological enterprise as 
a whole, within the ethos of capitalism and the open market system.   
I demonstrate that the function of ‘exclusion’ of competitors by the industrial firm is 
to create a crucible of ‘innovation’ for the generation of new knowledge and the 
addition of value that transforms that knowledge into goods capable of exchange in 
the market.  The protection of inchoate products through secrecy and the attachment 
of property rights facilitates their release into the public domain of commerce, in 
which they are widely accessible, subject to negotiation of terms with the property 
holder.  Property rights attach not only to tangible end products but also to pieces of 
patentable knowledge generated in the process, thus expediting their potential for 
release into the market and rapid availability to others in the field.   
My examination of industrial technology throws up two main paradoxes of openness 
and closure.  The first is that within the firm the openness of technical innovation 
produces closure in the stabilisation of products.  Complex non-linear dynamics 
between technology, firm and market characterise the process of innovation and 
exploitation that takes place within the parameters of ‘upstream and downstream’, 
resulting ultimately in economic goods.  Contrary to the common perception of 
technology, however, the story does not end there.   
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The second paradox is that the exclusion of competitors from the process of 
innovation facilitates openness by enabling the release of products into the public 
domain of commerce.  Like new knowledge in the ‘public domain’ of open science, 
the results of technological innovation are accessible to the public on the open 
market.  Unlike the public domain of science, exchange of knowledge and tangible 
products in the domain of commerce is mediated by property rights, which act as a 
gatekeeper for the controlled dissemination of resources.  The combination of the 
legal infrastructure of property, the divisibility of ownership into discrete rights, and 
the nonrival nature of knowledge facilitates the transfer of knowledge as well as 
delivery of concrete goods in the domain of commerce.  
The chapter demonstrates the misconception that ‘public’ science and ‘private’ 
technology are entirely incompatible with one another.  The picture that emerges is 
one of complementarity in the enterprises of science and technology463 each of which 
excludes the market in order to facilitate innovation, in the pursuit of the 
advancement of knowledge.  Their use of different media of exchange in the public 
domain enables technological exploitation to produce practical outcomes and the 
social benefits of public goods.  That neither the openness of science nor the 
exclusivity of technology are absolute reveals a potential for governance strategies to 
facilitate each to mutual advantage.  
5.2 Objectives  
Technology is the use of knowledge to achieve the practical aims of human life or to 
change or manipulate the human environment.  In conventional narratives referred to 
below, the focus of technology is the active pursuit of utility:464 the invention of 
means or methods to achieve a practical goal, solve a problem, enhance a solution, or 
perform a specific function.  The word ‘technology’ comes from the Greek 
tekhnología, comprising téchnē, an art, skill, or craft and its study or systematic 
treatment. 
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In technology there is an immediately apparent overlap with science in the pursuit of 
knowledge.  Just as scientific ‘discovery’ involves an active process likened to the 
‘invention’ of knowledge, so the invention of technical means and methods involves 
the ‘discovery’ of useful knowledge.  The synergy between science and technology 
that drives modern scientific technology is generated by this mutual interest in the 
pursuit of knowledge, albeit arising from different perspectives or orientations.  
Science and technology each conduct ‘research’, and they rely on observed facts and 
the same natural ‘laws’465 or understandings of the nature of things.466  Each is a 
cumulative process, and its outcomes are ‘diffused’ through the same mechanisms of 
education, publications and informal communication.  Science and technology are 
each organised around professional communities with clear disciplinary autonomy.467   
Technology is not, however, interested in knowledge for its own sake, but in its 
potential for use as a tool, method or product, to achieve some beneficial result or 
effect.468 Whereas the scientific pursuit of knowledge is concerned with how and 
why things happen, the technological focus is on making things happen.  Technology 
attempts to understand how knowledge can be concretised in a form that embodies 
practical value for the advancement of its own agenda.  The objective is to produce 
something that works, or works better, and ‘understanding’ is important only in so 
far as it helps in that effort.469   
Technical knowledge may have strong foundations in the understanding generated by 
rigorous science, as I discuss below, but it has a far wider base in empirical or 
experiential learning.  Although the explanatory power of science can contribute 
much to technological innovation, and in fields such as stem cell technology it is 
clear that the two are intimately connected, technology is - in conceptual terms at 
least - distinct from its scientifically validated knowledge inputs.  Many ancient 
crafts, such as beer brewing, spinning and weaving of cloth, and smelting of ore were 
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based on ‘purely empirical technology’,470 lacking any understanding of the scientific 
basis for the processes applied.  Likewise, many modern technologies look to science 
only as ‘necessary’ to advance the process.471  In the next chapter, I maintain that 
scientific technology should be understood as a marriage in which the two partners, 
however closely connected, retain separate identities.  
5.3 Origins  
‘Technology’ 
Technology predates the formal methods of science by hundreds of thousands of 
years, originating with the human conversion of natural resources into simple tools. 
The controlled use of fire, which began with Homo erectus 400,000 years ago and 
became widespread 125,000 years ago,472 was a turning point in the evolution of 
human culture, increasing the available sources of food, providing warmth and 
protection from predators and insects, and expanding human activity into the colder 
hours of the night.  Invention of the wheel facilitated travel and further control of the 
human environment.    
Industrial revolution 
Technological advance accelerated with the substitution of machines for animal and 
human labour.  The ‘Industrial Revolution’ that occurred in Britain from 1760 to 
1840, and spread from there around the globe, instigated a process of change that 
transformed agricultural societies into economies dominated by industry and 
manufacture.  New materials, energy sources and machines, along with increasing 
use of scientific inputs, contributed to the increased production of goods and services 
that affected every aspect of life.  The factory system reorganised work through the 
division of labour and specialisation of function, making possible dramatic increases 
in the use of natural resources and the mass production of manufactured goods.  
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Through important developments in transportation and communication, such as the 
railroad and the telegraph, the printing press and telephone, technology has overcome 
physical barriers to facilitate human interaction on a global scale.  The 
industrialisation of technology effected widespread changes in economic, political, 
and social organisation, including greater distribution of wealth, increased 
international trade, political changes as a result of shifts in economic power, and the 
institution of new social hierarchies and patterns of authority.473474  
‘Pasteur’s quadrant’ 
Scientific developments during this period, combined with the expanded technical 
capacities, spawned new disciplines of technological research and associated 
industries.  The work of generally trained scientists on practical problems resulted in 
the emergence of specialised fields in which research was focused on rigorous 
scientific understanding, but the field as a whole, and programmes of research within 
it, were dedicated quite explicitly to solving particular kinds of practical problems, 
and advancing bodies of practical technology.475  Metallurgy, for example, arose 
from the work of chemists on quality control in the steel industry; developments in 
chemistry and biochemistry gave rise to chemical engineering; the physics of 
electricity and magnetism generated electrical engineering and ‘systems’ 
technologies; the invention of the computer generated the field of computer science.  
New knowledge in chemistry and biology also led to specialisms in agriculture and 
medicine: medical pathology, immunology and cardiology grew up for teaching at 
medical schools.476  Such fields are described as falling within ‘Pasteur’s 
quadrant’,477 in reference to the work of Louis Pasteur on matters including the 
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pasteurisation of milk and the immunisation of patients with attenuated strains of 
bacteria, which were simultaneously ‘basic’ scientific and ‘applied’ technical 
research.  
Pharmaceutical industry  
The pharmaceutical industry as we know it was a comparatively late development.  
Although its roots lie with the apothecaries and pharmacies that offered traditional 
remedies as far back as the middle ages, it was not until the mid-19th century that the 
developments in chemistry from the 17th century, and the acceleration of industry 
during the late 18th century, combined to produce benefits for human health.478  This 
created a new relationship between scientists situated largely in universities and 
research institutes, who traditionally conducted drug ‘discovery’ through the 
isolation of active ingredients from traditional remedies, and pharmaceutical 
companies who undertook ‘drug development’ activities to determine the suitability 
of the identified compound for use as a medication.  The amount of capital required 
for developmental research, involving studies in vitro and in vivo, as well as clinical 
trials, made this the historical strength of the larger pharmaceutical companies.479  In 
this relationship there is an evident overlap between discovery and development: 
‘discovery’ of potential drugs is likely to involve, in addition to isolation of 
compounds, an element of ‘design’; and both discovery and development may be 
undertaken by industrial firms.  Large multinational corporations may participate in a 
broad range of drug discovery and development, manufacturing and quality control, 
marketing, sales, and distribution; smaller organisations are likely to have a more 
specific focus on discovery of drug candidates or development formulations.  
Further, collaborative agreements between research organisations and large 
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pharmaceutical companies may be formed to explore the potential of new drug 
substances.480   
I include this outline of the pharmaceutical industry because pharma companies are 
the likely hosts of the cell therapy or ‘CT-RM’ industry for the development of stem 
cell therapies, as indicated by the initial Geron trials for hESC treatment of spinal 
injury (since acquired by BioTime Acquisitions) and the advancing ACT clinical 
trials involving hESC treatment of macular disease.  Such firms already have some 
experience of working with large biological (as opposed to small chemical) 
molecules, having begun the expansion of their remit to include ‘biological drugs’ 
with insulin in the 1970s.  The combination of computer and bio-technology is seen 
as the way of the future481 as the use of high throughput screening, genetic 
modification and the computerisation of genomics facilitates development of new 
biologics at a much higher rate than was previously possible.  Biological drugs such 
as monoclonal antibodies, introduced at the turn of the millennium, point to a whole 
new array of more specifically targeted biologics that may have as great an impact on 
human health as the medicines of last century.   
It is a significant shift nevertheless from biological molecules to the development of 
therapies incorporating whole human cells.  Even if firms are willing to undertake it, 
the existing infrastructures have been developed for chemical drug development.  
They provide little precedent in the way of standards by which to assess technical 
and commercial uncertainty in the production of cell-based therapies as a means to 
encouraging investment; nor is the regulatory framework for the pre-clinical testing 
of drugs entirely appropriate to therapeutics based on cells.  I refer to these matters in 
relation to the barriers to translation of stem cell science in the next chapter.  Not all 
medicinal products are produced on a commercial basis, but I assume for the 
purposes of the following discussion that the large majority of stem cell-based 
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regenerative medicine treatments will be produced by pharmaceutical companies for 
the commercial market.482 
5.4 Ethos  
Against this historical backdrop, I examine the ethos of industrial technology in 
search of concepts and functions of openness.  My first observation is that the pursuit 
of technology, like science, operates in an open system that facilitates innovation.  
This seems immediately contradictory to open science theories that contrast the 
Republic of Science with a Regime of Technology geared to secrecy, or exclusive 
possession of the right to commercial exploitation of existing data, information and 
knowledge.483  I contend that ‘technology’ is both open and closed: that as a social 
organisation it is more complex than science, involving interrelated (or in the 
commons language used in Chapter 7, ‘nested’) systems and functions that create 
certain paradoxes of openness and closure.  I consider the ethos of technology to be 
the social order of capitalism, which invokes the laissez-faire market system for the 
production of goods and services that dominated the Industrial Revolution and still 
dominates the world today.484  The system of capitalism is much bigger than the 
market and is dependent upon social values beyond the market for the pursuit of a 
free society.  The market itself is an economic system of ‘open’ exchange that 
encourages initiative, innovation and productivity.  It is the activity undertaken by 
actors in the market system – the combination of innovation and exploitation for the 
generation of both new knowledge and products – that requires exclusivity in order 
to fit products for exchange on the market.485  Later in this chapter I examine models 
that try to explain the dynamics of this process from the perspective of the industrial 
firm, after considering the relationship between the ethos of capitalism and the 
‘open’ market. 
 
                                                
 
482 Chris Mason, comment, SCRIPT Roundtable Workshop: Open Science and the Regulation of Stem 
Cells, University of Edinburgh, September 2011. 
483 David P (2003) SIEPR, 5. 
484 Heilbroner R (1992) Twenty-First Century Capitalism, 3.  
485 Nelson RR (2004) ‘The market economy and the scientific commons’ 33 Research Policy 455. 
 148 
The market 
In principle, an economic market is ‘open’ if it permits all economic actors equal 
opportunity of entry to trade, without any external constraint.  This is in contrast to a 
market that is ‘closed’ by a dominant monopoly or oligopoly, or ‘protected’ by 
financial or legal conditions of entry or the imposition of tariff barriers, taxes, levies 
or state subsidies that effectively prevent participation.486  In practice, few markets 
are fully open, because they require legal frameworks to mediate commercial 
transactions by guaranteeing security of property, enforcement of contractual 
obligations and prevention of abuse, and because these frameworks may constrain or 
prevent participation by some actors.  The notion of openness of markets is therefore 
often reconstrued as ‘freedom of competition’,487 which is assessed with regard to the 
extent of the government regulation that impacts on it, the scope of competition it 
offers, and existence or absence of local barriers to trade.  Participation is thus 
attributable to the competitiveness of the actor rather than the market, and inability to 
participate is a subjective preference or personal incapacity. 
The industrialisation of technology, like the institutionalisation of science, formalised 
the pursuit of technological objectives in new social structures.488  It intensified 
production, increased productivity and created new markets.  The main actor for the 
purposes of my thesis is the corporation or firm,489 which - unlike the scientist - 
encompasses further tiers of organisation, including production units and individuals 
with various responsibilities within its operations.  Within the market, firms compete 
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with one another for economic rather than social rewards, yet in their competition 
contribute to the larger ‘collaborative’ enterprise of the market, which supplies the 
needs of society with goods and services.490  In the dynamics of the market, firms are 
both producers and consumers of goods and services, which are made widely 
available in the commercial domain.  The release of products onto the market not 
only makes them accessible to the domestic public but facilitates mutual exchange of 
resources among firms, for use in ongoing technical development and production.  
Interaction in the market takes place through multiple networks491 of communication, 
negotiation and transaction among firms.492  Commercial profits, enhanced by the 
prospect of a patent monopoly for a limited period, provide corporations with 
incentives for innovation, invention and thus investment.  Rewards for individual 
participation are, similarly, primarily economic rather than reputational. 
Just as the public domain of knowledge facilitates the advance of science, so the 
market provides a public domain of commerce that facilitates accessibility of 
resources for the production of technical goods.493  Like science, the advance of 
technology is not a mere consumption of resources in the process of manufacture, but 
involves their use in innovation or the generation of new knowledge. Innovation is 
characteristic of the whole of the R&D enterprise, to the extent that the literature, 
which I discuss in a later section,494 uses the term indiscriminately to refer to the 
goal, the process and the production of innovation.  In the next chapter, I argue that 
despite the industrial focus on production of goods, the key to all aspects of technical 
innovation is knowledge, and that given the technological drive for utility, it is 
‘useful’ knowledge that is sought, generated and used.   
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The key to the operation of the market system is in the core assumption that a 
‘maximising mindset’495 or ‘acquisitive mentality’496 is inherent in human nature, 
and that this human predisposition acts as an ‘inner force or directive’497 without 
which the market system will not work.  It is the predictability of this force in human 
behaviour that enables the market to bring order out of a ‘universe of individuals 
seeking to augment their fortunes’.498  Markets are not therefore the source of the 
energies of capitalism, nor of the division between public and private sector 
authority, but channels or conduits through which energies flow, and by which the 
private sector can organise its activities without direct intervention of the public 
realm.499   
Capitalism 
Capitalism is the wider social order rooted in economic and political ideology for the 
pursuit of a free society, in which industrial technology is situated.  I do not debate 
here the merits of the capitalist political economy that forms this ethos, but simply 
distinguish it from the market.  Although capitalism is commonly spoken of as ‘the 
market’, and aligned with competition and the drive for the acquisition of wealth, the 
market is only one aspect of the social order of capitalism.500  Capitalism as a whole 
is dependent upon values that are external to the market in order to balance the drive 
for capital and prevent the ‘market economy’ from becoming a ‘market society’.  
These values include the virtues such as hard work, thrift and deferred gratification501 
that directly undergird the market, but also encompass wider social values such as 
trust, integrity, honesty to customers, loyalty to employees, and a sense of 
responsibility to the community.  The notion that creation and ownership of wealth 
brings with it responsibilities of stewardship, the sharing of possessions and the 
alleviation of poverty in society is entrenched in Western social, cultural and 
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religious traditions that inform the capitalist ethos.502  The extent to which open 
markets and the capitalist social order can be attributed to the cluster of values 
brought to Europe by specifically Judeo-Christian religious philosophy is a matter for 
debate outside the scope of my thesis, but it has been observed that cultures that 
respect the individual, value work, and reward creativity and initiative are more 
likely to create free markets than are social systems that are highly collectivist, 
aristocratic, or conservative.503  Scholars once again point to the example of China, 
which until the 15th century was more technologically advanced than the West, but 
did not give rise to formal science, the Industrial Revolution or the market 
economy.504  
Sociologists of capitalism suggest that not only is capitalism unsustainable in the 
absence of human values external to the market, but that the market has a tendency to 
erode the values that are necessary to its own survival.  More than one has predicted 
the demise of capitalism due to its economic successes, rather than its failures, and 
its replacement by a post-industrial society defined by a socialist polity.505  
Schumpeter argues that economic successes create an unfavourable social and 
political climate or ‘atmosphere of almost universal hostility to its own social 
order’,506 while Bell contends that the material abundance that capitalism generates 
gives rise to a culture of consumerism characterised by a need for instant 
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gratification and irrational self-expression among the successful507 that undermines 
the values that gave rise to it.  Scholars have also forecast that an information-led and 
service-oriented ‘post-industrial society’508 will replace industrial society as the new 
face of capitalism, through a shift from manufacturing to services, centrality of new 
science-based industries and technical elites, and a new principle of stratification.   
Examination of these ideas, as well as the origins and future of capitalism more 
generally, is outside the remit of my thesis, but I raise them here to indicate the 
embeddedness of industrial technology and the market in the wider ethos of 
capitalism, and the extent to which they are shaped by economic and political 
ideology.  In the balance of this chapter, I proceed on the basis that despite cultural 
and economic contradictions, capitalism is still apparently alive.  The outcomes of 
technical innovation are released into the public domain of commerce, are available 
on the open market for use as resources in ongoing innovation, and the benefits of 
economic success are in principle extendable to society, through endorsement of 
social values beyond materialism.  Where, then, is ‘exclusivity’ in the open market 
system of commerce?  
5.5 Exclusion 
Versus ‘exclusivity’ 
At the heart of this ethos of capitalism is the practice of exclusion which, like 
disclosure in the system of science, serves certain functions in the enterprise of 
technology.  I purposely distinguish exclusion from ‘exclusivity’509 - the capacity or 
right to exclude – because while the actual exclusion of users from new knowledge, 
either by trade secrecy or by the exercise of property rights, may create conditions 
that are problematic for open science, the right to exclude, in itself, does not.  
‘Exclusivity’ or the ‘right to exclude’ refers to the legal right of a property holder to 
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enforce, as against third parties, the whole bundle of legal rights510 associated with 
property, including the right to use, to make money from and to transfer it.   
The ‘exclusivity’ associated with property rights (and technology and the market 
generally) is widely conflated with exclusion – with barriers that prevent access to 
and use of new knowledge.  The extent to which exclusion occurs and is problematic 
however depends upon the exercise of the right to exclude, and which of the other 
rights in the ‘bundle of property rights’ are enforced.  For open science and the 
growth of knowledge, what is objectionable is the enforcement of the exclusive right 
to use property rather than the right to make money from it or (as I argue later) to 
transfer it.  The difficulty is not with the fact that industrial technology generates 
‘economic rents’ or private profits from products through the market: recall that in 
science there is a pricetag on all results of scientific research made ‘public’ through 
subscription-based journals.  What is problematic is the control that is exercised over 
the use of knowledge or resources – the exclusion of others from the use of 
knowledge in order to create the conditions of secrecy that are necessary to generate 
the products and profits.   
The importance of this distinction for facilitative governance is that the ‘exclusivity’ 
of private property – like the non-excludability of public goods – involves elements 
of choice.  The right to enforce implies a right not to enforce, enabling holders to 
relinquish their rights if they so choose.  Combined with the divisibility of property 
rights, this means that holders can choose which of their rights, if any, they enforce 
and upon what terms.  Holders might prevent activity in relation to resources, but 
they might also use their property rights as a conveyance by which to transfer rights 
in technologies to a wide range of users.  Control over how, and to whom, and on 
what terms of access the technology is disseminated remains with the holder of 
private property rights.  This level of control is the key to strategies for facilitation of 
access to resources within the private sector, the implications of which become 
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apparent in Chapter 7.  
Functions 
The function of exclusion in industrial technology is to create the conditions of 
secrecy that are conducive to industrial ‘innovation’, involving the generation of 
products and profits.  The production of private commercial products, as opposed to 
public goods, requires economic ‘excludability’ which, as I discussed in Chapter 2, is 
based on the premise that if none can be prevented from access, all potential users 
will have free use of the goods and there will be no rational basis for anyone to pay 
for them.  In the absence of any barriers to third party use, or price attached to 
access, the ability of the producer to profit from his investment in the process is 
severely limited.511  Without such control there can be no collection of revenues, and 
transactions can be economically efficient only if the goods are virtually costless to 
produce,512 if the lost revenue is compensated for within a wider business strategy, or 
if the goods are supported as public goods through non-market sources of funding.    
Economic excludability is achieved by either trade secrecy, technical means 
(physical security) or legal property rights, depending on the intrinsic nature of the 
goods in question.  Tangible goods are excludable by secrecy and by technical 
means, as well as by enforcement of property law.  Intangible intellectual resources 
including new technical knowledge cannot be excluded by physical means, for ‘the 
knowledge which one man has may also be the possession of another’ and is 
undiminished through being shared.513  Knowledge is excludable only by secrecy or 
by intellectual property rights.  For purposes of the production of medical therapies, 
and my thesis, it is patent rights that are significant and at issue, rather than copyright 
or database rights, which may also apply to publications or collections of data. 
Exclusion in industrial technology has intellectual and economic as well as 
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organisational functions.  In its intellectual capacity, exclusion through secrecy and 
private property rights creates in the industrial firm an exclusive forum for the 
intensification of innovation, protected from revelation or unauthorised exploitation 
during the ‘gestation’ of new technical knowledge and products.  Secrecy is 
necessary to prevent competitors from taking and exploiting technical knowledge 
before property rights have attached to it, but exclusion prior to release into the 
public domain of commerce also prevents accessibility of knowledge in the public 
domain of knowledge.  Firms seek to exclude competition, and would not be adverse 
to third party uses apart from commercial exploitation, if it were possible to achieve 
one without the other.  The legal device of the patent is an attempt to facilitate this: it 
has the dual intellectual and economic function of expediting disclosure of new 
technology into the public domain of knowledge, while preventing its unauthorised 
exploitation by potential competitors.  This extends the ability of the firm to exclude 
commercial competitors from its technology after the knowledge has been released 
into the public domain, and thus in addition to enhancing innovation acts as an 
economic incentive for private investment in research and development.  
It is generally said that full technical disclosure is given as a quid pro quo for a 
limited monopoly over commercial exploitation, but the converse is equally correct: 
a monopoly is given to the firm for a defined period to protect it from the potentially 
adverse effect that full public disclosure of the technology would otherwise have on 
its competitiveness in the commercial domain.  Either way, the traditional goal of 
intellectual property is to strike a balance between commercial profitability and 
public interest concerns.514  The multiple ‘problems’ of patents associated with 
patent practices and the administration of patent systems do not change this 
objective.  As I discuss in the next chapter, the abolition of the patent system would 
not necessarily enhance innovation through the removal of barriers to technology; it 
would encourage secrecy within firms for a much longer period, until tangible 
products protected by ordinary ‘personal property’ rights are capable of release onto 
the market.   
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The functions of exclusion in industrial technology suggest a surprising parallel with 
the system of open science.  The establishment of the firm, and the containment of 
activity within it, serves a purpose comparable to the creation of public institutions 
for the advancement of science.  Whereas open science, through establishment of 
public institutes, excludes market forces in order to promote rapid production of 
knowledge, so industrial technology, through establishment of private firms, 
excludes potential competitors in order to intensify production of technical products. 
In each system, exclusion protects its activities from disruption or domination by 
external actors in the market, while facilitating a constructive competition within its 
own parameters.  Science publishes the outcomes of this process in the ‘public 
domain’ of knowledge, while technology releases its products onto the open market, 
in the public domain of commerce.  Each uses exclusion to create a crucible of 
innovative activity, from which it releases its results into the public domain in order 
to facilitate their exchange and use.  Further, both science and technology are, in 
principle, maintained by a commitment to a set of values, which as I discuss in the 
next chapter is beginning to show signs of strain.  The two systems differ in the 
conditions that facilitate their innovative activities, in the vehicles (of publication and 
property) by which they disseminate their outcomes in the public domain, and in the 
process of ‘innovation’ that they undertake.  In the following section, I examine the 
process of innovation and exploitation in the activities of the industrial firm.  
5.6 ‘Innovation’  
‘Technological innovation’ is the production of new knowledge or the combination 
of existing knowledge in new ways – and of transforming this into economically 
significant products and processes.515  Industrial analysts are largely concerned with 
industrial products and processes and the economic outcomes and effects of 
innovation, rather than the nature of creative event – the intellectual innovation - 
from which they spring.  The term ‘innovation’ may refer to every aspect of the 
generation of new products, particularly those products with economic 
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significance:516 it is often used to mean specific technical inventions517 (the new 
method or product itself)518 and might encompass all aspects of the industrial process 
that turns an idea into an object,519 including new commodities, forms of 
organisation, and the opening of new markets.520  In the policy context, the concept 
of technological innovation is generally confined to the definition of ‘TPP 
Innovations’ provided by the OECD:  
‘Technological Product and Process (TPP) Innovations comprise implemented 
technologically new products and processes and significant technological 
improvements in products and processes.  A TPP innovation has been implemented if 
it has been introduced on the market (product innovation) or used within a 
production process (process innovation).’521     
Attempts to construct ‘innovation policy’ are usually seeking economic frameworks 
or business models for stimulating industry, which have been juxtaposed against 
mechanisms that will foster technical innovation ‘as a platform for social 
improvement’.522  From the perspective of the facilitation of technology and the 
production of public goods, however, there can be little distinction between the two.  
The stimulation of industrial innovation in fields such as regenerative medicine is the 
very goal of facilitation that seeks to promote the activity of actors who are capable 
of private production of public goods, or some part thereof.  Framing ‘innovation’ as 
a business prospect or industrial process does not alter its nature as an essentially 
intellectual or cognitive creation that cuts across the public and private divide: the 
generation of new technical or useful knowledge.  In the next chapter, I adopt the 
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conception of innovation described as interactive process that does not happen in 
isolation,523 which ‘combines factors in a new way’, resulting in ‘new 
combinations’524 or fruitful ‘conjunctions’.525  The failure to articulate the conceptual 
distinction between the creative events and the industrial processes that generate new 
technical products is a source of potential confusion in the academic literatures, and 
could be problematic for policy attempts to facilitate ‘innovation’.  From the 
perspective of the industrial firm however, it is a distinction without practical 
importance.     
Innovation plus 
‘Technological innovation’ in the literature of industrial innovation is the 
combination of innovation and exploitation, which I touched on in relation to 
exclusivity.  The question here is not simply how firms pursue innovation, but how 
innovation can occur at all, in the apparent absence of disclosure, which in the 
narrative of science plays such an emphatic role in the advancement of knowledge.  
It has long been known that free markets, although arguably the best available 
mechanism for solving complex coordination and resource allocation problems, do 
not efficiently produce information or knowledge-based resources essential to 
research and development;526 these are essentially public goods that are better suited 
to the public domain, where access helps to minimise transaction costs and attendant 
uncertainties.527  How then can innovation flourish within the industrial firm? 
Models derived from studies of industrial innovation provide a number of possible 
answers.  First, in industrial technology, the disruptive process of ‘innovation’ is 
inseparable from the stabilising process of ‘exploitation’.  It is precisely this complex 
of innovation and exploitation that the industrial literature refers to as ‘innovation’, 
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and the synthesis of the two that makes the character of the enterprise different than 
the open science endeavour that results in the ‘invention of knowledge’.  Successful 
firms are able to synthesise technical innovation and commercial exploitation, 
bridging their differences, and utilising their strengths.  I address these models later. 
Secondly, the process involves a set of complex dynamics between the firm, the 
technology or ‘innovation’, and the public domains of knowledge and commerce.  
These interactions constitute networks of communication and exchange with 
suppliers, consumers, competitors and public bodies that not only facilitate 
commercial transactions but provide a means of obtaining external knowledge inputs 
into the innovation process.  Studies tracing knowledge flows in industrial firms have 
shown that inputs are obtained from external sources, public and private, as well as 
the internal contributions of those employed to engage in targeted research within the 
internally ‘open’ parameters of the firm.  In the next chapter I argue that these 
networks for transfer of knowledge are the facility for opening access to resources in 
the private sector.   
Thirdly, firms are able to innovate in the absence of publication, because they are 
pragmatic, rather than principled.  It is not the objective of the firm to ‘maximise 
innovation’ for the sake of posterity, but to stimulate sufficient innovation to support 
efficient production of enough intellectual property to generate products with 
practical and social utility.  Within the dynamics of the market, firms selectively 
exploit the outcomes of research by funnelling their resources into specific 
development pathways.  The interest of the firm is in optimal and efficient 
production, which is not dependent upon unlimited access to knowledge, or the 
practice of public disclosure of its own resources for use by others.  The 
maximisation of technological advance, for the delivery of goods and services 
culminating in the social benefits of complex global public goods, is an overarching 






The industrial pursuit of technological innovation, like science, is housed in research, 
but the methods and inputs used in technical research are coloured by the pragmatic 
and utilitarian orientation of technology that is uncharacteristic of pure science.  
Technological innovation has been described as a ‘competitive exploration of 
multiple paths’,528 a phrase that captures something of the common assumption that 
technological research uses empirical methods, as opposed to the theoretical methods 
employed by science.529  In response to contestation of this idea, scholars have 
demonstrated that while no clear distinction can be substantiated, there is 
nevertheless a correlation to support such an assumption.  It has been shown that 
although there is little to distinguish the types of methods employed by science and 
technology, and that they each use a variety of theoretical tools and empirical 
methods of observation, the proportion of theoretical to empirical methods used in 
research varies along a science-technology spectrum.  At the science end are the pure 
mathematical tools, and mathematically structured theoretical knowledge about the 
physical world.530  Such theories originate in science and attract scientific interest for 
their explanatory powers, but need to be reformulated to apply to technological 
problems.531  Toward the technology end of the spectrum, theory is based on 
scientific principles but is motivated by and limited to a technologically relevant 
phenomenon or specific device.532  Technical interest depends upon the utility of the 
artefact to which it relates.  At the far end of the spectrum, technology can apply 
‘phenomenological theory’, based primarily on ad hoc assumptions from trial and 
error practice, and only marginally on scientific principles.  The explanatory power 
of such theory is limited, although its practical utility is high. 
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Knowledge Inputs  
The pragmatism of technology is also reflected in the sources and patterns of 
appropriation of knowledge by which industrial firms obtain inputs to inform the 
research process.  Inputs may be obtained directly from employees, or the conduct of 
research within the firm, or from public and commercial sources external to the firm.   
Two major studies,533 conducted twenty years apart, showed that external sources 
accounted for only about one third of the total knowledge used by firms in the course 
of their operations.  The studies analysed the total knowledge requirements of 
industrial firms as the appropriate basis for assessing the contribution of public sector 
research to technological innovation.  The first (Gibbons) looked at thirty award-
winning products, analysing the content and sources of scientific and technological 
information used by R&D staff in the course of their development.  The second 
(Faulkner) studied three fields of technology (including biotechnology) to identify 
the main institutional source of original ideas for product innovation: it investigated 
knowledge flows, or scientific and technological inputs associated with the links 
between public sector research and industry, through interviews with R&D staff in 
23 firms.  The results provide a detailed picture of the full range of knowledge types 
utilised, and confirm earlier research showing that the dominant contribution to 
knowledge used in technical innovation comes from internal sources.   
The Gibbons and Faulkner studies conclude that, averaging across industries, about 
two thirds of knowledge used by companies in the course of innovation derives from 
their own in-house R&D and expertise, while the remaining one third comes from 
external sources.  The internal knowledge contributed by in-house entrepreneurs and 
researchers was associated primarily with developmental research and design rather 
than basic or pioneering research, which came primarily from external public 
sources.  Gibbons found that internal inputs made particularly high contributions to 
design, test procedures and techniques, and contributed substantially to the properties 
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of materials and components.  Similarly, the Faulkner study showed that internal 
sources dominated routine problem-solving, technical backup, and contributed 
substantially to skills in experimentation and testing. 
A crude interpretation of the studies says that firms rely upon inputs from the public 
sector for basic or ‘pioneering’ research, but also that academic and government 
laboratories contributed only a small part of external knowledge inputs.  The largest 
external source was found to be other industrial companies, especially users or 
suppliers, but inputs were also obtained from competitors.  ‘Public sector research’ 
accounted for only 5-20 percent (depending on the industry) of external inputs or 
roughly 1.5–6 percent of the total knowledge inputs into technical industrial 
operations.  
In another study534 it was demonstrated that local and tacit knowledge, despite some 
importance in the conduct of scientific experiments,535 has a far greater significance 
in technological innovation than it does in science.  Industrial researchers reported 
almost unanimously that tacit skills, acquired largely on the job (but also obtained 
from other companies and from public sector research) make a greater overall 
contribution to innovation than does formal knowledge acquired from literature and 
education536 and others suggest that ‘practical intuition’ is frequently more important 
than calculation and analysis.537  The development of technology has thus been 
described as still involving ‘activities better described by the metaphor of art than of 
science’.  The heavy reliance upon tacit knowledge has been explained by the fact 
that replication of reported technical experiments is not the common practice538 that 
it is in science, and that systems for validation of technological outcomes are limited.  
This could be interpreted to mean either that tacit knowledge fulfils a positive and 
necessary function of validation by providing informal checks and balances, or that it 
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is unfortunate that the use of unmeasurable539 and potentially unreliable tacit 
knowledge can go unchallenged in the absence of verification by peer review.  Either 
way, it is indicative of the different orientations of open science and industrial 
innovation that protection against potentially disastrous social and economic 
consequences540 in the event of failure of a technical product or process is provided 
not by peer review of new technical knowledge, but by external legal frameworks 
that govern the quality and safety of goods destined for commercial uptake and 
public consumption. 
Finally, patent disclosure is, in principle, an important public source of up to date 
technical knowledge, available for use in ongoing research without licence, in the 
absence of commercial exploitation.  As a criterion for grant of patent, disclosure 
makes technology accessible for use in ongoing research and development, while the 
patentee enjoys exclusive rights to control how the product is exploited for a twenty 
year period.  A patent application must describe the invention in terms that are clear 
and complete enough for it to be performed by a person skilled in the art, so that 
instead of waiting for a product to come to market and then having to use reverse-
engineering techniques in order to understand, copy, use and modify the embedded 
technical innovation, researchers and would-be competitors are able to obtain an 
‘enabling disclosure’ by reference to public patent documentation.  Patent disclosure 
as knowledge transfer - placing knowledge in the public domain for further research 
and development - is considered a quid pro quo for the private monopoly of patent, 
which would otherwise prevent R&D as well as unauthorised commercial 
exploitation.  Disclosure as a system of knowledge transfer is therefore particularly 
important in relation to technologies, such as medicine, in which patenting happens 
early in the technological process.  Barriers to accessibility of the information will 
block further use of the patented technology, except by the owner, until the twenty 
year monopoly of the patent expires.  
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Beehive 
This examination of methods and sources of knowledge used by firms is neither 
comprehensive nor current in regard to any one sector or field, but it helps 
nevertheless to create a conceptual image of the firm as a beehive of activity.  The 
firm constitutes an enclosed ‘open space’ within which confidential information can 
be exchanged and knowledge generated without relinquishment of control, but which 
remains connected to the external environment by various networks for 
communication and transfer of knowledge.  Studies have shown that the capacity for 
innovation is not a matter of the size of the firm but of incentives, and the stage of 
development of the technology.  It is not the largest corporations, but the new 
entrants to an industry, firms with no established stake in a product market segment, 
that are most likely to produce radical process or product innovation.541  Larger firms 
were likely to provide fewer incentives for their people to introduce radical 
developments - the type of major innovations that generate new industries around an 
emerging technology - than were smaller firms with a more organic structure.  
Neither large absolute size nor market power was therefore a necessary condition for 
successful competitive development.  The large firm was however shown to have an 
advantage over smaller entrants in the subsequently expanding industry, when R&D 
has widened the technological frontiers, research has become specialised and 
sophisticated, and specific components of the technology are identified for individual 
investigation and incremental improvement.  During the transition from radical to 
incremental innovation, smaller firms may consolidate and fight for market share, or 
the industry may become dominated by an oligopoly of large firms.  
Exploitation 
The process of ‘innovation’ in industrial technology, as I have already said, involves 
the simultaneous production of new knowledge and its transformation by 
exploitation into products.  In both the language of scholars of technology and the 
activities of industrial firms, the intellectual creation and the product are bound up 
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together.  The commercial imperative upon firms involved in ‘technological 
innovation’ is to produce economic goods.  The commercial mandate or motive is 
separate to the desire for technical solutions that enabled prehistoric cultures to 
control fire or take up agriculture.  The modern commercial setting of technology 
poses a challenge for the technological firm that was not encountered within simple 
prehistoric economies: the need to reconcile the conditions required for rapid 
innovation with those of proprietary control necessary for output and productivity.542  
The tension between innovation and exploitation is felt even within the parameters of 
the firm, and not only in relation to the distinction between the systems of public 
science and private technology.  
Definitions of the term ‘exploitation’ connect utilisation with the realisation of a 
benefit.  In common usage, exploitation means ‘the action of making use of, and 
benefiting from, resources’.543  Legal sources define it as ‘making use of’ or 
‘utilisation by application of industry, argument, or other means of turning to 
account’.544  To ‘turn to account’ means to obtain an advantage or profit.545  ‘Benefit’ 
similarly refers to an advantage, profit, privilege, gain or interest.546  The negative 
definition of exploitation, which is the taking of an unjust or unfair advantage of 
another for personal benefit, or a ‘use’ that derides or depletes resources, provides 
little assistance here for understanding the technical function of exploitation.  
In product development, ‘exploitation’ is as much about the process of infusing 
technical knowledge with economic value as it is about the commercial or financial 
benefits that are possible as a result.  Exploitation is not simply commercial usery of 
goods to produce a financial gain: it is the creation of economic value in those goods, 
which makes them capable of generating the financial gain.  Exploitation is a 
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utilisation that produces something of greater value, even if it consumes a less 
valuable thing in the process.  Scientists ‘exploit’ existing knowledge in order to 
develop new ideas, theories and information.  Regenerative medicine ‘exploits’ the 
natural attributes of stem cells to combat debilitating diseases.  In the production of 
economic goods, ‘exploitation’ of less valuable materials is undertaken in order to 
produce more valuable products.  
In technology, the advantage or benefit of exploitation of goods is an economic gain, 
whether they realise a financial profit or are delivered on a non-profit basis.  The 
achievement of technical innovation is utility, and utility is the usefulness or the 
practical value of a thing.  ‘Relative practical value’ is an economic concept related 
to production, in which a more valuable product is produced from less valuable 
materials.  Practical value has economic value, which is increased by exploitation.  
The value of science, by contrast, is measured by scientific standards, according to 
the contribution it makes to the deepening of our understanding of nature, rather than 
by economic criteria.  Some scientific outcomes have, in addition, an identifiable 
practical value that can be exploited by technology, but this does not obviate their 
innate intellectual value.  
In a context of commercial exploitation, practical value is determined by consumer 
demand, and economic advantage is measured in terms of financial profit.  An 
industrial process will form part of a commercial technology only if the product it 
produces is profitable.  A factory is a ‘centre of production’ if it puts out products 
that are more valuable than the resources used up, and normally this will mean that 
the proceeds of the sale of the goods will exceed what was paid for the resources that 
went into them.  In non-profit situations, an economic gain is identified by a non-
financial assessment as to whether the social or public value of the goods and 
services outweighs the cost of the materials used in their production.   
In either case, because exploitation is a relative economic concept, the value of 
technology, unlike science, is always vulnerable to economic considerations and 
conditions.  The utility of a technology can be wiped out by changes in the relative 
values of the resources used and the products produced.  If the cost of materials, 
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wages or other inputs increases dramatically in comparison to the price of the 
product, the technology could be rendered useless; a hundredfold increase in fuel 
prices would, for example, make all sorts of engines and vehicles redundant.  A 
technical process is therefore valid, strictly speaking, on the basis of valuations at 
any given moment, and wider application requires flexible management.547  
Industrial technology projects therefore require skilful assessment of the value 
relations involved, including an appreciation of the value of resources and urgency of 
demands as against the alternatives.548  There is also a danger that the value of 
industrial processes might be lost if they are transferred from developed countries to 
developing economies without being appropriately adapted to local conditions.  The 
value of science on the other hand is not affected by economic circumstances such as 
changes in the cost of materials or the wages of researchers.  If salt becomes as 
expensive as gold, or the price of gold becomes as cheap as salt, it may affect the 
feasibility of and interest in studying them, but it will not alter the known chemical 
or physical properties of salt or gold.549 
Models  
Scholars attempting to explain the behaviour of firms that achieves the synthesis of 
innovation and exploitation envision a set of complex relationships, governed by 
market dynamics and strategic choices.  Innovation is chaotic and unpredictable and 
therefore a source of uncertainty, while exploitation involves stabilisation of 
products as a basis for commercial competition and sustainable business 
administration.  The uncertainties of innovation create a dilemma for decision-
makers in both policy and business.  Policymakers are charged with making sense of 
and managing equivocal new technologies, which are ‘obscure or esoteric, 
incompletely transparent even to their designers and thus subject to 
misunderstandings, uncertain, complex and recondite’.550  The business response to 
persistent uncertainty is to try stabilise the technology by standardising design, 
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production, practices and use, calculating risk and efficiency, and instigating a 
process of deepened learning that generates understanding and permits control of 
practice and process.551  
Stabilisation of products involves the consolidation of technical advances leading to 
reliability, characterised by few ‘stochastic events’552 or ‘surprises’,553 which recede 
as learning develops.  Products stabilise as production and use iterations are 
accumulated, and the technology is refined and improved as individuals and 
organisations draw patterns from random events and look for understandings that 
will avert or resolve technical problems.  The reduction in the uncertainty of 
innovation coincides with clarification in the articulation of performance criteria for 
products or processes as a basis of competition.  The conundrum is that excessive 
stabilisation can threaten innovation and development by collapsing them into 
operations and commodification; technology becomes vulnerable to stagnation and to 
being superseded by competitors who continue to seek technological innovation 
despite ongoing uncertainty.  The aim is the optimisation of innovation and 
productivity through selective development of goods in accordance with principles of 
economic efficiency. 
Precisely how all factors come together to generate commercially viable outcomes is 
not well understood, despite extensive study and economic and policy debate since 
the 1960s regarding the nature of technological change.  Efforts to explain it have 
come from a variety of disciplines, including economics, business management, 
sociology, geography and political science.554  Attempts to depict the process have 
enabled scholars to appreciate just how complex the subject is, and to understand a 
number of characteristics of the process, but ‘the complete phenomenon is still 
covered under a veil of mystery, intuition and intelligent decisions in situations of 
risk, uncertainty and lack of information’.555  Taxonomies of the generations of 
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models include, in increasing levels of complexity: the black box model, linear and 
interactive models, as well as systems innovation theory and network models.  All 
models are of course simplifications of reality,556 but they can nevertheless provide 
insights into the conditions conducive to innovation, from an industrial perspective.  
Black Box Model 
The ‘black box’ model of the 1950s held that innovation was a transformation that 
occurred within an inscrutable ‘black box’ of technology, emphasising the 
importance of inputs and outcomes, with little understanding of what happened in 
between.  Economists applied a self-imposed ordinance not to enquire too seriously 
into what transpired there557 as long as money invested in research and development 
produced new technological products.  In a post-WW2 climate, with its awareness of 
political threats to scientific freedom and new technical developments such as radar 
and nuclear energy, the black box theory of technology sat well alongside the 
conventional model of autonomous and independent science. The circumstances 
supported the vision of ‘big science’: that if given sufficient resources and free reign 
to define its own methodologies and goals, science would produce not only new 
understanding, but radical technologies as well.  The fact that the process by which 
this happened was unknown was not problematic, because the unexamined ‘space’ of 
the black box was construed as a protective cover under which science could 
flourish.558  
Although the idea of ‘big science’ was to bolster government funding for science, its 
technical focus was of interest to private firms, who soon established large corporate 
research laboratories and became internationally renowned for innovation, even 
though their internal workings were not fully understood by their management. 
Science was conflated with technical research as a primary means of technological 
innovation, and a conceptual shift occurred from ‘science and technology’ to 
‘research and development’.   
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The black box model however had its limitations.  The reluctance of economists and 
researchers to examine the links between science, technology and industrial 
development within the black box559 discouraged public policy support for technical 
innovation.560  It was also problematic that the emphasis was on the ‘research and 
development’ component of the technical process, to the exclusion of important non-
R&D processes such as marketing and manufacturing.561  Eventually researchers 
sought a greater understanding of firms,562 in which incentives, contracts and firm-
specific resources are seen as crucial to the processes and learning involved in 
technological change. 
Linear Models 
Initially, simple linear models were developed to understand the technological 
process and were expected to facilitate the formulation of policies that would 
stimulate research and development and result in new products and processes.  The 
‘technology push’ model came about during the rapid economic growth that 
permitted industrial expansion in the Western world and in Japan between 1950 and 
the mid-1960s.  It views technology as a sequential process, with an emphasis on 
research and development as supply, and the market as receptacle of the results of 
R&D activity.  Companies adopted the ‘more R&D in, more new products out’ 
approach.  Commentators563 propose various steps, but agree that the process is 
driven by novelty:  
basic science > design and engineering > manufacturing > marketing > sales 
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As in the black box model, there is no real differentiation between technical R&D 
and basic science, described in the earlier 1945 Bush Report564 as the ‘unexplored 
hinterland’.  Both were considered to hold the key to economic prosperity, with 
potential to overcome the ills of society.  R&D was seen as a corporate overhead, and 
as ivory tower work to be isolated from the rest of the company.  This meant that 
R&D did not incorporate market information until late in the process, with the result 
that applications intended for commercial use were often technical inventions not 
properly adapted to the market.   
The ‘market pull’ model was the result of intensifying competition in the mid 1960s 
to 1970, during which companies were induced to shift their focus from new product 
development and related technological change to the needs of the market.  It also 
views the technological process as simple, linear and sequential, but emphasises the 
role of the market as consumer demand, to which R&D responds.  It sees the 
sequence of steps as: 
market need > technological development > manufacturing > sales 
Stronger integration of R&D into other operations, by including product engineers in 
science-led research teams, reduced the timeframe for market development.  A 
disadvantage of this model is its emphasis on optimisation of existing products 
through incremental improvement, rather than more radical innovation, resulting in a 
variety of short-term projects.   
These simplistic linear illustrations of the technological process and are now largely 
disregarded because they assume that all technical products develop in the same way 
in all firms, and fail to observe technical and organisational change and its 
interaction with the competitive marketplace.565  They operate very much on the 
basis of repeated continuous ‘innovation’ on the assumption that ‘we are doing what 
we do, but better’566 and fail to take into account that innovation is sometimes 
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unpredictable or discontinuous in nature.  Under conditions of technological or 
market disruption the usual ‘good practice’ approach that works in ‘steady state’ 
conditions may be inadequate or inappropriate to deal with the new challenges. 
Interactive Models 
More recently, interactive models have attempted to capture the complex interactions 
between science, technology and the market by describing all the aspects and actors 
in the technological process.  These focus on the ‘dynamic relationship between 
innovation, the marketplace and the actors that emerge and compete on the basis of 
particular products.’567  The sequential events of earlier models are viewed as stages, 
each of which interact with the others in a complex network of communication paths, 
both inter-organisational and intra-organisational, linking together in-house functions 
and linking the firm to the broader scientific and technological community and to the 
marketplace.568   
The instrumental model in this area identifies three phases of industrial innovation: 
‘fluid’, ‘transitional’ and ‘specific’569 and draws a distinction between product 
innovation and innovation in the process by which it is produced.  It describes how 
early participants in new industries, uninhibited by universal technical standards or 
uniform market expectations, experiment freely with new forms and materials in a 
flurry of radical product innovation.  This period of innovation ends with the 
emergence of a dominant design amenable to the market, when consumer 
preferences regarding form, features and capabilities begin to limit the bases upon 
which product innovation can be pursued.  As the rate of change is reduced and 
major product innovation drops off, research and development becomes focused on 
incremental changes to the existing features of the product.  With this decline there is 
a new emphasis on the process used to produce the product, resulting in more 
specialised tools, methodologies and machinery, in aid of increased efficiency and 
volume of production.  
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Interactive models demonstrate that ‘innovation’ is not merely the product at the end 
of a final stage of activity but occurs throughout in the process, which can be 
iterative (circular) rather than sequential.570  Feedbacks and loops allow potential 
innovators to seek existing inter- and intra-firm knowledge and to carry out or 
commission additional research to resolve any problems arising from the market 
design, production and distribution process.  Product and process innovation are 
clearly interconnected.  Early innovation resulting in product design seems to shape 
the course of development of the production process.  Later on, the early choices 
made in relation to process technology may constrain further developments in the 
product.  When both product and process design are highly elaborated, they may 
become so intertwined and co-dependent that neither can change without deeply 
influencing the other.571  This is observed in organisational structure and supplier-
buyer relationships as well. 
Historical studies of industrial products affirm the interactive model572 through the 
observation of patterns across industries and sectors in the way that products change 
and in the organisational structure of the firm.573  The patterns, which link product 
innovation, the stage of evolution of the industry and the competitive climate, do not 
indicate predictability, but identify the relationships that are key to understanding 
how firms integrate the processes of innovation and exploitation in the industrial 
manufacture of economic goods.   
Systems and Network Models 
Whereas the interactive models elaborate the process that occurs in the ‘black box’, 
systems and network models inform local and international strategies in regard to the 
efficient commercial production of the outcomes. ‘Systems of innovation’ (SI) 
theory since the 1980s has sought to identify the ‘determinants’ of innovation, 
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defined as: ‘all important economic, social, political, organisational, and other factors 
that influence the development, diffusion, and use of innovations’.574  Initially the 
emphasis was on ‘national systems’ of innovation,575 and the identification of the 
main national factors that influence technological innovation in a particular 
jurisdiction.  Strategic corporate choices were known to be strongly affected by the 
prevailing conditions (political, social and cultural) at home, so understanding these 
and how other national systems differ from them was considered vital to 
international activities.  Primary determinants were found to include local market 
demands and national competencies in production and research,576 especially local 
public and private investment activities, input prices, natural resources, research 
facilities, social concerns, sustainable business practices and regulation.   
Sectoral and regional variations on the generic systems approach577 have since 
emerged in addition to the national one.  The sectoral innovation systems (SIS) 
approach focuses on various technology fields or product areas; the geographical 
boundaries of regional innovation systems (RIS) are regions within countries or 
include parts of different countries.  These approaches are arguably complementary  
rather than mutually exclusive of one other578 and all versions of the SI approach 
consider processes of innovation to be evolutionary,579 echoing the notion that 
technological process requires a co-evolution580 of the body of practice manifested in 
artefacts and techniques, with the body of understanding that supports and 
rationalises it. 
The national SI approach supports the management of international strategies 
through global networks, as firms attempt to meet the challenges of scientific 
frontiers, new global markets and competitors, political uncertainties and regulatory 
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instability.  These models of wider inter-firm networks of exchange, collaboration 
and competition accord with the interactivity models that explain innovation in terms 
of complex dynamic relationships, first across firms with cross-functional links, and 
then through connections outside the firm.581  
The benefits of global networks may be greater than previously expected: a recent 
shift in systems theory582 suggests that they do not simply promote extensive 
outsourcing of operations, but have ‘emergent properties’: if management and 
coordination problems can be overcome, the network as a whole may operate as a 
system that is greater than the sum of the parts. 583  Large corporations now recognise 
that collaborative global networks enable them to source a much larger proportion of 
their ideas from outside the firm,584 and encourage policy links within the national 
system.  Commentators envision ‘open innovation’585 in which connections are as 
important as the actual production and ownership of knowledge, as well as 
‘engineered networks’586 structured around a specific goal, industry function or 
geographical location, in order to facilitate adoption of new ideas, new products or 
processes, or radically different combinations of knowledge.       
Across the generations of models of innovation, explanatory factors have changed, 
and the focus has shifted from the process within the black box to systems for the 
expansion of innovation through international networks.  The interactive and network 
models affirm that technical innovation requires interactive engagement, and that 
learning is enhanced when this occurs between, as well as within, organisations.587  
Networking among firms is thus a natural vehicle for enhancement of knowledge 
transfer in market conditions. 
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5.7 Organisation 
The dynamics of the innovation process indicate that industrial technology, unlike 
the community of science, is a two tiered social organisation, comprising the legal 
person of the corporation and the individuals within it.  The firm is the external face 
of the enterprise, which relates to other actors in the productive competition of the 
marketplace, within the capitalist ethos.  The success of the firm in the external 
environment is dependent upon its internal organisation, which is adaptable 
according to the dynamics between its internal technical activities and its external 
commercial activities.  The two tiers of this social structure are shaped by different 
but interconnected systems of incentive and reward. 
The immediate incentives for technological innovation are, at both firm and 
individual levels, primarily economic.  The firm seeks to achieve and sustain 
profitability in the commercial market, while rewarding its employees in financial 
terms through salaries and other forms of financial compensation that reflect the 
extent to which individual efforts have resulted in corporate success.       
External 
In the external environment of the market, technical firms, like scientists, compete 
for priority and recognition but, unlike open science, industrial technology measures 
these things in economic rather than social terms.  The means of achievement of 
economic profit and thus firm sustainability is competition for technical priority - the 
generation of original knowledge embodied in products - recognition of which is 
provided by consumers, as reflected in the revenues of the firm.  Competition ensures 
that the ‘winning’ products are those best suited to the needs of consumers, and 
promotes high standards of quality, product diversity, efficiency and adaptability of 
production.  Competition produces not one winner, but a diverse array of winners, 
spreading productivity and profitability among firms, which ultimately benefits the 
consumer and society as a whole.  The role of competition in the organisation of the 
market is not to promote the sheer amassing of material wealth, any more than open 
science is aimed at the self-aggrandisement of scientists, despite the fact that each is 
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susceptible to these sorts of abuses.  Competitive rivalry in the market is driven by 
economic incentives, but it promotes economic productivity by stimulating firms to 
invest in innovation and change as a means of ensuring their own survival.  The 
notion of the ‘invisible hand’ that in the theory of laissez-faire economic markets 
directs the adaptations of firms and their products is not unlike the concept of 
‘spontaneous coordination’ that explains the competitive collaboration of scientists in 
the production of knowledge.  
Internal  
The external competitiveness of the firm is dependent upon individual activity within 
the firm.  The internal organisation of individuals is also based on economic 
incentives and recognition, but involves recognition by the firm, which in turn 
reflects the recognition of consumers and the profits generated by the firm in the 
market.  According to the models of innovation, the internal organisation of the firm 
is variable, adapting as necessary in accordance with patterns of product innovation 
and conditions of uncertainty or stability.   
In the earliest stages of innovation, conditions of high commercial and technical 
uncertainty require individuals, or production units within the firm to coordinate and 
focus their efforts to gather and process information for decision-making.  An 
‘organic’ firm structure characterised by frequent adjustment and redefinition of 
tasks, limited hierarchy and high lateral communications588 is appropriate to the task.  
As the firm moves away from this early stage of intense product innovation, 
individuals and units in the firm lose their loose organic connections, become more 
interdependent, and require coordination and control.  As a dominant product design 
emerges and production operations expand to meet increased demand, the capacity of 
the firm to innovate is moderated.  Organisational subunits become more 
interdependent, making it more difficult and costly to incorporate radical 
innovations.  Once a production process and a set of market relationships and 
expectations become highly developed around a specified and standardised product, 
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firm structure becomes more ‘mechanistic’.  Goals and rules may be used to provide 
coordination and control and to establish consistent routines that minimise 
inefficiency and costs in operations. 
Organisations with an organic structure value entrepreneurial skills, and the 
substantial rewards given for radical product innovation may be more valuable than 
salaries.  Realisation of potential rewards depends on the survival and growth of the 
firm, which in turn depends largely on the ability of the entrepreneur to generate a 
superior product and to capture a share of an emerging market.589  As the firm loses 
its organic character and a dominant design emerges, greater value is placed on those 
with management skills and the original entrepreneur or entrepreneurial group may 
depart.  Traditional rewards in the form of bonuses, stock options, and other 
managerial extras go to those who facilitate growth by expanding production 
operations and marketing functions.  In a stable technical and market environment, 
the mechanistic organisation rewards those with administrative skills for their ability 
to hold a consistent course, and achieve financial results and predictable incremental 
performance building on past investments.  Ideas that threaten to disrupt the existing 
stability will be discouraged, and ideas that extend the life of existing products and 
technology will be encouraged and rewarded.590   
The dynamics within the organisation of the firm are therefore not unlike the 
competitive collaboration of scientists: while individuals are motivated by economic 
prizes and salaries in recognition of technical contributions, skills and service, the 
overarching imperative is to advance the objectives of the corporation, without which 
there can be no individual benefits.  The parallels between open science and 
industrial technology suggest that although they utilise different conditions, the two 
systems are not diametrically opposed, but pull in the same direction.  Given the 
technical complementarity between them, as demonstrated by fields of study in 
‘Pasteur’s quadrant’, the grafting of science into the economic and organisational 
structures of industrial technology, as I discuss in the next chapter, is not a wholly 
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unnatural development.  It does raise questions, however, about the perpetuation of 
open science as a separate system. 
Upstream / downstream  
The dynamic nature of the internal structure of the firm, which shifts from organic to 
mechanistic structures, and entrepreneurial to managerial drivers, is indicative of a 
distinction in industrial technology between early stage development of a technology 
or industry, characterised by conditions of uncertainty and rapid innovation, and the 
later stages in which product development and market conditions have stabilised and 
ongoing innovation has become incremental.  References to these arenas as 
‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ is shorthand terminology for discussion of policy 
approaches to conditions, needs and incentives at different stages, even though the 
technological continuum from one to the other is complex and transitional.  Although 
these differences are evident in the extremes of the earliest research and the delivery 
of tangible products, it is inaccurate to use the terms to correspond in any precise 
way to a distinction between ‘research and product development’, ‘pre-patented and 
patented’ products, or ‘pre-competitive and competitive’ materials.  In the industrial 
innovation literature, research and product development are continual processes, and 
patents may be obtained on different types of innovation at any point in the 
technological enterprise.  Further, it is apparent that there is no such thing as truly 
‘pre-competitive’ technical research, because research would be of no interest to the 
technological firm if it had no potential for utility and economic gain. 
5.8 Property  
‘Property’  
The unequivocal objective of industrial technology, unlike open science, is to 
generate goods that constitute ‘property’: that have ‘exchangeable value’591 and that 
are capable of possession, use and disposal in every legal way.  ‘Property’ refers to 
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that which is peculiar or ‘proper’ to any person,592 and is thus commonly aligned 
with ownership: the unrestricted, indefinite and exclusive right to possess, use, or 
dispose of a thing and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it.593  In 
addition to ownership, ‘property’ commonly denotes everything that is the subject of 
ownership, which extends to the corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, 
visible or invisible, real or personal, extending to ‘every species of valuable right or 
interest’.594   
Technology generates both corporeal and incorporeal personal property. Without 
providing a complete classification, ‘personal property’ refers to  everything subject 
to ownership that is not immovable ‘real’ property or land; corporeal personal 
property comprises tangible goods and chattels, while incorporeal personal property 
consists of intangible rights such as personal annuities, stocks, shares and intellectual 
property, including patent rights.595  Personal property may be ‘public property’ in 
that it is owned by a state, nation or municipal corporation, but ‘public property’ may 
also refer more widely to things that are considered to be owned by ‘the public’ or 
the entire state or community and not restricted to the dominion of a private 
person.596  In this latter sense, public property corresponds to concepts of ‘common 
property’ that is either held by a municipal corporation in trust for the common use 
of the inhabitants, or jointly owned by more than one person.597  The literature of 
science and the ‘commons’, which I come to in Chapter 7, generally avoid the 
confusion by referring to the ‘commons’, ‘collective ownership’, or ‘commonly 
owned’ or ‘jointly held’ resources, rather than ‘public property’.   
The topic of property is fundamental to the open market system and to notions of 
social liberty598 and political economy that are bound up with capitalism, but I cannot 
address it here in a comprehensive way.  I acknowledge, for example, the 
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philosophical debate over justifications for the original acquisition of private 
property rights,599 but rely on the theory of property in the Lockean tradition that 
asserts that appropriation of property rights can occur through the exertion of labour 
upon natural resources.600  Neither do I examine the subject matter debates regarding 
the types of living things that should be subject to property rights, even though they 
raise important issues in regard to ‘commodification’ of the human body601 and the 
patentability of stem cells.602    
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So far in this chapter, I have made various references to the functions of property in 
industry: I have described how property rights act as a means of exclusion of 
competitors from innovation and new technical knowledge produced by a firm; I 
have said that patent rights are a legal device that expands the zone of protection for 
technical innovation in exchange for its full disclosure; and that technical disclosure 
provides a public source of technical knowledge for inputs into ongoing innovation. 
In the rest of this section I elaborate very selectively on aspects of patents that are 
relevant to my thesis, and then consider the function of property rights in knowledge 
or technology transfer. 
The idea that property is something ‘owned’, which is rooted in the rhetoric of 
property as exclusive and absolute,603 encourages the view that property is unitary 
and static, rather than a divisible and transferable set of rights capable of providing a 
framework for mobilisation of resources.  A preferable starting point is to consider 
that the law of property is not about the control that an individual has over a thing, 
but about ‘the legally recognised relationships we have with each other in respect of 
things,604 which is a broader perspective from which to construct property-based 
approaches to governance for the delivery of public goods.  ‘Property’ is thus the 
aggregate of legal rights of individuals with respect to things and the obligations 
owed to them by others in relation to those things, which are guaranteed and 
protected by government.   
Legal ownership is described as having four main component rights: the right to use, 
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the right to earn income from, the right to transfer and the right to enforce the other 
three property rights.605  Rights of ‘ownership’ of intellectual property are provided 
by legislation, which extend the rights to inventions that are products or processes.  
A product patent grants the holder the right to make, dispose of, offer to dispose of, 
use, import or keep the product whether for disposal or otherwise.606  A process 
patent gives the holder the right to use the process or to offer it for use in the UK.607  
In each case patent protection extends also to the products that flow directly from the 
use of the product or process.608  Liability for infringement of a product patent is 
absolute, whereas liability for infringement of a process depends on whether the 
defendant user knew (or it would have been obvious to a reasonable person) that the 
unauthorised use would infringe the patent.  This has specific implications for 
biotechnological inventions, which I discuss in the next chapter.   
Patents 
The patent system has long been contentious, having grown out of Crown 
prerogatives to grant privileges to subjects in return for the conduct of corresponding 
duties.  As there were no formal limits on the privileges that could be granted - 
delivered by ‘letters patent’ or an ‘open letter’ from the monarch – monopolies 
frequently rewarded activities that were already being performed, at considerable 
detriment to competitors.  Criticism led eventually to parliamentary abolition of the 
royal practice in Britain under the 1624 Statute of Monopolies, with the exception of 
grants ‘related to a manner of new manufacture.’  Knowledge transfer in return for 
the privilege was first contemplated when the duration of the grant was limited to 
fourteen years – equivalent to two terms of apprenticeship – in which the patentee 
was to teach the new art to two sets of apprentices.609   
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The present patent system in Britain, as elsewhere, is a function of bureaucracy 
rather than prerogative, the product of 19th century developments in law and 
administration reinforced by the 1977 Patents Act and British entry into the 
European Patent Convention (EPC).  Public criticism continues to call for its reform 
or abolition on the basis of practical or administrative difficulties, as well as 
ideological arguments against government interference in laissez-fare market 
economics.  The patent does not simply endow new knowledge with the usual 
property rights - to use and exploit, transfer and enforce - but gives it an augmented 
right to exploit the patented technology by instating a temporary monopoly in favour 
of the holder.  That patents intervene in the market, reducing competition and 
causing inefficiency, is in itself problematic for some; the potential for them to result 
in elevated prices and reduced accessibility of goods by consumers is another 
concern, especially in the context of international development and the delivery of 
global public goods.610   
As Incentive 
The dominant argument for patent justification since the nineteenth century611 is 
based on the idea that the public should only have to endure the harm caused by the 
grant of a patent if it – the public - is going to receive some corresponding benefit.612  
The modern ‘social contract’ purports to use patent incentives to make certain goods 
available to society that would not otherwise be produced, given that they are not 
capable of production solely by public means.  The rationale of patent law is that the 
monopoly encourages private investment in markets characterised by prohibitive cost 
and risk through the expectation of future compensation in the form of enhanced 
profits.  This incentive to invest in innovation that would not otherwise be pursued is 
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given in return for disclosure of technical information that would not otherwise be 
produced, or would be withheld from the public domain.  The justification for patents 
is strongest therefore where the production of a technical product makes a clear 
contribution to an overarching policy goal for the delivery of public goods such as 
health benefits.   
Intellectual property law attempts to strike a balance between commercial 
profitability and public interest concerns by permitting the monopoly for a limited 
period, recognising that in the absence of exclusion there would be poor incentive for 
the creation of intellectual property, but also that permanent patent rights would lead 
to the standard deadweight losses of monopoly.613  Policy support for patents is 
therefore based on the assumption that the system constitutes a defensible attempt to 
promote social value as well as economic growth.614   
As Disclosure  
Patents are nevertheless commonly cited as barriers to the public circulation of 
knowledge, despite the fact that it is a central objective of the patent system to 
expose technical information that would otherwise be treated as trade secret.  Full 
disclosure of an invention is a condition of patent application, and must be sufficient 
to enable a person ‘skilled in the art’ to manufacture the invention.615  There is only 
one ground for the sufficiency examination in the UK, regardless of the type of 
invention in question: the patent specification must enable the invention to be 
performed.  The technical material required to satisfy the test of ‘enabling disclosure’ 
will however vary with the type of invention and other circumstances.616  While a 
formula might for example be sufficient in one situation to enable an invention to be 
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worked, another case may require disclosure of starting materials or means as well as 
a formula.    
As a result of the disclosure requirement, there are vast public repositories of 
technical specifications in regard to patents that are pending, in force or lapsed, and 
thus constitute a significant source of information about current technology and the 
commercial potential of specific areas of research.  The patent holder controls the 
right to exploit the invention described in a patent, but information set out in the 
applications is freely available for use as the basis of further research.  In terms of 
‘conventional’ industrial technology this means that potential competitors are not 
prevented from using the information in R&D to generate competing products during 
the term of the patent, as long as the results are not released onto the market until the 
foundational patent has expired.  In addition to the research use offered by the 
specifications, there is plenty of opportunity during the term of the patent - typically 
twenty years, but capable of extension in the event of further innovation – to obtain 
from the patent holder more extensive rights to use and exploit the patented 
technology by negotiation of appropriate licensing arrangements.  
What is not clear however, is the extent to which these resources are being used.  
Even though the databases are construed as a major source of scientific as well as 
technical knowledge617 there is at least anecdotal evidence to suggest that academic 
scientists do not use them as such: either they have little awareness of, or interest in, 
patent databases or there are infrastructural difficulties in accessing them.618 
‘Publicly-funded’ upstream researchers may for example scrutinise patents merely as 
a means of avoiding infringement of downstream applications, from which they feel 
far removed.  There may be difficulty in locating relevant patents due to technical 
classification issues, and in accessing them due to the technical language in which 
patents are necessarily drafted.  The extent to which patent databases are used as a 
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specific source of knowledge by industrial firms is equally obscure, despite the 
studies that I discussed earlier in relation to industrial research.  
What is wrong with this picture, I suggest, is that private researchers cannot rely on 
the disclosure of patent specifications as a basis for ongoing research, not because 
the foundational disclosure is inaccessible or insufficient, but because technology 
advances so quickly that new ‘products’, which may be tiny links in a web of 
knowledge, are forged within a fraction of the twenty year timeframe that is the term 
of the original patent.  Further, the scope of a patent extends not only to the original 
invention – a product or process – but to the ‘derivatives’ that flow directly from 
their use.  To ensure that they do not infringe a patented technology and new results 
or derivatives do not sit on the shelf waiting for the original patent to expire, firms 
are obliged to negotiate licenses that authorise them to use, patent and disseminate 
new advances incorporating the original patented technology in step with the rapid 
pace of technological advance.  While the option of obtaining a patent licence to use 
a technology without patenting the results of ensuing research may remain open to 
academic scientists, it is not generally one that is open to the private firm.  Rather the 
decision for the firm is at what point in the process patenting should be undertaken to 
ensure that advances do not stagnate but can be disseminated and used by others in 
the field.  The negotiation of patent licenses to access multiple pieces of technology 
as a basis for ongoing research is, however, expensive in terms of time and money, 
and may ultimately act as a deterrent to the use of foundational technology by both 
publicly and privately funded researchers.  This ‘patent congestion’ allegedly creates 
an ‘anticommons’ effect: 619 an underuse of technical resources that poses a threat to 
ongoing innovation.  
Problems 
It is not surprising therefore that the literature is rife with claims of adverse effects 
and problems associated with patents, despite the fact that the system is intended to 
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facilitate disclosure. Merton for example argued that patents result in the 
‘suppression of invention, contrary to the rationale of scientific production and 
diffusion’620 on the basis of a judicial pronouncement that an inventor has discovered 
something of value in which he has absolute property, and that he is free to withhold 
it from the knowledge of the public.621  A significant question is the extent to which 
patents potentially undermine the development of ‘innovation’ or technical products 
that they were designed to facilitate, and the extent to which governance might 
overcome the barriers that they pose.  The potential barriers are many, and include 
the patent congestion622 discussed above, the granting of patents of overly broad 
scope,623 and the misuse of patents to ‘block’ exploitation of the technology through 
failure to work or license it.  Patent laws generally include rules that permit 
compulsory licensing to other users in the event that the patent is not ‘worked’ by the 
holder, but such provisons are seldom used.624  To the extent that the social contract 
regarding the patent system is defensible, as discussed above, it is the role of law, 
policy and governance to identify the problems that it raises and to facilitate some 
means of ‘solving’ them, or to enable them to be circumvented, to the mutual benefit 
of the actors in the system. 
The more particular question for the design of facilitative governance is whether, in a 
given situation, patents and the patent system not only can but do have an adverse 
impact on research and, if so, whether the effect is to limit the translation of 
knowledge into public goods.  Understanding of the potential or capacity for patents 
to create barriers needs to be applied in the context of the particular circumstances of 
specific technologies, in order to identify with clarity the problems that need to be 
addressed.  It is not clear for example that despite concerns about ‘patent thickets’ in 
biotechnological research there is any significant degree of frustration of innovative 
research in regard to stem cell technology in the UK.  The equally relevant but less 
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debated question is whether uptake by pharamaceutical companies may be limited in 
some way by the emphasis on facilitation of basic academic research.  These are 
questions for the next chapter. 
To conclude this section, then, the patent system in principle provides incentives for 
innovation and the ability to exploit technology while overcoming the potential for 
exclusion to prevent access to and use of technical information.  Intellectual 
innovation that would otherwise have been held in confidence through a long process 
of product development and pre-market approvals may be endowed with property at 
an early stage, thus facilitating its mobility in the complex of rapid technical 
advance.  The patent owner can extend rights to other users, under conditions of 
licence and for a price, without undermining its commercial operations.  The 
potentially serious problems associated with patents are a subset of wider issues to be 
addressed through mechanisms of governance for the delivery of public goods. 
Knowledge transfer 
Gatekeeper 
Property rights therefore act as a ‘gatekeeper’, rather than an absolute barrier to the 
transfer of privately held technological resources.  The implication of the 
conceptualisation of property as a conglomerate of rights and obligations is that they 
are severable from one another.  It is possible to transact in them individually: to 
retain some while others are relinquished, thus giving up partial but not all control, 
either voluntarily or by external authority.  Relinquishment of some rights by an 
‘owner’ corresponds to the enhancement of control by others, thus expanding the 
number of actors that can interact with the property.  Further, as intellectual property 
is essentially non-rival, any number of non-exclusive use licences can be extended to 
users at the owners discretion.  
Legal Structures 
Property rights are also governed by legal norms and frameworks that provide 
structures or vehicles, such as licences and material transfer agreements, for their 
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transfer or conveyance.  These frameworks facilitate the mobility of private 
technology through interchange between the parties that may involve any number of 
actors, making contractual construction a potential medium for large collective if not 
‘public’ endeavours, as is demonstrated by some of the strategies that I examine in 
Chapter 7.  The nature of the access is determined by the terms of the agreement, 
rather than the motives or objectives for entering into the agreement: property is no 
less ‘property’ in the law if it is given away or exchanged according to principles that 
are counterintuitive to usual business practices.   
Discipline and Design 
The legal frameworks that govern property permit the parties to discipline and design 
the mode of dissemination of technical resources.  The arrangements are shaped by 
the precise terms of patent licenses and MTAs, which can reflect a wide variety of 
policies or approaches to access and use.  Contracts constitute both access to and 
dissemination of resources, with rights and obligations, involving exchange between 
the parties.  The exchange is accomplished not through general release into the 
public domain of knowledge, but in the public domain of commerce, in a controlled 
or modulated fashion, through negotiation of specific arrangements that impose 
certain limitations on use.  The cumulative effect of transactions involving multiple 
patents in a rapidly developing field is a network of interactivity and engagement 
with technology.  The publication of science is by comparison a less strategic, 
shotgun approach to maximising the reach of its new knowledge.  Given the 
limitations on publication however it may not be unrealistic to think that the ‘texture’ 
of accessibility within the domain of knowledge and the domain of commerce may 
not be very different. 
Private Control 
Finally, the bottom line in the domain of private property is that whatever potential 
there may be for expansive dissemination and use of resources, the holder of 
property rights maintains control.  Any transaction or collective arrangement for the 
transfer or sharing of privately held resources requires the willing participation of the 
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proprietor, which is important in relation to the design of governance structures. 
Participation is dependent upon a sustainable economic model for industry that not 
only protects the viability of the proprietor but advances its core objectives.  A firm 
will not normally be in a position, even if it were willing, to accede to a sharing of 
resources that undermines the production of its core product or requires a complete 
alteration of its objectives.  An example in which this happened is in regard to the 
development of ‘open source software’, which took off in the 1970s.  Delivery of the 
crucial ‘source code’ along with a piece of software enabled users to access, copy 
and manipulate the software and so create new computer solutions to complex 
problems, but it rendered the software nonexcludable and therefore nonsaleable as a 
proprietary package.  The commercial viability of open source software is therefore 
dependent upon a different business plan, which focuses on delivery of services to 
users of the manipulable open source software, rather than sales of proprietary 
software packages designed to serve fixed functions.  What works for computer 
software may not however work for other technologies, such as stem cell 
therapeutics, in which the fixed function of the therapy is the primary and non-
negotiable objective, and the expense involved in producing even the basic materials 
of that product is such that production cannot be sustained on the basis of a 
peripheral business plan in which the core product is not a direct source of revenues.   
In Chapter 7, I look at various strategies for unlocking the use of resources at specific 
junctures in the process of research and development.  Some of these address 
concerns about the privatisation of science in general and others the shortcomings of 
the patent system.  The question for a later chapter is not how successful these 
arrangements are in defending open science within the marketplace, but the extent to 
which they are mutually beneficial for both science and for overcoming hurdles to 
production of stem cells. 
5.9 Domain of commerce 
Public forum of exchange 
Through the chapter I have made reference to the ‘public domain of commerce’ in 
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the paradigm of the open market, as opposed to the ‘exclusion zone’ of the private 
firm within it.  The enterprise of technology, unlike science, does not create out of its 
products a freely accessible pool of ‘common property’.  It creates instead a public 
forum for exchange in which its products remain privately held but are nevertheless 
available and accessible, subject to negotiation of terms of access with the holder. 
Science and technology are each innovative systems that result in the release of 
products into the public domain, but technology ensures that strings remain firmly 
attached.  The use of exclusion by the industrial firm is to protect the inchoate 
product through the extended innovation and exploitation process until it is 
characterised by economic value and property that renders it capable of the kind of 
control that is necessary for transmission in the public domain of commerce.  
Technical knowledge, like science, may be withheld from the public domain or 
released as determined by the producer, but in neither case is it in the interest of the 
enterprise of science or the advance of technology to withhold indefinitely. 
Accessibility 
I have described the network of potential transactions that facilitate the transfer of 
knowledge within the open commercial market.  The question that scientists pose in 
relation to the private dissemination of knowledge is whether it can make knowledge 
sufficiently ‘accessible’, even on the basis of an individual transaction, that it can be 
engaged in ways that promote its use, manipulation and reuse, as opposed to mere 
consumption.  This question implies first that scientists are interested in accessing 
technical knowledge, and secondly that scientists apply - to the system for production 
of practical knowledge motivated toward products - the same objectives that they 
apply to the ‘invention’ of pure scientific knowledge.  The primary consideration, for 
production of any new knowledge is that there is engagement with the existing 
resources; but from the point of view of the industrial firm, it is equally necessary 
that the knowledge that results can be packaged in tangible (or intangible) form and 
sold to consumers who may not want to do anything but consume it.    
What accessibility means in relation to ‘technology transfer’ in the private sector 
must therefore be carefully defined.  Whether and how accessible is ‘accessible’ may 
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depend on the objectives of the potential user.  An ‘available’ resource may be 
inaccessible if the purchase price or licensing fee poses an insurmountable barrier.  It 
is also inaccessible if the scientist or other researcher cannot engage with it 
sufficiently to unlock its potential utility, or to understand and adapt it to different 
purposes.  In some cases, the release of a tangible product into the commercial 
domain without prior patent or technical disclosure will enable a potential user or 
competitor to ‘reverse engineer’ the product in order to obtain the intellectual 
property that enables it to be copied and exploited.  It is the knowledge that firms 
protect by exclusion from competitors and which is key to innovation and 
production.  
Complementarity 
Finally, ‘exclusion’ in technology, like ‘openness’ in science, has specific functions 
in the system of production of practical knowledge and goods but in practice is not 
absolute, as property rights mediate the accessibility of technology in the domain of 
commerce.  The public domain of knowledge and the public domain of commerce 
are not incompatible polar opposites, but complementary systems moving in the 
same direction, with a degree of overlap in which they can accommodate each other 
by accepting limitations and conditions imposed by the other.  The purpose of 
facilitative governance is to promote not two separate systems but an integrated 
approach to innovation and exploitation across science and technology and the public 
and private sectors, to promote and utilise the strengths of each for the production of 
knowledge and the delivery of public goods.   My conceptualisation of this integrated 
approach is set out in the next chapter. 
5.10 Conclusions 
From this chapter I draw the following conclusions:  
1. ‘Exclusive’ technology is part of an open system.  The main conclusion of 
this chapter is that the private enterprise of ‘industrial technology’, which is 
conventionally construed as ‘exclusive’, in fact operates within an innovative system 
characterised by both openness and exclusivity.  The industrial firm excludes 
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competitors from its internal activities, but releases its products into an open market 
or public domain of commerce.  The market is one aspect of the social order of 
capitalism, which supports the enterprise by infusing it with social values that 
balance the drive for capital.  In contrast to the community of open science, the 
organisation of technology is two-tiered: the firm is both an organisation of 
individuals, and the external face of the enterprise in relationship to other actors in 
the open market.   
2. ‘Innovation’ in technology is a process involving both ‘innovation and 
exploitation’.  In the language of industrial technology ‘innovation’ encompasses the 
whole process that generates both new technical knowledge and products; it involves 
simultaneously the innovation that generates new knowledge and its exploitation, 
which transforms knowledge into products by infusing it with economic value and 
endowing the outcomes with property rights.  According to industrial models that 
attempt to explain the process of innovation, the process is a set of complex 
dynamics between the firm, the technology and the market.  Although the process 
cannot be construed as linear in any way, there is an apparent distinction between the 
‘upstream’ chaotic activity that characterise radical innovation and the ‘downstream’ 
stabilisation of products.  
3. Exclusion facilitates innovation.  The ‘exclusion’ of external competitors 
from the internal operations of the firm, by secrecy and property rights, serves 
specific functions in the delivery of products to the open market.  First, exclusion 
protects the inchoate products, during their protracted gestation, from revelation to 
and exploitation by other actors prior to attachment of patent or other property rights.  
Secondly, exclusion of competitors contains activity within the firm, creating a 
private forum that facilitates intensification of innovation and exploitation, with the 
specific objective of producing economic goods.   
The functions of exclusion in industrial firms suggest a surprising parallel with the 
system of open science.  The establishment of the firm, and the exclusion of other 
actors in the market from its internal activities, serves a function comparable to the 
creation of public institutions for the advancement of science.  The isolation of 
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science from market forces, through its treatment as a public good, ensconced in 
public institutes, is undertaken to promote rapid production of knowledge; equally 
industrial technology, contained within the private firm, excludes market forces in 
order to intensify production of technical products.  Science publishes its outcomes 
in the ‘public domain’ of knowledge, while technology releases products onto the 
open market, in the public domain of commerce.  Each uses exclusion to create a 
crucible of innovative activity, from which it releases its results into the public 
domain in order to facilitate their exchange and use.   
4. ‘Exclusive’ property rights serve several facilitative functions.   
 
First, property rights render products excludable in economic terms, and thus capable 
of commercial exchange without relinquishment of control that might threaten the 
enterprise of the firm.  Secondly, patents expedite the release of intellectual 
resources into both the public domain of knowledge and the open market, making 
them available for rapid access by others, through public databases or negotiation of 
licenses.  While commonly seen as a barrier to knowledge dissemination, the patent 
system is in principle at least a defensible attempt to advance both commercial 
innovation and disclosure of technical knowledge.   
 
Thirdly, property is governed by legal norms and frameworks that can facilitate 
discipline and design in the mode of dissemination of technical resources.  This legal 
infrastructure enables the holder to maintain control over the terms upon which 
property will be disseminated and accessed in the public domain of commerce, and 
can provide the vehicle for innovative governance strategies. The publication of 
science is by comparison a less strategic, shotgun approach to maximising the reach 
of its new knowledge. 
 
Lastly, property rights facilitate knowledge transfer in the public domain of 
commerce.  The ‘gatekeeping’ function of property rights makes property 
‘accessible’, subject to the negotiation of terms with the holder.  The different means 
of conveyance - the publication of science and the private transaction of technology - 
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alters the ‘texture’ of the interactive networks that each system generates, but as 
neither the openness of science nor the exclusivity of technology is absolute there is 
room for compatibility between the systems.   
5. Open science and industrial technology are complementary rather than 
incompatible systems.   
The paradoxes of openness and exclusivity that I identify in industrial technology 
shed new light on the conventional dichotomy between the public or communal 
enterprise of science, and the private or individual enterprise of the market.  The first 
paradox is that from the dynamic and chaotic process of innovation comes stable 
products endowed with exclusive property rights.  The second is that the exclusion of 
competitors from the innovation process of the firm creates a beehive of innovation 
for the specific purpose of facilitating release of products into the open domain of 
commerce.  This suggests a further parallel with science, in that the isolation of 
science by its treatment as a public good is also an exclusion of market forces, which 
creates a forum for the intensification of innovation for the express purpose of 
increasing knowledge production.  
The result is a construction of two open systems that are not incompatible but have 
complementary capacities.  Each employs exclusion of the market in order to 
establish a forum in which innovation may be fostered in the pursuit of new 
knowledge.  Science focuses specifically on knowledge, while industrial technology 
involves more complex dynamics of innovation and exploitation in order to generate, 
in addition to knowledge, concrete products.  Despite the offence caused to science 
by the reticence of technology to make its results public without the control afforded 
by property rights, private infrastructures for technology transfer offer a means of 
negotiating mutually advantageous access to knowledge resources.  It is clear that 
science has not been deterred from alliance with the enterprise of technology, which 
is the subject of my next chapter.  
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Chapter 6. SCIENTIFIC TECHNOLOGY  
6.1 Introduction  
In this chapter I set out my conceptualisation of ‘scientific technology’, 
distinguishing it from pure science, proprietary science and industrial technology, as 
well as theories regarding new paradigms in the nature and practice of science.  I 
conceive of scientific technology as technology rather than proprietary science 
because it pursues practical outcomes within a market economy; I construe it as 
scientific because it is a confluence of scientific understanding and technological 
utility.  I understand ‘scientific technology’ to result from a synergistic relationship 
of science and technology, in which technology is not simply augmented by strong 
science, but which is capable of combining the strengths of each to generate 
something different than either science or technology is able to produce on its own.  
It is characterised by six primary features: synergy, research, innovation, utilisation 
of resources, a domain of exchange and an institutional ethos.  The equal promotion 
of these features is central to my conception of governance, and the design of 
organisational structures capable of their facilitation.   
This conception of scientific technology is informed by the results of the previous 
two chapters, in which I examined the discrete systems of open science and industrial 
technology that emerged following the revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries.  In 
this chapter I recognise that the traditionally asserted bifurcation between the norms 
of science and proprietary technology is increasingly untenable; I look to the natural 
interconnections inherent in science-based technology, recent changes indicating 
deeper levels of integration, and trends in patent law, practice and public policy, to 
determine how openness and exclusivity are manifested within the context of modern 
‘scientific technology’.  Although the effect of many of these changes is to raise 
concerns among science scholars and academic researchers about the long-term 
viability of science-based technology, I suggest that despite presenting ongoing 
challenges (particularly in relation to the patent system), such changes are indicative 
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of a coherent system of scientific technology with certain identifiably consistent 
features.  This chapter addresses first the natural connections between science and 
technology, then the significant changes that have been observed, as well as the 
issues and implications that they give rise to, before I set out the six integrational 
concepts that characterise ‘scientific technology’ as I understand it. 
There have long been interconnections between science and technology, given their 
natural complementarity with regard to the pursuit of knowledge.  The resulting 
overlap between ‘discovery’ and ‘invention’ has been recognised in patent law, 
which has sought to balance market-based technological advance with the public 
disclosure of knowledge for access by the scientific community, as I discussed in the 
previous chapter.   
Changes in recent years, however, indicating greater scientific and technical 
integration and interdisciplinarity in research, have given rise to concerns about the 
impact of commercial incentives on the sustainability of openness in science.  
Influxes of private investment in the field of biomedicine, increased patenting of 
scientific discoveries, changes in patent law doctrine, government and university 
policies encouraging patenting of academic work, and more collaboration between 
academia and the private sector have all given rise to a debate about the 
commoditisation of knowledge and the privatisation of science.  The concern is felt 
largely by those who share the interests of publicly funded scientists, rather than 
industrial corporations involved in ‘innovation’, who continue to engage with 
resources generated by publicly funded ‘scientific’ research as well as their own in-
house facilities in R&D to create products and processes.  The concern is that the 
impact of commercial incentives for the protection of intellectual property will 
undermine the traditions of open communication and the free flow of knowledge 
within the scientific community, and further that encroachments which threaten to 
close down public science have long term adverse implications for the science-based 
technology which relies upon it.  
The debate over privatisation of science is important in that it examines the process 
of change that is occurring in modern science and technology, promotes an 
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understanding of the difficulties that such change gives rise to, and considers various 
ways of addressing them.  The difficulty however is that the debate perpetuates the 
traditional distinction between public science and private technology, which is no 
longer an accurate depiction of reality.  The way ahead is construed mainly in terms 
of greater government support for the public system of science, protection and 
promotion of the role of scientists in directing it, and in devising solutions to the 
problems that inhibit it - with an emphasis on thorny patent problems such as the 
effect of broad and multiple patents on ongoing research.  The whole debate obscures 
the fact that the liason of science and technology has already infiltrated public 
science: that the vast majority of academic and government research funded by the 
public system of ‘science’ has since WWII been directed toward practical problems 
in fields located in ‘Pasteur’s quadrant’.  Greater government support for ‘science’ 
thus also supports basic technological research, generates resources that undergird 
the interests and ongoing innovations of private industrial technology, thus 
stimulating more private sector patenting that entices public sector researchers to 
obtain a slice of the commercial pie.  Even if governments and universities could be 
persuaded to turn back the clock to stop public sector patenting of technical 
processes or products, there is nothing to stop private sector companies from taking 
information freely available in the public domain and applying to patent it 
themselves.  
My proposition is that adherence to traditional narratives of ‘public science’ and 
‘private technology’ inhibits the facilitation discourse, which seeks to support robust 
scientific enquiry, but with a clear view to the exploitation of knowledge for its 
practical outcomes and social benefits.  Much of the literature in this area advances 
the cause of science,625 attempting to promote or reinstate public science, or to create 
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pockets of openness against the background environment of the market, which 
arguably in the long term facilitates technology too.626  Little attention and certainly 
no priority is given to impediments to the short term production of the outcomes of 
industrial innovation, although the more successful innovative ‘commons’ 
approaches that I refer to in the next chapter might, through removal of barriers to 
the research commons, also enhance the associated industry.  
In an attempt to streamline the discourse about facilitative governance, therefore I 
propose a conceptual framework for ‘scientific technology’ that acknowledges the 
trend toward integration and commercialisation in modern biomedicine.  I argue that 
attempts to devise mechanisms that facilitate activity at all levels should be based on 
an understanding of ‘scientific technology’ as an integrated meta-system for the 
production of goods and services, which encompasses research, innovation and 
exploitation, across science and technology and the public and private sectors.  I 
submit that an accurate conception will permit the identification of the relevant 
problems or hurdles to be overcome, and ground the formulation of strategies for 
overcoming them in relation to a given technology: the arrangements and structures 
that might be used to achieve optimal conditions for innovative use and exploitation 
of resources. 
6.2 Science-based technology 
Interconnections  
I have already indicated some of the ways in which science and technology although 
institutionally separate, and distinct in orientation and objective, are nevertheless 
allied and interconnected with one another.  Technology has long benefited from the 
explanatory power of science, and most commentators agree that the power of 
modern technological developments depends to a large extent on its ability to draw 
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upon the knowledge generated by modern science.627  There is less consensus – some 
would say there are ‘quite wrong beliefs’628 - about the nature of the connections 
between science and technology.  Modern technology is no longer considered a 
predictable ‘application’ of science but is said to constitute a ‘co-evolution’ of 
understanding and practice, and even though science provides a strong component of 
the process, technology still needs to engage in a ‘competitive exploration of 
multiple paths’. 
Scientific enquiry is equally inspired by technical advances.  Science may be alerted 
to questions of scientific interest by practical realities as well as theoretical ones, and 
an awareness of utilitarian pursuits of technology can enhance its progress.  The fact 
that scientists address questions, the answers to which have immediate practical 
importance for technology, does not undermine the purity of the scientific pursuit of 
knowledge, nor the value of its outcomes.  Who sets the agenda – whether it is a 
scientific, policy or private agenda – and whether results are accessible to the wider 
scientific community are the concerns raised in the debate about the long term 
freedom of scientific enquiry and future knowledge base for science and technology. 
I have described the development of fields of research in ‘Pasteur’s quadrant’629 in 
which scientific enquiry into the natural properties of things coincides with the 
advancement of technological utilisation of those properties.  Biomedical research is 
such a field, which pursues both deep understanding and solutions to particular kinds 
of practical problems.  The selection criteria regarding the projects that will be 
pursued or funded in these fields, however, cannot be kept distinctly separate; those 
who think that they might be able to apply science according to practical criteria 
(does it work?) are able to provide a stringent testing ground for the claims of science 
(is it true?), and the failure to understand why something works is a strong motivation 
for scientific research.  Although the first institutional structure of open science 
demarcated it from the economic environment of technology, it did not sever the 
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natural affinity of science and technology for one another that results from their 
different orientations - toward understanding and utility – which inspire and 
complement one other in their respective pursuits. 
Public policy  
It was a natural extension therefore to include these fields of ‘applied science’ or 
‘research and development’ under the umbrella of public support for academic 
‘science’.630  Government-supported programmes of R&D during World War II, 
particularly in the U.S., were hugely successful, resulting in the development of 
weapons that won the war and medical capability that reduced casualties, and 
postwar recognition of the importance of public science in technological progress, 
particularly in the U.S. and the UK.631  A new debate was generated in regard to 
science and technology policy going forward.  There had been earlier debate about 
science policy in the US,632 and Francis Bacon himself, as I have already mentioned, 
had much earlier envisioned support for science as a means through which societies 
would progress materially.  The debate did not contest the fact that companies, with 
their own R&D capabilities, had a central role to play in the process of technological 
advance.  It focused instead on the extent to which government would fund and 
control the agenda of the public system of ‘science’ conducted in universities and 
public laboratories, separate from but complementary to the corporate system of 
R&D.  Some advocated stronger government support on grounds that it would make 
the overall system of innovation more powerful, while others were wary that this 
would limit the freedom of scientific enquiry.  In the UK, physicist JD Bernal633 
favoured a closely monitored government program that would allocate public funds 
to science on the basis of assessment of social needs.  This approach was countered 
by philosopher of science, Michael Polanyi,634 who advocated a publicly-funded but 
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largely self-governing organisation, in which scientists would set their own priorities 
and standards of good science.   
In the U.S., the influential 1945 report entitled ‘Science, the Endless Frontier’ (the 
‘Bush Report’) stood in favour of a self-governing scientific community, but 
permitted a government role in setting national priorities in certain areas, including 
national security and health.  The budget and broad agenda in these areas were to be 
established by political and government processes, but within these parameters, 
scientists were to have discretion in the construction of appropriate research 
programs.  In the use of public science to pursue economic progress more broadly, 
the role of the government was limited to the support of basic research, in which self-
governing science would identify the broad fields of greatest potential, the detailed 
allocation of funds and the conduct of research.  The Bush Report, like the Polanyi 
response to Bernal, was to stave off attempts to propose a postwar system involving 
tighter government control, which would be potentially destructive for the creativity 
of science, concluding that it would be preferable to allow top scientists to run the 
show.635  
Economic interdependence 
The debate over the governance of public ‘science’ postwar obscured the fact that the 
large majority of ‘scientific’ research conducted at universities and institutes since 
WWII has been carried out in fields in which practical application is central to the 
definition of a field.636  These are also the fields of research from which industrial 
technology draws most heavily.637 Much of the credit for the power of modern 
capitalism as an engine of technological progress has been given to businesses and 
entrepreneurs, and their efforts to develop the proprietary capabilities of firms in the 
market, as the central actors in the development and introduction of new products 
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and processes.  There is nevertheless a widely recognised dependence of industrial 
innovation and invention upon the strength of the science base from which it draws.  
Despite the institutional divide that separates science from the market, there is an 
economic interdependence between science and technology that arises from their 
reliance upon one another for inspiration and inputs of knowledge.  The foundational 
science for technology is largely the product of publicly funded research, and the 
knowledge produced by that research is mostly in the public domain and available 
for potential innovators to use.  The market part of the capitalist engine thus rests on 
a publicly supported scientific commons, as has been demonstrated by various 
studies of national systems of innovation.638 
Popular perception  
The close association of science and technology in research is reflected in the 
popular perception that construes them as almost interchangeable.  As a result, 
science is often attributed with responsibility for the technical applications of its 
work, whether they are beneficial or undesirable.  Support for science and the 
integrity of scientists is increased by technical applications that demonstrate 
scientific theories in a way that is accessible to the lay public,639 and that produce 
welcome social enhancements.  Science may also take the blame, however, for 
technological developments that are disapproved by agents of authority or pressure 
groups.640  Scientists themselves affirm this conflation of science and technology: the 
presumption by some scientists that all social effects of science are ultimately 
beneficial, and that the purity of discovery is undermined by external judgment, fails 
to distinguish scientific truth from social utility.641  The distinction is important in the 
life sciences, in which technical uses of scientific knowledge in relation to 
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biomaterials, including stem cells, are the subject of heightened public awareness and 
policy debate.  
Laws of patent  
I also referred briefly to the overlap between ‘discovery’ and ‘invention’ in the 
conduct of scientific research, and the effect of this in the law of patents and the 
norms and ethos of science.  The norms of science and technology have coexisted for 
many years under the patent system.  In simplistic terms, in addition to the doctrine 
that restricts patentability to ‘inventions’, as opposed to the ‘discoveries’ of basic 
scientific research, the reach of patent protection is further restricted by the 
requirement of specific and substantial utility - that the applicant should demonstrate 
that the invention is operable and capable of use.  This means that an invention is not 
patentable until outstanding technical problems are solved, regardless of the extent to 
which it may be interesting and significant to research scientists; it also means that 
discoveries that result from much basic research, even if not prevented from patent 
on grounds of subject matter, will not be ripe for patent protection due to lack of 
demonstrable utility.642 
6.3 Recent changes  
The process of change in the paradigms of science and technology, and the 
difficulties that come with it, are the fruit of the evolution of understanding and 
practice in the advance of scientific technology.  Scientific and technological 
integration has given rise to changes in patent law doctrine, government and 
university policies regarding the use of commercial incentives, and ultimately 
changes in patenting practices by publicly funded as well as private sector 
researchers.  These changes shape the conduct of ‘scientific technology’ and affect 
the governance initiatives that respond to them.  I outline these changes, then ask 
whether and ask what bearing they have on openness in scientific technology and 
policy attempts to facilitate the delivery of complex public goods. 
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The new biology 
Scientific and technological ‘integration’ in the life sciences involves both the dual 
orientation of research in the fields of Pasteur’s quadrant’ as I have already 
discussed, and the incorporation of a wide variety of technologies in the research 
process.  Regenerative medicine (RM) is typified by the combination of diverse 
technologies, united in the common aim of restoring impaired anatomy and 
physiological and biomechanical function.643  Combinatory approaches result in 
inter-disciplinary transfer of knowledge, innovative solutions that would not be 
accomplished by any one discipline alone, and expanded potential for application to 
many and various targets and conditions.  RM illustrates what has been referred to as 
an emerging movement to integrate different types of research inputs into the ‘New 
Biology’.644  Technological advances in biology, as in other life sciences fields such 
as microbiology and genomics, are creating opportunities for the integration of 
disparate sources of scientific knowledge and research at a time when pioneering 
methods645 have emerged to produce and process increasingly vast amounts of raw 
materials, data and information.646 This trend toward technological integration has 
been recognised recently by the U.S. National Research Council:   
‘Years of research have generated detailed information about the components of the 
complex systems that characterize life – genes, cells, organisms, ecosystems – and 
this knowledge has begun to fuse into greater understanding of how all these 
components work together as systems.  Powerful tools are allowing biologists to 
probe complex systems in ever greater detail, from molecular events in individual 
cells to global biogeochemical cycles.  Integration within biology and increasingly 
fruitful collaboration with physical, earth, and computational scientists, 
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mathematicians, and engineers are making it possible to predict and control the 
activities of biological systems in ever greater detail.’647 
The process of integration within the life sciences is aided by the parallel integration 
of techniques and concepts from engineering, robotics, computer science, 
mathematics, statistics, chemistry and other fields.  Mathematics has played an 
especially critical role in the processing of massive amounts of data and in building 
digitally accessible collections.  The U.S. National Research Council foresees the 
possibility of much greater integration, with enormous benefits to public health, 
food, security, environmental protection and other urgent social needs.  It bases its 
expectations on advances in foundational technologies: information technology, in 
vivo imaging of cells, organisms and ecosystems, high through-put technologies 
including nanotechnology, and engineered biological systems.  Hopes for the new 
biology are pinned on three foundational sciences: systems biology, computational 
biology and synthetic biology.648  
Patent law doctrine 
Along with the prospect of more powerful combinatory technologies have come 
changes to patent law doctrine that challenge the traditional view of basic science by 
expanding the potential for patentability of the results of research ‘discoveries’ in 
general, and biotechnological inventions in particular.  In 1980, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in the case of Diamond v Chakrabarty,649 granted to General Electric the first 
patent over a genetically engineered micro-organism, thus enabling inventors to 
exploit the ‘manufactured’ life form or ‘composition of matter’ in addition to the 
production process.650  With this shift toward the patenting of discoveries, there was 
allegedly a tendency for patent office directives and the U.S. courts to authorise 
patents that are presumed to have utility as a basis for further developments, even if 
their immediate usefulness could not be proven at the time of the application.651  
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This, it was suggested, amounted to a renunciation of the criterion of industrial 
utility, that would encourage patenting of scientific insights in the very early stages 
of research, and give the holder the ability to control and potentially block the use of 
research tools and the outcomes of activities that might rely on them.652  The United 
States Patent and Trademark Office however, in its 2001 Utility Examination 
Guidelines,653 now requires that utility in relation to a claimed invention be ‘specific, 
substantial and credible’,654 thus adopting the 1966 Supreme Court test of substantial 
utility655 - as having a real world use in currently available form.656  The CAFC657 
recently upheld a similar standard in relation to gene fragments by deciding that their 
uncharacterised functions failed to satisfy the ‘specific and substantial’ utility test.  It 
found that an applicant asserting utility must show that the claimed invention has a 
‘significant and presently available benefit to the public’.658  An invention that is 
only an object of further research, or useful in order to determine what it might be 
useful for, does not therefore have a substantial, currently available utility.659  
Apart from USPTO retention of the utility requirement for patentability, trends 
toward expansion of the scope and reach of patents can encourage industrial firms, 
particularly in biotechnology research to engage in early stage research in-house and 
to license their own patented research results to other firms that can make use of 
them.  These trends are reflected in the rapid adoption of public policies by which 
universities are permitted to patent the work of their employee researchers.  The 
Cohen-Boyer patents, over the technique of recombinant DNA that permits the 
useful manipulation of genetic material, are cited as an example of the attraction that 
rapid and substantial revenues to university rights holders can have for university 
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officials and university scientists.660  The first Cohen–Boyer patent was granted in 
1980 prior to the passage of Bayh–Dole Act, which legitimated and warranted such 
university patenting, as discussed below.   
In the EU, after ten years of debate, the 1998 Biotechnology Directive661 was 
adopted in an attempt to harmonise national approaches of Member states to the 
patenting of biotechnology inventions.662 The current European patent system is 
based on the 1973 European Patent Convention663 (‘EPC’) which established the 
European Patent Office and a unified ‘European Patent’ procedure.  The EPC permits 
an applicant to obtain, in one procedure, a group of national patents and thus patent 
protection in any of the Member states of the Convention; it does not however create 
a unified European-wide patent law, and because enforcement of European Patent 
rights occurs under national laws of individual Member states, there is room for 
various interpretations in the implementation and application of the laws in national 
legislation and courts.  Attempts to establish a harmonised Community-wide patent 
law have not yet been successful, and the Biotechnology Directive does not impose a 
standard patent law for biotechnological inventions, but clarifies how the provisions 
of the EPC664 with respect to the threshold criteria for patentability665 and specific 
exceptions666 are to be applied to them.  The Directive does not unfortunately address 
the precise scope of the research exemption provided by patent disclosure, even 
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though the laws of Member states diverge on this point.  It fails to clarify the 
circumstances in which patented biological material may be used by third parties for 
research purposes: which experimental acts are permissible without the authorisation 
of the patentee. 
The Directive in other ways largely affirms the long-standing practises and 
jurisprudence of the EPO and most national patent offices,667 stating expressly that 
inventions meeting the threshold tests of novelty, inventive step and capacity for 
industrial application shall be patentable ‘even if they concern a product consisting 
of or containing biological material or a process by means of which biological 
material is produced, processed or used.’668  Biological material may be the subject 
of an invention if it is isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of 
a technical process ‘even if it previously occurred in nature’.669  This includes 
elements isolated from the human body, ‘even if the structure of that element is 
identical to that of a natural element’.670  Inventions related to individual human 
genetic sequences, and their functions, can therefore be patented, subject to the usual 
criteria.671 
The Directive contemplates patentability of broad scope, pertaining to biological 
materials, biotechnological processes and products containing or consisting of 
genetic information.  A patent on biological material extends to materials derived 
from it as long as they share its characteristics;672 likewise the protection afforded by 
a process patent that enables production of a biological material extends to the 
material produced through the process, as well as its derivatives.673  Patents on 
products involving genetic information extend to all material (except the human 
body674) in which the product is incorporated, and in which the genetic information is 
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contained and performs its functions.675  Protection does not extend to derivatives, 
however, that are the result of propagation or multiplication that necessarily occurs in 
the use of an application of the patented material or process marketed in a Member 
state for precisely that purpose.676  
Specific exemption of inventions from patentability on grounds that their commercial 
exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality677 is also addressed by the 
Directive.678  It rules out: the patenting of an entire human body at any stage in its 
development,679 procedures designed to allow human cloning,680 human germ line 
engineering,681 and the use of embryos for industrial or commercial purposes.682   
The Directive does not, however, make specific reference to human stem cells or 
processes by which they might used to produce cell-based therapeutic applications. 
Analysis of the interpretations of Article 6(2)(c) by national patent offices683 and the 
EPO reveals a fragmented view as to which, if any, hESCs or processes are 
patentable in Europe.684  Increasing legal uncertainty on the scope of application of 
the moral exclusion clause to hESCs is the inevitable consequence, and carries the 
risk of a threat to research and investment in the life sciences and innovation in 
Europe,685 both of which have been earmarked as a strategic priority for Europe.  
The matter was recently considered by the European Court of Justice in Brustle v 
Greenpeace686 in which it ruled against the patentability of the process by which 
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neural precursor cells are differentiated from a stem cell line of embryonic origin, 
regardless of the fact that the process specified in the application made no reference 
to human embryos or the process of derivation of stem cells from an embryo, and in 
itself met the threshold criteria for patentability.  The Court held that the 
implementation of the patent would entail either the prior destruction of a human 
embryo, or use of an embryo as a base material, contrary to the Biotechnology 
Directive.  The decision is unfortunate on many levels but primarily for the fact that 
it creates a wide precedent capable of frustrating technological advances in 
jurisdictions such as the UK that have chosen to permit derivation of embryonic stem 
cells for the very purpose of achieving such therapies.  It also contradicts the 
interpretation of the moral exclusion clause that construes its purpose as precluding 
direct instrumentalisation of the embryo through its use as a raw material in a 
repetitive (technical) process, or its commodification through trade of human 
embryos involving monetary exchanges,687 thus reinforcing the technical and 
commercial uncertainty already felt in the field. 
Public policy 
In conjunction with scientific and technological integration, and changes in patent 
law doctrine, significant changes occurred in government attitudes and policies 
toward the patenting of publicly funded research.  The literature documents a major 
ideological shift in the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s, from the general hostility of 
the 1930s and the early postwar years to ‘a belief that patents were almost always 
necessary to stimulate invention and innovation’.688  Universities were increasingly 
expected to contribute to the reinstatement of U.S. economic competitiveness in 
international markets, and technological leadership in certain fields.689  They were 
strongly encouraged to take out patents on their research results, on grounds that this 
would arguably enable capable firms to make practical use of the results under a 
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protective license.690  A key feature of this policy shift was federal legislation known 
as the Bayh-Dole Act,691 which was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1980.  Although 
there is empirical evidence to show that in many industries patents are a relatively 
unimportant stimulus for investment in R&D,692 the Bayh-Dole legislation focused 
on the pharmaceutical industry, for which patent protection was and continues to be 
important.693   
The Bayh-Dole Act encourages universities to patent inventions generated in the 
course of publicly funded research through a mandatory notification system, whereby 
the university must report anything that ‘is or may be patentable’ to the government 
sponsor within a reasonable time, failing which patent rights in it may be claimed by 
the government agency.  The Act does not prevent the publication of research results, 
but permits universities to retain patent rights, subject to a non-exclusive license to 
the sponsor for use of the patented invention, only if they agree to file for patents 
promptly after publishing.  Further, if the university fails to exploit its patent the 
sponsoring agency can ‘march in’694 and license the university invention itself.  
Bayh-Dole also requires universities to share patent royalties with inventors, which 
gives researchers a personal financial stake in the results and creates an incentive for 
them be alert to patent opportunities.  
In Europe most countries, except for Sweden, adopted laws that mirrored Bayh-Dole.  
This ‘wave of legislation’695 inspired by the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act increased the 
involvement of universities in obtaining patents on the work of their employee 
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researchers,696 to allow universities to become the owner of patents for inventions 
made by their employees according to certain conditions.  Studies show that 
‘university-invented patents’ are nevertheless far more prevalent in Europe than 
‘university-owned patents’, meaning that patents on the results of academic research 
in Europe are still being obtained far more frequently by companies than by the 
universities.697  In Europe, the corporate patenting of work that was initiated by 
universities represents a more important academic contribution to technological 
invention than university-owned patent rights.698  Moreover, the effects of specific 
Bayh-Dole inspired legislation studied in national context indicate that the 
introduction of such a law may have negative impacts on university-industry 
collaboration. 699 
Patenting and licensing  
In association with these other changes, there are evident changes in patent practices, 
both with regard to the volume of patents obtained and the point in the innovation 
process at which they are sought.  It has been clearly demonstrated that across 
industrial sectors there has been a dramatic increase in patents granted during the last 
two decades, both in the U.S. and in Europe.700  In Europe, Switzerland and Sweden 
generate the most patents, measured by ‘patent families’ per million inhabitants.701  
This reflects the strength of the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry in these two 
countries, in contrast to Germany, where the biotech industry has remained relatively 
weak compared to those of Switzerland and Britain.702  
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With changes in patent doctrine that permit patent applications at a much earlier 
stage in the innovation trajectory, there has also been a shift in practice toward 
patenting further ‘upstream’, particularly in the field of biotechnology.  The effect of 
this is that instead of the patenting of ‘end products’ ready for manufacture, around 
which the patent system was originally designed, the large majority of 
biotechnological ‘inventions’ are now ‘research tools’ that play a critical role in the 
furtherance of knowledge and innovation in both the public and private sectors.  The 
term ‘research tool’ in its broadest sense embraces the whole range of resources used 
by researchers use in the laboratory including, for example, cell lines, monoclonal 
antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry 
libraries, drugs and drug targets, clones and cloning tools, methods, laboratory 
equipment and machines, databases and computer software.703  What is to the user or 
researcher a ‘tool’ may nevertheless, from the perspective of a provider, be a 
valuable commercial ‘product’.   
Even in the context of upstream biological research, where the label ‘research tool’ 
would seem to apply unequivocally to the multitude of discoveries (including DNA 
sequences, databases, clones, cell lines, animal models, receptors and ligands 
involved in disease pathways704) that precede the identification of new therapeutic 
compounds, or the techniques used to create or identify them, such ‘tools’ might 
constitute commercial end products to the institutions that discover them.  Many 
research tools are costly to develop and have significant competitive value to the 
firms that own them. Some might ultimately prove to be therapeutic or diagnostic 
products in their own right, marketable to consumers for use outside the laboratory.  
Others might be identified as resources with sufficient commercial potential in the 
discovery of future products, to motivate investment in their development for sale or 
license for use in further research.  Research tools are however difficult to value: 
value varies according to the tool and the type of use, and the party - provider or user 
– that is doing the assessment.  The characterisation and valuation of resources as 
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research tools or end products varies therefore with the interests of the parties. 
Inevitably, each minimises the value of the discoveries it borrows from others, while 
seeing great existing or future value in its own discoveries.705 
With increased use of the patent system to obtain proprietary rights in research tools 
across the public and private sectors, there has also been a move toward the use of 
licences and material transfer agreements (MTAs) for the dissemination of such 
tools, as a means of delineating the terms and conditions under which they can be 
used.  Despite a certain amount of withholding of discoveries from their professional 
rivals, past practice among scientists allowed for relatively free exchange, typically 
without formal agreements and without explicit consideration of commercial rights 
or potential financial benefits.706  The use of licenses and MTAs, which has long 
been standard practice for private firms, has now however become fairly standard 
practice for universities and government laboratories as well.707  Although such 
agreements may be used effectively to disseminate patented or unpatented materials, 
the terms of these agreements can also interfere with the widespread dissemination of 
resources, either because owners and users are unable to reach agreement on fair 
terms, or because the negotiations are difficult and cause protracted delays.708   
The problems of access to resources look quite different from the perspectives of 
different types of actors: scientists, universities and private firms, with considerable 
variation within each category.709 Those who seek advantage in the competitive 
market from their proprietary research tools are not generally in a position to make 
them freely available, and may attempt to limit who has access to the tools, restrict 
how they are used, and delay disclosure of research results.710  Moreover, 
corporations that have invested in the development of valuable research tools have a 
fiduciary duty to use them in a manner that returns value to their shareholders.   
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Potential users who have limited ability to pay up-front fees, may enter into licensing 
mechanisms whereby providers seek to profit from potential discoveries arising from 
the use of tools, on the basis of future royalty obligations or rights to future 
intellectual property.  Such arrangements are capable of constraining future 
opportunities for research funding and technology transfer.  Other users may be 
capable of paying fees to obtain biomedical research tools, but are reluctant to share 
profits in potential future discoveries with institutions that do not share the risks and 
costs of product development.  
As a result, many scientists and institutions involved in biomedical research may be 
frustrated by difficulties and delays in the negotiation of permission to use tools and 
materials on a case by case basis.  The recommended solution is often to standardise 
terms of license and MTAs, but given the differences in the nature and value of 
research tools and in the objectives and constraints of owners and users it is difficult 
and may be undesirable to standardise terms of access across the broad spectrum of 
biomedical research.  A multi-pronged approach would entail: dissemination of 
resources without legal agreements whenever possible, especially when the prospect 
of commercial gain is remote; use of standard agreements such as the ‘Uniform 
Biological Materials Transfer Agreement’ (‘UBMTA’) to reduce the need for 
individual negotiations; development of guidelines for recipients of public funds 
regarding reasonable terms for use in licenses and MTAs.711 
Institutions   
 
Finally, the literature recognises that all of these changes - scientific and 
technological integration and the expansion of the role of patents in legal doctrine, 
government policy, and in the practice of both public and private researchers – have 
consequences for the organisation of research.  Universities and public laboratories 
have become actors in the patent arena.712  In the field of biotechnology, 
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collaboration has increased since the 1970s between publicly funded researchers and 
proprietary firms.  With the realisation by scientists and investors of the potential 
benefits for human health of the advances and products that could be generated in 
fields such as molecular biology, biomedical researchers increasingly chose to 
collaborate with entrepreneurial companies that understood and valued basic 
science.  Others decided to leave academia and join these firms as founders or 
employees.  As a result many biotechnology companies emerged with strong ties to 
the academic world.713  
U.S. venture capitalists suggest that in 2008 there were about 1000 companies in 
over ten countries involved in the pursuit of cell therapies and regenerative medicine, 
and while over half of these are mid-sized to large pharma companies with multifold 
interests, ‘300 to 400 are focused solely on regenerative medicine.’714  These fall into 
four main categories.  Cell therapy companies pursue therapeutic treatments 
involving human embryonic stem cells (Geron and Advanced Cell Technology) as 
well as those derived from adult stem cells and their precursors (Mesoblast and 
Cytori).  Tissue engineering firms develop replacement tissues (such as the Tengion 
product NeoBladder made from bladder epithelial cells of the patient).  A third 
category comprises tool companies that produce cells for drug discovery and toxicity 
testing (VistaGen) and instruments and devices (such as the Novathera bioreactor 
that enables three-dimensional cell culture) used in the manufacture of cell therapies.  
Fourthly, other companies focus on bioaesthetics, including skin rejuvenation and 
repair products (Organogenesis) and hair regeneration procedure involving 
cultivation of cells from human hair follicles (Intercytex).  
 
Such firms may have a greater role than previously recognised in the shaping of the 
new ‘mode of science’.  In the U.S. pharmaceutical sector, contract research 
organisations (CROs), which were largely nonexistent before 1980, now reportedly 
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carry out a significant part of drug development and clinical trial management.715  
These firms arose out of small specialised boutique providers of narrowly targeted 
services to pharmaceutical clients,716 but now range from small, niche specialty 
groups to large, international full-service organisations.  They differ markedly from 
earlier for-profit toxicology, bioassay, and pharmaceutical testing firms, which they 
have tended to drive out of business.717  The role of the CRO, as opposed to that of 
its main competitor the ‘academic health center’, has been discussed in the medical 
literature for more than a decade, but it need not be restricted to the pharmaceutical 
industry:  it has been suggested that the CRO is the essence of the new paradigm of 
privatised science in the post-1980 era of commercialised research718 and as such 
holds potential for other sectors.   
To summarise: since the 1970s there has been significant integration of scientific and 
technological advances, an expansion of patentability of early discoveries and living 
things, a dramatic change in the attitude of governments in favour of patenting of 
publicly funded research, increased volumes of patenting overall, mixed patterns as 
to the roles of universities and corporations (particularly as between the U.S. and 
Europe) in regard to such patenting, and the emergence of new actors and types of 
collaborations between the universities, researchers, and private firms.   
6.4 Implications  
 
What do these changes mean for the governance of scientific technologies – 
particularly biotechnologies - and facilitation of stem cell therapies?  I have 
attempted in the previous sections to identify the main changes that have occurred 
recently in the models of science and of technology, without straying too far into the 
issues that they raise, partly because many of them cannot be dealt with fully within 
the scope of this thesis, but also because it is not the purpose of the thesis to solve 
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those problems per se, but to consider how they are or might be addressed.  I outline 
the main issues below.  The question that underlies much of the academic debate 
around these developments is whether the public system of science is under threat 
and, assuming that it is, how the situation can be remedied.  The central threats under 
discussion are the inhibition of research as a result of the commercial incentives of 
patenting and, to a lesser extent, the effect of the crossover of scientists from 
academic institutions to employment within private sector organisations.  There are 
other problems in both public and private sectors - with the patent system in general 
and biotech patents in particular,719 barriers to translation of knowledge into final 
industrial products, and other issues specific to the various sectors and actors.  The 
dominant debate however concerns the impact of commercialisation on publicly 
funded or government-supported science.  
This ‘privatisation’ debate, like that surrounding government policy post-WWII, is 
not so much concerned with the activity of private sector organisations in research 
and industry but with academic or government research and the consequences of the 
proprietisation of the work of academics through the encouragement to patent and 
license.  It is the move from the old norms of science to proprietary science within 
the system of public science that is of primary concern to scientists.  The problem for 
facilitative governance is that the situation continues to be assessed in relation to the 
norms of open science, framed by the traditional distinction between science and 
technology.  Given continued public support for research, and the fact that in its new 
mode it is certainly not industrial technology, many (perhaps most) scholars continue 
to treat public research as the ‘science’ of the Mertonian conceptual framework.  The 
main response to the changes is therefore to attempt to protect and reinforce the 
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scientific commons, or at least the essential function of disclosure (or its private 
counterpart, knowledge transfer) in order to ensure public access to new knowledge.   
The reality is that the new mode of public research in fields such as biomedicine is 
neither open science nor industrial technology.  Public science has not simply 
metamorphosed into private industrial technology, nor is it clear that it is heading in 
precisely that direction, but neither does it conform to the norms of open science.  It 
no longer fits either of the ‘old’ boxes.  The proprietisation of public science is one 
aspect of the development of modern scientific technology across the public and 
private sectors and that the facilitation discourse is inhibited if we continue to frame 
our approach to these changes in terms of an unsustainable distinction between 
science and technology.  Attempts at governance, I suggest, require a more integrated 
conceptual foundation upon which to move forward.  To understand the new 
landscape we need to recalibrate our thinking, by abstaining from presumptions and 
generalisations about openness and commercialisation that are rooted in the received 
doctrines of open science and industrial technology.  Before setting out my 
perception of the new conceptual landscape, however, I outline the implications of 
the changes that I described above for patent law, public policy and the development 
of new ideas regarding new paradigms of science and technology.  
Patent law  
 
Scholars in the patenting of academic research have identified at least two different 
situations in which the presence of patents might potentially hinder research.  The 
first is the grant of ‘broad’ patents over research tools: techniques that are widely 
used in a field, materials that are frequently used as inputs, or key pathways for 
research.  The other is the grant of a profusion of patents in a particular field, so that 
any one piece of new research may be dependent upon access to ‘multiple’ patented 
technologies.  The concern in regard to the broad patent is that the holder could 
either reserve to itself the exclusive right to use the tool, or aggressively prosecute 
unlicensed use.  The allegation in regard to multiple patents is that the burden of time 
and cost involved in negotiating the licenses necessary to avoid infringement creates 
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a disincentive to ongoing research in fields characterised by patent congestion.  In 
each of these situations, perspectives regarding the effect of patents on research are 
informed by a range of doctrinal theory, anecdotal evidence and empirical studies.         
Multiple Patents  
 
Concerns about the effect of multiple patents are heavily supported in theory but are 
not necessarily borne out in practice.  In theory, patent congestion occurs where the 
advance toward a useful product or technique involves transgression on several 
patents held by different parties.  The more patent claims there are to negotiate for a 
given piece of research, the more time-consuming and costly for the user.720  Given 
the cumulative nature of research, and the speed of technological change, the trend to 
proprietary science has raised fears that access and licensing difficulties721 may result 
in a paradoxical underuse of new technologies, thus stifling ongoing research.  This 
‘tragedy of the anticommons’722 is the reverse of the metaphor of the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’723 used to explain the overuse of commons property when there is no 
incentive to conserve.  A resource is prone to overuse when too many owners each 
have a privilege to use it and no one has a right to exclude another.724  A scarce 
resource is prone to underuse when multiple owners each have a right to exclude 
others from it and no one has an effective privilege of use.725  Proponents of the 
theory claim that biomedical research is a key area in which competing patent rights 
could lead to a reduction in innovation: that the unintended consequence of the 
proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream may stifle life-saving products 
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further downstream in the course of R&D.  Too many property rights can arguably 
block innovation, and prevent useful and affordable products from reaching the 
marketplace.726  They assert that ‘privatisation of biomedical research must be more 
carefully deployed to sustain both upstream research and downstream product 
development’.727 
Empirical studies in the field of biomedical research however suggest that the need to 
assemble a large number of permissions or licenses before being able to go forward, 
is not particularly problematic.  The Walsh results728 demonstrate that although 
commercial activity is widespread among academic researchers, patenting does not 
significantly restrict access to intangible knowledge inputs essential to research.  
From a random sample of interviewees, no researcher reported that a project had 
been stopped as a result of external patents on research inputs necessary to their 
work, and only 1% reported delays of more than a month.729 Regarding research 
tools, a number of the more important general purpose ones are available to all who 
will pay the price, and while in some cases there were complaints about the price, at 
least they were available.730 The studies did not however measure the number of 
patents impinging on any given piece of research, and researchers indicated a lack of 
awareness by the interviewees with regard to the existence of the relevant patents.731  
They did however indicate that obtaining access to tangible research inputs of others 
was more problematic than knowledge inputs, and more likely to impede research.  
Further analysis suggested a distinction between legal and practical excludability in 
academic research and the need to look beyond patents to understand the restrictions 
on the flow of information across biomedical research.732  It was concluded that 
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patents are not apparently determinative, and what matters is a combination of 
academic and commercial incentives and effective excludability.733  
 
These results are largely supported by an international analysis734 and a study of the 
Canadian stem cell research community.735  The former found that IP protected 
technologies ‘remain relatively accessible to the broad scientific community’.  The 
Canadian study indicated that although many researchers believe that patents may 
have adverse effects on research, very few have encountered any in practice.  
Researchers, while admitting to withholding data to protect patenting opportunities, 
maintained that patents did not contribute to publication delays, and felt that the 
pressure to commercialise their research was reasonable.736  
Broad Patents   
Another problem associated with changes in patent law and practice is that of ‘broad’ 
or ‘blocking’ patents.737  This is a central difficulty in a rapidly changing field of 
technology, where the thing that is innovative at the time of patenting may quickly 
become standard practice; the significance of the patent criterion of novelty is soon 
diminished and the patent becomes a limitation on standard practice rather than an 
encouragement for invention.738  Such patents may be problematic if the patent 
holder aggressively prosecutes unauthorised (unlicensed) use of the technology or 
refuses to license, reserving exclusive rights to further research using the tool.  The 
empirical studies cited above739 identified a number of such situations, in which the 
holder of a patent on a key input or pathway did not widely license, and in some 
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cases sought to preserve an exclusive monopoly over use of the technology.740  These 
were not limited to the private sector, but arose in relation to patented work that had 
benefited from some degree of government funding.   
The foundational U.S. patents obtained by Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation 
(WARF)741 over human embryonic stem cells are a case in point.  Shortly after James 
Thomson reported that he had developed the first line of hESC cells742 (which he 
mildly suggested ‘should be useful in human developmental biology, drug discovery 
and transplantation medicine), three patents ensued.  These were issued to Thomson 
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), assigned to WARF as 
his sponsoring non-profit organisation, and applied throughout the United States.  
WARF did not file for patents in Asia, but did file at the European Patent Office and 
in individual European member states.  The three patents claim, respectively: the 
general class of primate embryonic stem cells; human embryonic stem cells; and the 
proliferating hES cells maintained without the growth factor LIF, a protein normally 
expressed in the developing embryo.743  The third of these, which is ‘stunning in its 
breadth’744 covers: 
‘A replicating in vitro cell culture of human embryonic stem cells comprising cells 
which (i) are capable of proliferation in in vitro culture for over one year without the 
application of exogenous leukemia inhibitory factor, (ii) maintain a karyotype in 
which the chromosomes are euploid through prolonged culture, (iii) maintain the 
potential to differentiate to derivatives of endoderm, mesoderm, and ectoderm tissues 
throughout the culture, and (iv) are inhibited from differentiation when cultured on a 
fibroblast feeder layer.’745 
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With the exception of the reference to exogenous ‘leukemia inhibitory factor’ (LIF), 
this is a definition of a stable human embryonic cell line.  Thus, any cell line with 
these characteristics, maintained without applying LIF, would infringe the patent.  
Although the patents also cover the process by which the cell lines are made, it is the 
product or ‘composition of matter’ claim that gives them teeth.  It means that not 
only can WARF exploit the lines it produces, but wherever the patent is in force the 
company can extract a royalty-bearing licence from anyone who wishes to make hES 
cell lines by any method, or to use or sell them.  The licensing strategies of WARF 
are central to the controversy over the patents.  Having already taken what was 
considered an unusually aggressive policy toward educational and scientific 
institutions,746 WARF focused its commercial strategy on a prominent exclusive 
licensing arrangement with Geron for the development of therapeutic and diagnostic 
products using hESC-based neural, pancreatic, and cardiac cells.747  Other WARF 
licensees were able to conduct research in these fields, but any commercial potential 
was subject to approval by, and payments to, Geron.  
The WARF patents were challenged in the U.S on technical grounds, and in Europe 
on moral grounds.  Critics said the patents were too broad, failed to meet the basic 
requirement of novelty or ‘nonobviousness’, and that the aggressive approach of the 
holders would stifle748 innovation.749 In Europe, the Biotechnology Directive was 
interpreted to preclude patents on inventions that required the destruction of human 
embryos,750 resulting in further uncertainty for Member states.  Upon reexamination 
in the U.S., the USPTO Board of Patent Appeals invalidated the third (2006) WARF 
patent on grounds that it had been ‘anticipated’ by a 1992 patent and was obvious 
rather than novel, in light of ‘significant guideposts’ in the prior art.751  The two 
related (1986 and 2001) WARF patents survived reexamination.  While there are 
some specific differences in the wording of the claims, the three patents are very 
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close in their structure and scope, and it is not clear why only one failed.752  The 
significance of the WARF reexamination ruling for biotechnology patent law is not 
in the ruling on anticipation, which is dependent upon the factual circumstances of 
the prior disclosure.  The decision may be of greater general significance for the 
finding of obviousness as a ‘collateral attack’753 on broad patents, particularly in 
relation to biotechnological inventions – the (retrospective) finding that the invention 
is obvious to a person skilled in the art.   
Responses  
 
All of these potential problems related to patents raise questions for governance that 
can be dealt with in a variety of ways.  For the purposes of protecting the regime of 
science from encroachment, it is not clear that problems of broad or multiple patents 
can be adequately addressed by changes to patent law.  This is primarily because the 
patenting of research tools as opposed to final products or processes, questions of 
subject matter patentability (discoveries versus inventions) and the appropriate scope 
of patents will always be difficult to discern.  ‘One can urge several things of the 
patent office and the courts, but the problem of innately blurry lines will remain.’754  
Arguments can be made in favour of restricting the patenting of discoveries of 
natural phenomenon by requiring that the subject matter be demonstrably ‘artificial’ 
or a ‘substantial transformation’, and limiting the scope of patents to ‘artificial’ 
outputs or elements.  The breadth of patents could be limited by ensuring that claims 
do not exceed what has been achieved in practice.  In the case of a process for 
purification of natural substances, patentability could be limited to the process, 
excluding the purified product per se.  The meaning of ‘utility’ or ‘usefulness’ could 
also be given a more restrictive interpretation that requires a more compelling 
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demonstration of significant progress towards a particular practical solution.755  
Public policy 
The implications of the major shift in government policies toward patenting and 
licensing of public research are by now apparent.  It is evident that the attitude of the 
patent holder plays a strong role in the effect that patents have upon scientific 
research, as exemplified in the WARF patent scenario, where the holder controls 
access to research tools which are key to future avenues of research as well as the 
solutions to practical problems.756  The Royal Society in the UK asserts that ‘[T]he 
problems associated with intellectual property rights are not primarily due to its 
format, nor to ideas about how best to deploy it.  The problems lie with those who 
use it.’757  The claim is supported by the ‘Hargreaves Review’758 in the UK, which 
found no evidence that intellectual property causes harm to the research community 
that cannot be remedied by better local practices.   
Attempts to influence government and university policy is therefore the objective of 
other strategies, apart from patent law amendment, for protecting the scientific 
commons.  These focus on promotion of an explicit research exemption, and 
attempts to persuade universities from harmful patenting practises. 
Research Exemption 
The point of disclosure as a quid pro quo for a grant of patent is to ensure that 
technical information about an invention is available for use by researchers for 
ongoing innovation – though not its exploitation - during the patent period.  It is not 
always clear however what constitutes permissible research activity and what 
infringes the patent, even though many jurisdictions include research exemption 
provisions in their patent legislation.   




757 The Royal Society, Science as an Open Enterprise, 46. 
758 UK Intellectual Property Office (2011) Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth, 
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In the U.S., universities until recently relied on judicial statements in support of a 
‘experimental use’ exemption - to the effect that use of a patented product for pure 
research purposes does not infringe a patent - coupled with the fact that in practice 
industrial firms were likely to give academic researchers a de facto exemption.  With 
university patenting, however, industrial firms are now more likely to see university 
researchers as direct competitors for practical patentable results - and to require 
universities to obtain licences to access their patented resources, just as universities 
require licences from firms prior to use of their patented results.  In 2002 this 
position was upheld in Madey v Duke,759 which defined the exemption narrowly and 
said that universities did not benefit from it, on grounds that research is a core 
business of universities and it is therefore reasonable for an external patent holder to 
require them to obtain a licence in order to use patented material in research.  The 
court found that: 
‘…regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an endeavor 
for commercial gain, so long as the act [research] is in furtherance of the alleged 
infringer's legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle 
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very 
narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense.  Moreover, the profit or non-
profit status of the user is not determinative.’ 760    
The decision also undermines potential for wider exemption of basic research by way 
of new legislation, given the difficulty of distinguishing ‘basic research’ from other 
university research, much of which falls within ‘Pasteur’s quadrant’, as previously 
discussed.   
In Europe there is no harmonised approach to research exemptions. Serious 
uncertainties about the boundaries of the UK exemption761 has led to the launch of a 
consultation by the UK IPO in an attempt to obtain some clarification.  At present, 
the defence is limited to acts that are carried out on or into the invention rather than 
with or using the invention.  Acts to test a hypothesis about the invention, or to 
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develop and improve the invention would generally be safe, but the use of a patented 
‘research tool’ in an experiment unrelated to the subject matter of the invention 
would not come under the exemption.  The exemption does not permit collection of 
information in regard to regulatory approval of a product;762 nor does it apply when 
the preponderant purpose of the defendant is to generate revenue, and conduct of 
experimental investigation into the invention is secondary.763  In relation to 
pharmaceuticals, a specific exemption (the ‘EU Bolar’ provision764) has been 
adopted to permit pre-clinical studies and trials of medicinal products.  
Modification of Bayh-Dole 
A second strategy for influencing university policies in favour of patenting would be 
to attack or amend the existing Bayh-Dole style laws.  The argument for limiting 
commercial incentives is that as long as public sector work remains publicly funded, 
proprietary control of its resources is not essential to the survival of universities in 
the same way that it is to private corporations.  While the ability of private sector 
researchers to control their use of results and tools is an important incentive for the 
research that creates them, this is not usually the case in regard to research funded by 
government grant.765  It is irrelevant that universities are now conducting ‘applied’ 
research, because they have been doing so for years prior to the move toward 
patenting.  Whether or not to patent arguably remains at the discretion of the 
researcher, institution or government sponsor and a large part of the problems of 
commercialisation therefore falls on the shoulders of government and university 
policies.   
Further, Bayh-Dole legislation could be amended to discourage potential for 
exclusive or narrow licensing, and to counter rhetoric suggesting that release of 
research results into the public domain does not encourage use.  Non-exclusive 
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licensing arrangements are not necessarily an impediment to the advance of research, 
especially where the patented research tools are of wide application, or where 
successful development would find a large market.766  The Cohen-Boyer patents 
provide an example of non-exclusive licensing of university patents that attracted 
many users.  There is also evidence to suggest that private pharmaceutical companies 
may be willing to work on the basis of non-exclusive arrangements with university 
patented findings if there is sufficient foreseeable potential for development of 
treatments.767  The point is that if universities want to patent their results as a means 
of generating university income, they should undertake to license the results to all 
who want to use them, at reasonable fees.  The licensing fee is not, within reason, an 
issue as long as results are made widely available.  
The huge increase in patenting and licensing of research that has occurred since the 
1970s, both in and out of the academic sector, thus appears to be as much a result of 
economic and institutional changes, patent laws and policies, as of technological 
breakthroughs.768  The debate, as I have said, has focused on the effect of 
proprietisation of research in the public realm of science and the universities in 
particular769 even though a patenting boom has occurred simultaneously in the 
industrial sector.  Many scholars have either ‘sounded the alarm’,770 sought to define 
and protect an optimal sphere of pure science, or attempt to minimise the impact of 
patenting and licensing policies on the research commons.  These approaches seek to 
prevent commercialisation of science in the public arena or, failing that, to ensure 
that the proprietary science that happens in the public sphere is as open as possible.  
In the next chapter, I demonstrate that many of the collective approaches to the use 
of research resources employ innovative structural arrangements to achieve particular 
goals, but are similarly oriented toward protection of the scientific commons.  
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New paradigm? 
The changes to science and technology as described have implications not only for 
patent law and public policy, but also scientific theory, giving rise to growing 
speculation about the emergence of a ‘new paradigm’ or ‘paradigms’ of science.   
Technological Science  
The idea of a new paradigm of technological science is articulated in various ways, 
but there is a prevalent sense among scholars, public authorities and others, that the 
increasing characterisation of science as technical and proprietary is not only a 
massive trend but irrevocable, given its embeddedness in a wider set of technological 
changes and economic and political circumstances.  Everyone concerned is 
beginning to look for patterns to emerge from the disruption of the traditional system 
of open science.  A new technological paradigm of science is seen in its orientation 
toward the solution of technical or practical problems, in its integration with multiple 
technologies, and in the new technological tools that it applies: particularly the power 
of modern computers and informatics, which are capable of not only supporting 
traditional scientific enquiry but fundamentally changing the development of a 
discipline.771   
Proprietary Science 
The accommodation of the commercial incentives of patenting and licensing within 
the scientific ethos has generated a new paradigm of proprietary science, as 
discussed above, which nevertheless pertains primarily to science in the public 
sphere.772   
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Privatised Science 
An even wider shift is envisioned by proponents of a paradigm of privatised science.  
These suggest that the focus on commercialisation within the universities obscures 
the full extent of the privatisation of science on other fronts, and that the 
restructuring of scientific research since the 1980s is a subset of larger political and 
economic trends in the privatisation of science, to which universities are relative 
latecomers.773  They assert that the development of the services of the ‘contract 
research organisation’ and the migration of scientists away from academia, to start up 
their own businesses or as employees of existing corporations, should not be viewed 
as ‘the dubious behaviors of a few misguided individuals or transgressions of the 
terminally greedy’,774 but as structural changes in the organisation of science that are 
‘harbingers of the future of privatized science’.775   
The advocates of science undertaken in a ‘for-profit modality’ insist that privatisation 
has had no adverse effects upon the conduct of research.  As a major spokesperson 
for the industry put it: 
‘Those of us who choose to pursue clinical science within the CRO industry reject 
the assumption that wisdom and ethical behavior are solely the province of the 
academy or the government.  We reject also the presumption that the pursuit of profit 
along with the progress of science and medicine is inherently in conflict.  In fact, in 
our experience the marketplace accurately reflects the public’s hopes and 
expectations for science, and is a powerful guardian of behavior.  It has little 
tolerance for shoddy performance or misapplied energies.  It is a powerful 
mechanism for progress, for which no apologies are needed.’776 
The ‘regime of industrialised research’, they argue, implies a necessary reordering of 
the goals of scientific research, the conduct of research on human subjects, the 
controls applied to disclosure and confidentiality, the management of intellectual 
property (especially ‘research tools’), and the role and functions of publication, all of 
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which are under discussion in the legal and medical literatures.777   
Post-academic Science 
 
The ‘privatised science’ paradigm merges into the post-academic paradigm778 of 
science, which emphasises both continuity and discontinuity between academic and 
industrial research.  It is based on observation of the ‘radical, irreversible, worldwide 
transformation in the way that science is organised, managed and performed’779 and 
reiterates that the new mode of science is driven by ‘counter-Mertonian norms’ that 
have ‘subverted the idealised social order of academia’.  Rather than communal, 
universal, disinterested, original and sceptical, industrial science is now construed as 
characteristically ‘proprietary, local, authoritarian, commissioned and expert’.780  
Discontinuity is identified in the pressure upon scientists to deliver obvious value for 
money, and the norm of utility that pervades modern research culture.  Competition 
for research funding transforms the forum of scientific opinion into an actual market 
in research services in which commercial evaluation of scientific discoveries may 
take priority over scientific validation; as scientists are not well-equipped to assess 
the utility of their work, expert peer review expands into ‘merit review’ by non-
specialist ‘users.’  Further, post-academic research is no longer independent of the 
influence of other actors in the market with similar material interests, with respect to 
everything from the formulation of projects to the interpretation of outcomes.  This 
has direct repercussions for disclosure, because although scientists may tell ‘nothing 
but the truth’, they may be prevented, in the interests of their employers, clients or 
patrons, from revealing the ‘whole truth’, including negative results or doubts that 
would put a very different complexion on their testimony.  What is not said may 
corrupt the meaning of what is communicated, with potentially damaging impact on 
the credibility of scientists and their institutions.   
Continuity, on the other hand, is also found here in the development of much closer 
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relationships between academia and industry, and comparable conditions and results 
in regard to the research conducted in each.  Members of this camp argue that with 
the proprietisation of academic science, industrial scientists now experience little 
difference in autonomy or openness than their academic colleagues:781 both want to 
work in environments in which they can do interesting work and enjoy a degree of 
freedom in doing so.782  There is no clear difference, they suggest, in the quality of 
the results of university and industrial science,783 and any presumption to the effect 
that industrial R&D requires less intelligence than ‘pure’ research is unsustainable.784  
To conclude this section, what emerges from all of these changes and the various 
types of responses to them is a diverse and rapidly evolving landscape in which 
research, innovation and production are carried out by a variety of different types of 
actors in many different organisational arrangements across the public and private 
sectors.  Much of the literature is oriented toward the defence of the scientific or 
research commons, rather than industrial technology, even as it recognises that the 
changes to science may be representative of a wider paradigm of privatisation.  
At this point, I want to remind the reader of the purpose of my analysis of openness 
in science, technology and the present realities of scientific technology.  I recall from 
Chapter 2 that the policy goal is not merely the advancement of knowledge, but the 
delivery of cell-based therapeutic products for clinical use or ‘improvements in 
public health’.785  In Chapter 3, I said that ‘a public good is not a single good, but an 
effect involving complex antecedents: complementary goods (private and public) and 
the activities of different types of social actors’.786  I also suggested that modern 
‘scientific technology’ - the synergy of science and technology - is the means to 
production of public goods such as stem cell therapies, and that ‘facilitative’ 
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governance is able to address complexity, fragmentation, interdependencies and 
overlaps between public and private, in order to ease the way.   
The way to such facilitation, I suggest, is through development of an integrated 
conceptualisation of modern scientific technology that accurately observes and 
describes its real objectives, functions and operations.  In the next section, I ‘stand 
back from the landscape’ and construe ‘scientific technology’ as an overarching 
‘system’ rather than a set of isolated components in order to identify the unifying 
concepts, connections and complementarities among its actors and activities.  It is the 
construction of existing features and functions as an integral whole that provides a 
sound conceptual foundation upon which to develop effective approaches to 
facilitative governance; it is not necessary to define the system as a new model or 
‘paradigm’.  Theories of ‘technological science’ and ‘proprietary science’ each 
observe changes in specific components of the system, without defining the factors 
that connect the whole.   The Mirowksi and Van Horn proposition of a new paradigm 
of ‘privatised science’787  is, in my view, an overstatement of the extent to which the 
private sector does and will for the foreseeable future dominate scientific technology.  
Similarly, the Ziman ‘post-academic’ paradigm788 overreaches in its attempt to 
contrive a predominantly proprietary model of science, rather than recognising the 
variety and diversity of organisations and actors, resources and types of exchange, 
that presently characterise the realm of scientific technology.   
Finally, my conceptualisation of scientific technology in this chapter is not 
undertaken in an attempt to determine whether and how it might be possible to 
ensure that publicly funded ‘science’ remains ‘open’.  I am primarily interested in 
understanding the conceptual bridges between basic science and technological 
research in the public sector, and technical research in the private sector and private 
industrial research and development and production, so that all of these energies 
might be brought ultimately to fruition in the production of public goods.  One of the 
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contributions of my thesis is the identification of certain features that integrate 
‘scientific technology’ across the public and private sectors.  
6.5 Integrational concepts  
Synergy 
The primary factor integrating the modern complex of scientific technology is the 
synergy or synergies that exist between science and technology, and between 
different fields or disciplines of science and technology.  While some suggest that 
modern research constitutes a complete merger or unification of science and 
technology, I hold to the view that close association between them does not negate 
their different orientations and objectives, any more than it negates the different 
types of expertise contributed by different disciplines.  A conceptual, if not very 
practical, distinction between science and technology still holds, because although 
the window of opportunity may be small – scientific enquiry can still be conducted 
without any utilitarian aim; similarly, technical research could still, in theory, 
proceed with little scientific understanding of its own utilitarian advances.  The fact 
that in modern practice research occurs least at these two ends of the spectrum is not, 
I suggest, an indication that most research entirely obliterates the distinction between 
science and technology.   
That scientific technology is defined by research between these two poles - in which 
science is inspired by and directed toward practical ends and technology is informed 
by the explanatory power of science - indicates rather that science and technology are 
interdependent, or symbiotic, in that they are drawn to, rely upon and contribute to 
one another from their respective strengths and capabilities.  The rapidity and 
intensity of the co-evolution of understanding and practice789 in sophisticated 
research makes it difficult and pointless to try to discern individual contributions, but 
it is their very differences that create complementarity between them, and their 
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complementarities that when combined are capable of outcomes that neither science 
nor technology is able to produce on its own. 
The same is true of the contributions made by different disciplines.  Fields such as 
regenerative medicine integrate a variety of technologies that have themselves 
reached a certain stage of maturity, opening the way for the exploration of new 
frontiers in the combination of once apparently disparate fields.  It is the combination 
of a variety of tools that stimulates innovation which, as I discuss below, involves the 
reconfiguration of fundamental elements in pursuit of complementarities and fruitful 
conjunctions.  Such synergies are therefore a basic integrational rather than divisive 
feature of modern scientific technologies.  
Research  
The second integral feature of scientific technology is research.  The literature is full 
of references to different types of research: basic, pure, scientific, applied, technical, 
developmental, translational, commercial, non-commercial, upstream, downstream 
etc. 790  However useful these labels may be to describe what is happening in a given 
context, for the purposes of facilitation all research is equal.  The aim of strategies 
for the advancement of both knowledge and the production of goods is to create 
environments that are conducive to all types of research, without distinction.  
The bifurcation between ‘public’ science and ‘private’ technology results in 
distinctions, such as those between basic and applied, and commercial and non-
commercial research, that are problematic in the current research environment.  
Despite their common useage, these distinctions are not clear, and attempts to define 
and use them in a regulatory capacity are fraught with difficulty.  ‘Basic’ research for 
example could mean ‘early’ or ‘exploratory’ scientific or technical research in 
relation to a question, subject area, problem or field, but given the cumulative 
knowledge upon which new enquiry rests and the pace at which it advances, it is 
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difficult to distinguish ‘basic’ from that which is the application of something else.791  
Further, basic and applied research have merged in the academic setting, so that the 
‘application’ of knowledge to practical problems now falls under the auspices of 
scientific research as well as by private firms for purposes of development of 
products.  ‘Basic’ might refer to ‘pure’ research, as in scientific enquiry that is not 
externally ‘directed’ toward a utilitarian aim, which eliminates most modern 
research, as previously discussed.  Or it might be used to mean ‘upstream’ in the 
innovation process, without clarity as to the point at which ‘upstream’ becomes 
‘downstream’ research.  
The distinction between commercial and non-commercial in modern research is 
equally difficult.  Licensing arrangements and material transfer agreements may 
employ it in various ways: to define the scope of permissible (non-commercial 
research) use of resources; or to trigger a mechanism (upon determination of a 
foreseeable commercial potential for licensed research) for negotiation of a separate 
commercial agreement, or allocation of intellectual property rights.  The latter is the 
situation in the ‘Research Use Licence’ of the UK Stem Cell Bank.  The problem is 
that in ‘Pasteur’s quadrant’, where the whole field is oriented toward a practical 
outcome with a potential for commercialisation, there is no point at which research 
can be characterised as ‘non-commercial’.  From an industry perspective, 
determination of actual commercial interest, in a stem cell line, for example, is 
determined by the existence of a potentially marketable and profitable product or 
service, on the basis of a satisfactory commercial risk assessment.  A stem cell line, 
and the research that it is involved in, could be of commercial interest, therefore, 
whether it is earmarked for use as a research tool, or for potential clinical application.  
Equally, potential clinical products may be of no commercial interest if the assessed 
risks cannot be overcome.  In principle, however, all types of research are conducted 
for a commercial purpose and hold commercial potential.   
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The U.S. case of Madey v Duke792 which I referred to earlier, made this point quite 
clearly when it found that as research was the ‘legitimate business’ of the university 
the research exemption did not apply, regardless as to the ‘for profit’ or ‘not-for-
profit’ status of the organisation.  In effect, all research is of a commercial nature; 
there is no such thing as ‘non-commercial’ research in the context of modern 
scientific technology.   
For purposes of facilitative governance this is the preferable approach, because the 
goal is to encourage people to use resources for all types of research, and to find 
practical and commercial as well as research uses for them.  The creation of 
distinctions between basic and applied, commercial and non-commercial research, 
arguably discourages potential users from accessing and using resources in ways that 
will maximise research and produce new innovations.  Research is the second 
consistent feature of scientific technology. 
‘Innovation’ 
 
The third integrational concept in the regime of scientific technology is innovation.  
The pursuit of ‘innovation’ is the common aspiration - the raison d’etre - of both 
science and technology, in academia and industry.  In the previous two chapters I 
described the perception and process of innovation in science and in technology: 
science as intellectual discovery, and in industry the intellectual property embodying 
a new useful method or product, as well as the whole process of development, 
wrapped up with exploitation, that gave birth to it.  I also pointed out that the failure 
of the literature of industrial technology to articulate the distinction between the 
creative event and the industrial process is a potential source of confusion, and that 
innovation in technology, as well as science, is rooted in the pursuit of new 
knowledge.  Here I expand slightly on the nature of innovation, in order to 
demonstrate both its integrative function in scientific technology, and how it might 
be facilitated.  
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‘Innovation’ in the broadest sense is the emergence of something new, unique, or 
different than what has gone before.  It is not necessarily the result of human 
initiative, but is the source of novelty and diversity that occurs throughout the natural 
world and in human society.  In nature, for example, innovation occurs in the 
biological processes that generate new species and genetically unique individuals.  In 
social relations, negotiation may result in new understanding of the respective 
interests of the parties, bringing accord where none was possible before.  In product 
design and manufacture, basic materials are transformed into complex goods that are 
essentially different than the sum of their component parts.   
Recombinatory Process 
What is common to all of these situations, and which I suggest is the essence of 
innovation in science and technology, is that novelty and diversity are the result of 
new configurations or ‘recombinations’ of some set of essential ‘elements’.  This 
notion comes from the literature of industrial innovation, in which it has been said 
that innovation is an interactive process that does not happen in isolation,793 which 
‘combines factors in a new way’, resulting in ‘new combinations’.794  Scholars in the 
economics and sociology of science also refer to fruitful ‘conjunctions’795 in the 
generation of knowledge.   
The concept of fundamental reconfigurations as the basis of radical innovation is best 
illustrated by the natural biological process of sexual reproduction.  The innovation 
in sexual reproduction is in the new combination of genetic material that occurs at 
fertilisation, and in the process of meiosis that precedes it.  Not only does fertilisation 
combine the two sets of chromosomes from the parental gametes, but the single set 
of chromosomes contained in each of those gametes – egg and sperm – is a 
scrambled version of the genome of the parent that produced it.  The genome of that 
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parent is itself a combination of two sets of chromosomes, each of which derives 
from a gamete that contains a mixed up version of the genome of the grandparent, 
and so on.   
The scrambling, or ‘homologous recombination’ of genes, takes place in meiosis, the 
type of cell division particular to the production of gametes.  The two sets of 
chromosomes present in an ordinary diploid cell are duplicated, and an exchange or 
crossover of pieces of genetic material occurs between the duplicate pairs before the 
cell undergoes two further divisions.  The result is four haploid gametes, each of 
which is genetically distinct from the individual that produced them.  Fertilisation 
then combines the haploid egg and sperm, reinstating a duploid chromosomal 
complement in the zygote to produce genetically unique offspring.   
In this natural system of innovation, the basic elements that are being reconfigured 
are tangible genetic materials.  Fertilisation is the crucial engagement of the elements 
that facilitates the recombination and thus unique offspring: the introduction or 
accessibility of the gametes to one another, even within a conducive environment, 
cannot guarantee that it will occur.  The result is genetic diversity in sexually 
reproducing populations, as well as the ‘phenotypic’ variation in physical and 
behavioural attributes, upon which natural selection can act. 
The enterprise of scientific technology for the production of new knowledge, by 
contrast, involves the engagement of human minds in the reconfiguration of 
intellectual elements including data, information, ideas, theories, design796 and 
existing knowledge.  How ‘newness’ and ‘knowledge’ are to be defined, and the 
nature of the inscrutable process of intellectual creativity are epistemological 
questions that I do not address here.  The message is that however methodological 
the pursuit of innovation may be, however diligent (or mechanised) the process of 
recombining the elements, and however radical or incremental the resulting change, 
innovation involves recognition of something novel and potentially meaningful in 
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the results.  The essence of ‘innovation’, I suggest, is in this recognition of novelty 
that occurs in the creative process, which may range in effect from the mere 
compilation of new data, to a greater illumination of understanding of the patterns 
that they present.   
Novelty 
I am not however concerned with precise definitions of ‘novelty’, as various systems, 
including industry and patent law, define it in different ways for their specific 
purposes.  In patent law, the inventor, by exercising choice in the research process 
and active involvement in the shaping of the end product, engages with nature to 
create something new.797 In industrial technology, certain commentators view 
‘novelty’ as the mere creation of new artefacts within the domain of the known, as 
distinguished from ‘variation’ (changes in the features and components of an 
artefact, without affecting its core functions or capabilities), ‘improvisation’ (to meet 
urgent demands for creative time-critical responses to crisis situations)798 and 
‘innovation’ which represents a more radical change than the others by expanding 
the capabilities at the edges of new technologies.799  These scholars seek a more 
nuanced understanding of ‘innovation’ which they argue is being overused by being 
lumped together with the others.   
The point I make is simply that it is a recognition of newness in the dynamics of 
creativity that is behind both discovery and invention, and which integrates scientific 
technology.  Construed in this way, the essence of ‘innovation’ is an intellectual 
process and not, as often perceived in the industrial literature, the economic goods 
that emerge from a process of industrial technology.  The new artefact or tangible 
product is, I suggest, a realisation of the innovation that occurs more fundamentally 
in the minds of the innovators. 
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As a creative process, although research may be active, methodological and diligent, 
innovation is never entirely predictable: the identification of novel and meaningful 
outcomes cannot be taken for granted.  The technology literature refers to 
‘stochastic’ events that occur outside the realm of recognised cause and effect 
relations,800 having a ‘random probability distribution or pattern that may be 
analysed statistically, but not predicted with precision.801  Innovation is construed as 
non-rational, ‘serendipitous’ and incapable of being systematised to generate 
predictable results, or reduced to orderly logics for purposes of effective planning.     
The ‘pursuit’ of innovation as discussed earlier may operate on the basis of a belief 
that the more research that is undertaken, and the more targeted it is toward particular 
questions, the more likely that radical innovation will occur.  Funding cannot 
‘purchase’ innovation, but it can support the search for fruitful combinations among 
all available resources, and though research will not always produce groundbreaking 
results it produces results, which are new intellectual elements for access and use by 
others in ongoing research.  Nevertheless, there is always some degree of uncertainty 
or unpredictability in the nature of the results, which is a critical consideration for 
policymakers, funders, industrial strategists and others interested in involvement in 
the enterprise.   
Facilitation: Access and Exchange 
For governance of scientific technologies, facilitation of innovation therefore entails 
the enhancement of research, the forum for the recombinatory process.  Production 
of new knowledge is promoted by the engagement of as many users with as many 
resources as possible, without regard to the domain (public or private, industrial or 
academic, commercial or non-profit) in which resources are held or in which the 
interaction occurs.  The goal is wide dissemination, accessibility and exchange, and 
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extensive manipulation, use and reuse of resources: a static collection of intellectual 
resources cannot give rise to innovation. 
This notion of facilitation implies the attempt to maximise accessibility of 
intellectual and material resources held in various types of property regimes in the 
public and private spheres.  Availability, ‘access’ or authorisation to use resources 
does not necessarily facilitate ‘accessibility’ to the full extent.  As I have already 
indicated, there is no such thing as absolute accessibility to any type of resource, 
whether the common property of the public domain of science, which is limited by 
practical barriers and public interests802 or the private resources of industrial firms 
from which others may be excluded, in whole or in part, in aid of the production of 
commercial goods.  The capacity for engagement with and manipulation of resources 
is a function of legal structures, the technical properties and ‘packaging’ of the 
resources in question, and the capacities of the user.  The terms of a license or 
materials use agreement might, for example, impose legal restrictions on uses to 
which a licensed technology may be put.  Purchase of a proprietary good may permit 
the consumer to ‘consume’ the service that it was created to provide, but not transfer 
the embedded technology for ongoing use.  Technical barriers to access - such as the 
source code for computer software – may bar the type of access that enables 
manipulation or modification of the resource.  Facilitation therefore promotes 
delivery and dissemination of resources for all sorts of purposes, by all types of 
vehicles, which provide varying degrees of technical ‘accessibility’.  Secondly 
facilitation will attempt to identify potential barriers to innovation imposed by terms 
and conditions of access that might impair full accessibility and (with special 
reference to proprietary products) promote accessibility that permits fundamental 
manipulation of the embodied intellectual resources. 
Innovation is also promoted through networks of intellectual exchange between 
individuals, groups of individuals and organisations.  The potential for innovation is 
enhanced through exchange of resources among a wide audience of potential users 
organised in every conceivable way, on commercial or non-commercial terms.  This 
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notion is supported by prevalent academic references to ‘exchange’, ‘sharing’ or 
‘transfer’ of knowledge or technology among some set of actors or elements.  In 
open science disclosure or publication facilitates exchange of intellectual elements 
through the public domain.  Others draw a necessary connection between social 
interaction and science, suggesting that acquisition of knowledge is impossible 
without the interaction of social life, which is itself a form of acquiring, preserving 
and transmitting knowledge.803  In industry, innovation systems theory defines a 
technological system as ‘a network or networks of agents interacting in a specific 
technology area under a particular institutional infrastructure to generate, diffuse and 
utilise technology’.804  The cumulative effect of the exchange of resources among all 
actors, and by all means, is knowledge networks that integrate pure science, 
‘proprietary science’ and industrial technology within a ‘domain of exchange’, as 
discussed below.    
Outside of the field of publicly funded pure academic science, the term ‘openness’ is 
therefore of limited use in describing the mechanisms, arrangements or types of 
social organisation that might enhance innovation through the dynamic utilisation of 
resources.  Innovation in modern scientific technology is not facilitated solely by 
public disclosure, but by dissemination of knowledge through public and private 
vehicles and environments that enable - to varying degrees - the capacity for 
interaction and engagement with intellectual resources.  
‘Utilisation’  
 
The fourth concept that integrates scientific technology is the notion of ‘use’ or 
‘utilisation’ of resources.  Utilisation is the flip side of innovation: if innovation is 
the generation of new knowledge, utilisation is the manipulation or exploitation of 
resources in the process.  I hesitate to refer to ‘use’ as ‘exploitation’ because the 
traditional dichotomy between open science and private technology associates 
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‘exploitation’ with the commercial function that takes practical value and transforms 
it into economic value in the development of goods.  In fact, intellectual resources 
are ‘used’ in the generation of new scientific knowledge just as they are in 
technology.  The difference lies not only in the process but in the objectives of the 
utilisation.   Whereas the ‘use’ by science or ‘research’ produces more knowledge for 
ongoing use, innovation and reuse in continual cycle, industry ‘uses’ knowledge to 
generate more knowledge, for ongoing use, but also to generate commercialisable 
goods.  So both science and technology have always each exploited intellectual 
resources, but for different purposes.   
‘Use’ of resources may seem an obvious concept, and part and parcel of innovation, 
but it requires different treatment in order to emphasise the need for more attention to 
it in every aspect of scientific technology.  Literature in the governance of science 
and technology contains enthusiasm for the promotion of innovation by protecting 
openness in the science commons and reducing exclusion to the extent possible in the 
realm of proprietary research; there is less excitement about the concomitant 
facilitation of the ‘use’ of resources across public and private sectors, at least insofar 
as use implies commercial ‘exploitation’.  The mission of the scientists, as I point out 
in regard to commons strategies in the next chapter, is to promote research use, 
rather than commercial use even though, as mentioned above, the distinction is a 
difficult one to make in the current context of proprietary public science.  To the 
extent that mechanisms for the promotion of research also happen to overcome 
barriers to commercial use, such use finds favour, but it is not pursued in equal 
measure.  The attitude is predominantly defensive of the science commons, and 
antagonistic toward the background environment of the market.     
This focus on facilitation of innovative uses of resources in research, and the relative 
neglect of industrial exploitation might seem reasonable, given that private industry 
is inherently motivated toward efficient production, and should be capable of looking 
after its own commercial interests, but this is not necessarily the case.  General 
concern over patenting and the potential anticommons effect in public sector research 
may overshadow the identification of the specific problems in any given field of 
scientific technology.  In the stem cell arena for example, it is not a given that there 
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are problems with encroachment of patents on research and innovation; the more 
apparent barriers occur further downstream, involving the huge upfront costs of 
development of products including clinical trials of therapeutic products, and in the 
EU in particular an almost certain unpatentability of products – techniques as well as 
therapies - derived from embryonic stem cell lines.  Accessibility to expensive cell-
based resources that may not be subject to intellectual property, appropriate 
frameworks for assessment of commercial potential of cell-based tools and resources, 
and the need for incentives that might induce industry to take and use intellectual and 
material resources for commercial ends are the main issues that need to be addressed.  
The utilisation of resources for a diverse range of purposes, intellectual and practical, 
is therefore an integrating feature of scientific technology.  
Domain of exchange 
A further integrative concept of scientific technology is that of a single public 
domain of exchange.  Like the term ‘openness’, references to a ‘public domain of 
knowledge’ have limited usefulness outside of a narrowly defined public system of 
science.  At the end of the previous two chapters I concluded that science and 
technology presented as two separate systems, pulling in the same direction, one 
delivering its products into the public domain of knowledge for immediate access, 
and the other releasing its products, after a period of productive exclusion, into a 
public domain of commerce.  In light of the current proprietisation, which fits 
research results for exchange in the public domain of commerce rather than the 
‘public domain’ of knowledge, and the fact that the freedom of the ‘public domain’ 
has always been about freedom of access to knowledge resources rather than 
freedom from financial charge per se, it is not much of a stretch to propose that in 
reality there is a single domain of exchange, in which all types of resources are 
available on a variety of bases, commercial and non-commercial.  Availability of 
resources in this domain does not differ from availability in the public domain of 
knowledge or the commercial domain of the market: as in the traditional systems of 
science and technology, the withholding or release of resources into the domain of 
exchange is a matter of choice of the holder.  That the public domain of commerce 
should be somehow separated from the public domain of knowledge by the payment 
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of a fee for access seems unsustainable.  That the terms of access should vary 
according to different arrangements for different resources, within a single domain of 
exchange, does not.  The domain of exchange, I suggest, is neither the ‘public 
domain’ as previously conceived, nor synonymous with the commercial market.  It 
accommodates commons and contracts, collaboration and competition.   
This open domain of exchange is thus the domain of networks, in which actors with 
all sorts of interests can interact with one another in various types of relationship and 
organisation across different disciplines and regimes for the communication and 
exchange of resources, intellectual, material and monetary, in the pursuit of any 
number of objectives.  The domain encompasses entirely private commercial 
transactions between proprietary actors as well as the pooling of resources held in 
common and shared by a community of users.  It permits public-private 
collaborations, as well as collective arrangements that establish terms of access to 
common or private property for the optimal use of resources.  The ‘commons’ 
strategies that I discuss in the next chapter do not fill this domain, as they sometimes 
suggest; they sit together with exclusively proprietary activity.  Networks of 
interactivity are the cumulative result of all sorts of exchange, from individual 
contracts constituting narrow ‘modules’ of accessibility to the ‘pools’ of openness 
created by the commons. 
Further, the domain of exchange is a global domain805 in which international 
organisations and open trade regimes have a role in the worldwide dissemination of 
knowledge and transfer of technology,806 permitting innovation, learning and 
diffusion to flourish.807  Access to an extended commercial domain is in principle 
beneficial for interaction with information and technology, as well as economic 
development, but the ability to take advantage of global opportunities may itself be 
dependent upon the existence of competitive technological markets.  Some level of 
technological proficiency by developing countries is arguably therefore a prerequisite 
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to the ability to access the benefits of globalisation: an inability to absorb and 
implement new technologies could risk increased fragmentation and divergence from 
the technology-driven world economy rather than growing integration and 
convergence.808  
More generally, accessibility of resources within this domain of exchange, for 
purposes of engagement, manipulability and innovation is whatever actors determine 
it to be.  The use of specific arrangements, whether legal instruments, property 
regimes or social organisation, does not necessarily restrict accessibility to resources, 
but it means that accessibility is managed, and tailored or devised to meet particular 
needs.  As much of the property created in scientific technology is essentially ‘non-
rival’ intellectual property, there is great capacity for dissemination on a non-
exclusive licensing basis for access by multiple users at the discretion of the holder.  
The precise terms of access to resources available for exchange - will depend on the 
nature of the resource, the objectives for its use, the economic, legal and social 
frameworks, regimes and circumstances that govern the resources, and the interests 
of all parties involved. 
The domain of exchange is therefore the domain of facilitative governance.  The 
domain of exchange provides the scope for strategies that mix and match commons 
and proprietary devices in pursuit of mutually beneficial solutions to complex 
problems in a technological system or systems.  Those charged with designing such 
arrangements should ask, among other things, what resources need to be made 
accessible to whom, to what end, on what terms, and by what means.  What are the 
interests involved and what is at stake?  The capacity for negotiation of facilitative 
arrangements among all interested actors in the system, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
also permits reflexivity for reassessment and adaptation of modes of governance over 
time.  
 
                                                
 





Finally, the ethos of scientific technology is characterised by institutional values.  
With the use of commercial incentives in science and the devolution of some science 
to the private sector, the question arises as to the source of the social and moral 
norms that govern the ‘post-academic’ paradigm.  Rather than a shift from communal 
values to the self-interestedness of the marketplace, what is indicated is the 
paradoxical notion that the integrity of science now resides not in the virtues of the 
individual but in the institution.809  The modern ethos of scientific technology is 
arguably no less an inculcation of individual scientists with the cultural values of the 
organisation than it was in the Mertonian community of science, yet whereas moral 
responsibility for the scientific mission in that environment rested with the scientists, 
in the modern ethos it is the institutions in which scientists work that are considered 
the ‘sites of virtue’.810   
This conceptual shift from the individual to the institution as the moral agent of 
science is attributed largely to secularisation during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, rather than proprietisation per se.  At a time when all of society 
construed nature as divine, scientists were made virtuous by its study, and held a 
place of moral superiority in societal perception.  Genius could be viewed as 
inspired, as opposed to method which was available for mechanical application by 
anyone who could master and employ it.811  Professors were not well paid and 
science could be identified with the cloistered academic life.  By the early 20th 
century, with industrialisation and the employment of scientists in remunerated 
positions, science was very authoritative, but this no longer rested on the special 
status of individuals.812   
                                                
 





This shift toward institutional values has implications for academic science, for the 
research firm in the private sector, and for the ethos of capitalism which, as I 
discussed in the previous chapter, is sustained by additional social values that 
differentiate the economic market from a market society.  First, if universities and 
public institutes intend to move into the ‘business’ of practical innovation they 
should consider how high-tech firms and biotech businesses seek to manage and 
motivate creative people rather than relying solely on an administrative perception of 
pertinent business realities.813  Secondly, contract research firms or biotechnology 
start-ups are likely to have a more entrepreneurial approach and a different view of 
risk than large established corporations.  Thirdly, some types of modern industry 
may be able to offer better conditions814 for scientific inquiry than some universities 
and institutes.  Lastly, the emphasis on institutional values implies a need for more 
consideration of the ‘additional social values’ that are required in order to ensure that 
the power of the market serves rather than undermines society.  The prioritisation of 
values in life science technologies, and support for corporate responsibility in 
relation to the outcomes of economic productivity, for example, are key to good 
relationships between science, industry and society.  It is easy to assert however that 
social direction is necessary to ensure that the market serves the public purpose,815 
but how this might be undertaken through a process of deliberative democracy in a 
particular political economy is a question for another thesis.  
6. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have presented my conception of scientific technology, which is 
informed by an examination of the potential concerns and approaches related to 
recent changes in law, policy and practices regarding the patenting of research 
results, as well as the natural interconnectedness of science and technology.  I draw 
the following conclusions.   
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1.  The current state of ‘scientific technology’ is rooted in the integration of science 
and technologies across academia and industry in pursuit of outcomes with practical 
and social benefits that neither is capable of achieving on its own.  Most of the 
‘scientific’ research conducted in universities has for some time been in fields that 
are directed toward practical outcomes.  In keeping with these technological 
developments, changes in patent law doctrine and public policy have resulted in 
increased patenting and licensing practises that raise fears about privatisation of 
public sector research, patent congestion and the prevention of ongoing research.   
2.  There are mixed views and varied sources of evidence with regard to the impact 
of this shift toward convergence and the proprietisation of public sector research.  
While it seems clear that these changes give rise to significant potential for 
problems, and that in certain cases such difficulty has transpired, there is sufficient 
empirical evidence going the other way to suggest that no presumptions can or 
should be made about the use and effect of commercial incentives in a given field of 
technology.  
3.  The focus on changes in university policy for commercialisation of academic 
science has obscured the process of privatisation of science outside of the public 
sector.  Movement of scientists from academia into biotechnology start-up 
companies, contract research organisations and employment with established 
industrial corporations has led to prophecies of wider paradigms of technological, 
proprietary, fully privatised, or ‘post-academic’ science.  My conception of 
‘scientific technology’ does not conform to these supposed paradigms, which 
overstate the extent to which science has been dominated by proprietisation, and  
paints a more accurate picture of its integrative features.    
4.  The landscape of scientific technology is characterised by diversity: of resources, 
actors and types of organisation and interaction among them, across public and 
private sectors, and academic and industry divisions.  I have no reason to believe that 
this will change, or any basis for predicting that it is just a matter of time before 
science will be entirely privatised.  I would welcome more empirical research in 
particular fields to determine the lay of the land: to clarify who the actors are, their 
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objectives, modes of operation, activities and relationships with others, results and 
their dissemination.   
5.  Modern scientific technology, to the extent that I can observe it, is defined by six 
integrational concepts: synergy, research, innovation, utilisation, a domain of 
exchange and an institutional ethos.  This conception reflects the current state of 
integration and diversity across academia and industry, without regard to a 
dichotomy between public and private sectors.  It envisions advances at the interface 
of science and technology through research, innovation and utilisation of resources, 
for the production of all types of intellectual and tangible products.  It contemplates 
one domain for exchange of resources among all types of actors, in all types of 
organisational structures, for all purposes.   
 
6.  The domain of exchange encompasses the interchange of intellectual and material 
resources among actors by all means or vehicles, from commons to contracts.  These 
vehicles deliver varying types and degrees of accessibility to resources according to 
the legal, economic and social norms and regimes that govern them.  ‘Openness’ in 
both individual and collective exchange of resources is determined by the actors 
involved, within the limitations of the applicable normative frameworks. 
Dissemination of, and access to, materials and information can occur through any 
combination of individual ‘modules’ of transfer and collective ‘pools’ of sharing that 
supports the activities and advances the interests of the actors in the system.  The 
cumulative effect of these interchanges is networks of interactivity. 
 
7.  Scientific technology thus conceived is receptive to ‘decentred’ governance that 
includes, but is not limited to, government legislation.  Governance occurs within the 
networks of interactivity, through which a variety of actors impact upon and shape 
the actions of one another.  Every type of individual transaction and collective 
mechanism for the generation and use of resources in relation to a technology, or 
field of technology, constitutes ‘governance’.  Attempts to facilitate include 
purposive attempts by policymakers or parties to construct mechanisms for achieving 
certain mutually beneficial objectives, such as overcoming hurdles that impair the 
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production of knowledge and products.  This conceptualisation of scientific 
technology therefore provides a strong foundation for the design and implementation 
of a variety of vehicles for facilitative governance.  
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PART III: APPLICATION  
Introduction to Part III 
In Part II, I analysed the interplay between openness and exclusion in traditional 
narratives of science and technology.  In the last chapter I developed a 
conceptualisation of scientific technology in which the degrees of accessibility rather 
than ‘openness’ are achieved through vehicles of exchange and networks of 
interactivity across the public and private sectors.  Referring back to my research 
questions, I suggest that I have answered the first two: ‘what is the relevance of 
appealing to openness?’ and ‘how might the concept and functions of openness be 
reconceived?’ It is now left to address the consequences of my reconceptualisation.   
How does it make a difference?   
In the concluding Part of this thesis, I consider that, as in the concept of governance 
that I proposed in Chapter 3, the significance of the conceptualisation is not so much 
in what it means816  but in what it can do, or what we can do with it.817  How we 
think about things makes a difference.  The function of my conceptualisation of 
scientific technology is to encourage networks of interactivity - the construction of 
all types of creative arrangements and mechanisms - unburdened of the biases of 
public and private, open and proprietary - in which actors across the board are able to 
participate and contribute their strengths and capacities to the negotiation of solutions 
to problems that would otherwise inhibit activity essential to the provision of public 
goods.  To this end, I use it to assess certain examples of the growing number of 
collective strategies, lumped together under the heading of ‘commons approaches’, 
that might be useful for the governance of biotechnologies.  Finally I identify the 
relevant features of the conceptualisation for the UK Stem Cell Bank.   
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Chapter 7. STRATEGIES  
7.1 Introduction   
The growing proprietisation of scientific research in fields directed toward technical 
goals has given rise to attempts to protect or reinstitute openness through collective 
arrangements for the sharing of resources.  During the 1980s, separate initiatives in 
different disciplines began to develop collective strategies involving the common or 
shared use of resources to meet a wide range of objectives.  These started as largely 
bottom up initiatives by actors in the field who identified specific needs and the 
capability to address them through the sharing of resources.   
7.2 Common pool resources  
Much of the current work in relation to intellectual resources flows from social 
theory in regard to the sustainable use of commonly held natural resources - in which 
property rights are not well-defined.818  Contrary to the traditional notion that the 
problems of over-consumption of common resources can only be overcome by 
privatisation or external enforcement,819 the common pool solution suggests the 
establishment of self-governing institutions that define terms of community use of 
the resource.820  The theory has led to structures for a wide variety of specific uses, 
and to the top down institutionalisation of some of them by policy organisations and 
legislatures.   
The relevance of these common pool principles for my thesis is that they are now 
being applied to knowledge821 or ‘cultural’ resources822 and scientific research more 
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broadly.  The ‘commons’ is not a new phenomenon,823 but has found new relevance 
in constructed ‘cultural commons’ in which knowledge is the shared resource, and 
‘research commons or semi-commons’  that straddle public and private sectors in the 
context of modern integration and diversity.  Under the auspices of ‘building 
institutions for sustainable scientific, cultural and genetic resource commons’, 
presenters at a conference of the International Association for the Study of the 
Commons (IASC) in 2012 addressed problems related to: global climate change, 
agrobiodiversity, drug discovery and affordable healthcare, developing country food 
security, life sciences research collaborations, microbial and genetic research 
materials, digital information, protected cultural resources, urban spaces and human 
capital.  Manifestations are so diverse that a systematic framework is necessary in 
order ‘to develop an inventory of structural similarities and differences among 
cultural commons in different industries, disciplines and knowledge domains’.824   
From my perspective on scientific technology, this is an indication that the 
‘commons’, like ‘openness’ has outgrown its usefulness as a way of describing the 
multifarious arrangements that the domain of exchange is capable of supporting.  
‘Commons approaches’ are more accurately ‘collective strategies’ for the governance 
of all types of activities and untangling of complex problems.  They draw upon all 
the tools in the toolbox.  They may include a ‘common’ element, but the mutual 
benefits of sharing resources may equally be achieved without creation of a pool of 
commonly held resources and may instead build new structures around existing 
property rights, using legal frameworks for contractual construction, licensing 
regimes and the like.   
                                                                                                                                     
 
‘Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research’ 13:2 Social Philosophy and 
Policy 145.  
822 Madison MJ, Frischmann BM and Strandburg KJ (2010) ‘Constructing Commons in the Cultural 
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Institutions, and Innovation’, Conference on the Legal History of Intellectual Property, Working Paper 
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2012. 
824 Ibid, 658. 
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I view these collective arrangements, like individual transactions, as vehicles that are 
specifically tailored for the exchange of resources, which facilitate the activities and 
interests of all actors equally, through particular structures devised by the parties to 
meet their mutual objectives.  There is no ‘background environment’ because the 
public and proprietary environments are integrated in the domain of exchange.  This 
view overcomes the traditional distinctions reiterated in contemporary perspectives 
on the ‘cultural commons’ in which the public domain is characterised as the 
‘natural’ environment of knowledge and the proprietary environment is the ‘default’ 
setting, from which the knowledge commons deviates.  The collective strategy is 
simply ‘facilitative governance’, which is not only capable of finding ways of 
making resources accessible by breaking down barriers between actors, but also 
facilitates facilitation, by welcoming interested actors to participate in the 
negotiations.   
7.3 Patent pools   
In other arrangements, such as patent pools, holders do not relinquish their private 
property rights, but aggregate and share them by way of mutual agreement to cross-
license to other participants in the scheme.825  The purpose is to facilitate innovation 
by streamlining the licensing of a number of complementary technologies among the 
members.  Patent pools can act as a means of unblocking or preventing patent 
congestion, but may create further problems under anti-trust or competition law if the 
members of the pool are corporations that do compete or might compete directly with 
each other.826  
7.4 Open access  
I have already touched upon open access arrangements in relation to publication and 
the public domain at the end of Chapter 4.  In these arrangements, voluntary 
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participants establish licensing schemes for the sharing of copyright rather than 
patent rights.  In the case of publications, the objective is delivery free to the user, 
thus avoiding user subscription costs, while the author typically pays to publish.  
Attempts to maximise access to publications should be a component of any 
integrated regime for facilitation of research, in order to overcome barriers to the 
mining of data and information in the public domain. Moves in this direction will 
impact on the role of publishers who limit circulation by requiring rights to control 
access to journals through subscription.  Open access and digital journals are a way 
of ‘cutting out the middle man’ in order to avoid the limitations they impose on 
promotion of wider dissemination.  In light of the option of on-line publication, there 
may also be potential to negotiate direct payment for publication services, without 
provision of additional rights to control circulation.     
7.5 Open source  
In the open source software strategy, computer scientists share ‘code’ embedded in 
software by providing, along with the software, the ‘source code’, the key that 
permits access to and manipulation of the programme internal to the software.  The 
Linux operating system for example, was developed on an open source basis as an 
alternative to proprietary software such as Windows and the Mac OS, by a volunteer 
collaborative of programmers.  The participants in the project contributed pieces of 
code for common access under the terms of the Linux General Public License, which 
allowed them to take and modify any of the accumulated code as long as they 
returned their modifications to the central project.  The argument is that open source 
produces more innovative and stable software as a result of the contributions of a 
wider community of contributors.  
Open source is itself rooted in the concept of ‘free software’ that arose in the 1980s 
with the institution of the first computers at the Artificial Intelligence laboratory at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The notion of free software is 
attributable to Richard Stallman, whose immediate objective was to re-create, in the 
face of the practices of emerging proprietary software companies, a collaborative 
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community of computer programmers.  Early computer users were mainly scientists 
and engineers, working in corporate and academic laboratories, who did their own 
programming and exchanged code freely, with few restrictions.  As the market for 
software developed, software companies began spinning off, and the old community 
of laboratory ‘hackers’ dissipated as individuals went to work for corporate software 
developers. In response to commercial pressures, these companies relied on their 
copyright by withholding the source code to their software, which effectively 
prevented programmers like Stallman from using and modifying it to suit their own 
purposes.  Without the code it was virtually impossible for hackers to figure out how 
a programme worked, adapt it to specific technical needs, improve it and circulate 
the changes. Over time, collaboration among programmers became increasingly 
contained within in-house communities.  
Stallman was perturbed by these changes and envisioned the hacker community 
being rebuilt around the development of a free operating system. This would run 
independently of existing operating systems and act as a platform on which other free 
software could be built. To this end, the ‘GNU’827 project was launched in 1984 with 
the publication of a Manifesto asking other programmers for their participation and 
support. The Free Software Foundation (FSF), established a year later as the main 
organisational support for GNU, describes itself as ‘a nonprofit with a worldwide 
mission to promote computer user freedom and to defend the rights of all free 
software users’. 
Social movement 
The free software concept was not just a means of developing better software, but a 
movement espousing specific ethical and social values.828 Stallman found it 
unacceptable that proprietary companies should exert what he considered to be 
excessive control over software development. The basis of this ethic was a fear of 
proprietary domination of computer technologies in an increasingly digitised world. 
                                                
 
827 The acronym GNU refers to ‘Gnu’s Not Unix’, Unix being a popular proprietary operating system. 
828 R Stallmann, Why Open Source Misses the Point of Free Software, 52:6 Communications of the ACM, 2009, 
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Stallman felt that corporate control over the modification of software, through their 
ownership of sources, would erode human autonomy and enable companies to 
monitor the technologies used in homes, schools and businesses.  The free software 
movement was defined by four freedoms: 
• ‘the freedom to run the program, for any purpose; 
• the freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to your needs;  
• the freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor; and  
• the freedom to improve the program, and release your improvements to the 
public, so that the whole community benefits.’829  
The ‘freedom to run, for any purpose’ meant that no restrictions should be imposed 
on the use of free software in terms of time, purpose or geographic area. 
Specification that a licence applies for only a predetermined trial period, or until a 
stated expiry date, limits the use of free software. Similarly, specification of 
permissible types of use, such as research or non-commercial, or prohibited uses, or 
places of use, would encroach on the freedom of the user.     
Secondly, if users are unable to understand and modify software to suit their specific 
needs their work will be restricted by versions supplied by the sole proprietor who is 
controlling the changes. Failure to release the source code - the preferred 
representation of a programming language – prevents a user from comprehending 
and thus editing a programme.  Mandatory conditions of use, such as special 
licensing terms or a non-disclosure agreement are also forms of proprietary control 
that the philosophy of free software seeks to avoid.   
The notion that modified software should be freely distributable for the benefit of 
others affirms the collaborative approach to problem solving on which the early 
programmers operated. Freedom here means permissible, not free of charge.  
Software can be disseminated at will, but it is not necessarily transferred without 
financial charge.  Stallman was not opposed to the imposition of a fee, despite the 
fact that software can be copied and distributed at virtually no cost.  The freedom to 
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distribute was not limited to the assistance of other programmers, but includes the 
possibility of releasing improved software to the public, many of whom do not have 
the time or skills to solve problems.  In this way, the community as a whole might 
benefit indirectly from the freedom to modify software. This distribution may also be 
done for a charge.   
These freedoms were espoused not simply for the sake of the individual user, but to 
promote social solidarity in the form of sharing and cooperation.  He envisioned a 
different society in which computers ‘work for the benefit of the individual and the 
community’, not for proprietary software companies or governments who might seek 
to restrict and monitor use.  The open source explosion that came out of the free 
software movement did not entirely embrace these social values,830 but picked up on 
the value of the copyleft licensing regime for communal building of software as a 
huge boon for innovation.  Whether it is essential to embrace these values as a basis 
for the development of free software is a question that has divided computer 
programmers.  From the perspective of my model of scientific technology this is a 
good example of an ‘ethos’ defined by an institution, which might be a local 
phenomenon or an attempt to influence a wider body of actors in the system.    
Open source biotechnology  
The success of open source was widely advertised and attempts to apply its 
principles in a variety of other disciplines have met with varied success.  Of 
particular interest are the attempts to apply it to the field of biotechnology in the hope 
that the capacity to foster innovation encountered in the information technologies 
would rub off on the life sciences.831  Attempts to apply open source licensing 
schemes, in any direct way to biotechnological research have however been largely 
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unsuccessful, primarily because of the different intellectual property regimes on 
which they are reliant: the automatic copyright of open source versus the patent 
system of biotechnology.  Further, the physical material component of biotechnology 
which impacts dramatically on both costs and transferability and dissemination of 
resources is not a factor in the open source system of information technologies.    
7.6 Research commons 
Of collective arrangements that I have encountered the most relevant for stem cell 
technology is the contractually constructed832 research commons for the sharing of 
knowledge assets and physical materials.  An example is the microbial research 
commons833 which enables the sharing of upstream research inputs in the life 
sciences based on the formation of digitally integrated research networks that afford 
willing participants greater reciprocity benefits than those that are likely to accrue 
from hoarding materials, data and information.  The microbial research commons 
seeks to overcome the hoarding of microbial resources that have accumulated in 
hundreds of culture collections around the world and the propertisation of these 
resources through the use by culture collections such as the American Type Culture 
Collection, which have devised MTAs that progressively restrict access to use and 
re-use, even for research.  A fundamental difficulty to be overcome is that everyone 
treats each unit of microbial genetic material as if it were potentially valuable, when 
in reality the bulk of all the microbial materials in collections have no known or 
likely high pay off commercial applications, but are only valuable as inputs of basic 
scientific research.    
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The microbial research ‘commons’ is a virtual pool, rather than a physical repository; 
it only receives deposits of materials that have no known or likely high value 
commercial uses at the time of deposit; individual collections must maintain the 
highest quality standards; and within the semi-commons there are virtually no 
restrictions on upstream public research functions with respect to all the deposited 
material.  The intention is that participants should invoke a (‘take and pay’ or 
‘liability’) rule834 by which original depositors would be compensated by way of an 
pre-determined royalty payment in the event of the development of downstream 
commercial applications of the pooled materials.  The ‘liability rule’ is not an 
exclusive property right that says ‘you cannot use my property unless you have my 
permission’, but an entitlement to take: ‘please use my property, do something, make 
it valuable, just give me equitable compensation for the commercially valuable uses 
that you have put it to.’  
 
The model is structured by the use of an standardised MTA, that regulates all willing 
participants.  The scheme requires a governing body or a trusted intermediary to deal 
with the governance of knowledge and international legal aspects which are 
important and complicated, as well as a set of governance rules related to mediation 
and dispute resolution.  The culture collections from which the microbes were taken 
would manage any resulting income streams from downstream applications.  The 
proposed model would require external funding most likely from the public sector, 
but might also be attractive to the private sector.  
 
The key premise is that the depositor of material in the research semi-commons does 
not forfeit all rights to benefit from downstream commercial applications that 
emerge.  The objective is to strengthen the potential reciprocity gains from 
participation in the collective arrangement by addressing the fear that the original 
depositor will lose out if someone else makes money from his materials.  The sub-
premise is that participants will not normally, nor would they be expected, to 
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contribute materials having a known or likely potential for high commercial pay off.  
The model establishes a global research exemption within the controlled commons 
that communicates to researchers that they can take materials and do whatever they 
want with them, as opposed to the message ‘do what you want if its non-
commercial’.  The economic logic is that depositors should obtain more potential 
reciprocity benefits from access to vast upstream research opportunities through the 
semi-commons than would accrue from operating in isolation.  
 
The model accords with my conception of the domain of exchange in that it 
overcomes the inhibitions of public and private, open and proprietary, and in 
particular commercial and non-commercial research.  It illustrates the construction 
of facilitative strategies grounded in the identification of real rather than perceived, 
problems.   
7.7 Conclusions  
Collective strategies for facilitative governance provide endless opportunity for the 
advance of scientific technologies.  In my conception of scientific technology their 
strength is both in the interactivity with resources that they promote, and in the 
interactivity of the process, which is the inclusion of all receptive actors for the 
negotiation of mutual benefits.   
The difficulty that I have with analytical approach of many of the collective 
strategies is that they are conceived in terms of the old unhelpful contradictions 
between proprietary and public domains.  I see no benefit in framing mutually 
beneficial collective arrangements as means of capturing a particular kind of 
‘openness’, defined in terms of a deviation835 from a default or background 
environment, which generally implies that one approach to achievement of 
accessibility and exchange is preferable to another.   
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In my conception of the domain of exchange, there is no ‘background’ environment 
and therefore no need to catalogue in these divisive ways the various means by 
which resources might be accessed and exchanged.  The point is that the combination 
of public and private, commons and property in the exchange domain provides the 
widest selection of tools and devices for designing architecture that contain rooms 
and corridors for various types of interchange and transmission, all of which are 
necessary in the enterprise of facilitation of the production of knowledge and goods.  
My conceptualisation does not eliminate the extremes: sometimes pure commons and 
purely proprietary approaches are necessary to achieve certain objectives.  The 
domain of exchange however invites every possibility by enhancing the opportunities 
for collaboration and exchange among parties from across the spectrum of social 
organisation in the public and private sectors.  
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Chapter 8. UK STEM CELL BANK 
Finally, I come back to the UK Stem Cell Bank, to flag up the implications of my 
ideas about scientific technology for the Bank, and for a future research project.  
First I remind the reader that the UKSCB is one illustration of the much broader set 
of issues that I have addressed in my thesis surrounding the sharing of resources for 
the facilitative governance of scientific technology.  It is one governance structure in 
the field of stem cell technology, and constitutes one set of arrangements that impact 
on the behaviour of actors in the system.  I view it therefore as one of the actors in 
the overarching enterprise of the delivery of stem cell-based public goods.   
Secondly, the UKSCB cannot be construed as a ‘collective’ arrangement for the use 
of resources (even though the public supporters of the Bank might be considered one 
of the actors in such a scheme or a neutral holder of pooled resources) because the 
depositors are at present not all voluntary participants.  The Bank is neither the 
product of statutory authority per se, nor a self-organised arrangement.  It comprises 
both voluntary and non-voluntary participants.  The terms of use established by the 
Code of Practice and the Material Transfer Agreements are not negotiated among the 
participants, but externally imposed, however receptive the Bank may be to their 
adaptation over time.   
The rationale for this structure is rooted in the origins of the Bank as an informal 
regulatory mechanism for the ethical oversight of embryonic stem cells, and is 
unlikely to change as long as human stem cells are construed as products of embryos 
rather than ‘ordinary’ human tissue such as blood or transplantable organs.  To the 
extent that the oversight functions of monitoring compliance of ongoing research 
could be severed from the functions of the Bank as a vehicle for sharing of cell lines, 
a structure more in line with a controlled common might be contemplated.  I think 
that such a separation is conceivable, primarily because apart from the records of the 
Bank, which provide the traceability that supports guarantees of both ethical and 
technical provenance, the functions of the Bank (custody and qualification of cells) 
and those of the Stem Cell Steering Committee (monitoring of applications for 
access and ongoing use among other things) are already distinguishable.     
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Thirdly, in its own terms, a main objective of the Bank is to provide support for 
‘research’, yet the Code of Practice and the MTAs attempt to create a distinction 
between research use and commercial use that is not and cannot be properly defined 
and is therefore a source of confusion and inhibition to upstream as well as 
downstream activities.  There is no apparent reason for the distinction, except for the 
notion that the embryonic origins of the cell line makes them special in a way that 
requires that they should not be ‘commodified’.  The more relevant distinction is the 
technical one, between cells that are cultivated for clinical use, according to EUTCD 
standards, and those that are laboratory grade cell lines, which is relatively clear and 
subject to different types of MTAs.  The use of laboratory grade cells and clinical 
grade cells could in each case result in some type of ‘commercial’ outcome as 
research tools or tangible therapies, so any attempt to create a commercial/non-
commercial distinction remains problematic.   
Subject to the ethical monitoring function of the Steering Committee, it might be 
possible to consider modifications to the Bank to create a mechanism more along the 
lines of a contractually constructed global research commons.  The Bank lends itself 
to such a scheme because its resources (stem cell lines) are ‘upstream’ products, 
likely to be unpatented, and therefore amenable to transfer by MTAs rather than 
patent licensing.  As a centralised repository with strong expertise in biological 
standards, the Bank would not have to address the issue as to how to regulate quality 
standards in the individual facilities of the participants.  Necessary changes would 
include the willing participation of all depositors, standard MTAs negotiated among 
the participants, alterations to governance to reflect the collective nature of the 
project, and terms of access and use that encourage all types of research, without 
distinction as to ‘commercial’ and ‘non-commercial’.  It is feasible that a liability 
rule for compensation of depositors in the event of downstream success could act as 
an incentive to encourage buy-in by cell developers who are wary of sharing their 
cell lines.  Finally, the role of the Bank as a biological resource could be greatly 
enhanced by linking its current functions to a global digitally-integrated network for 
dissemination of data and information related to particular stem cell lines.  
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Potential difficulties to be addressed include first, the fact that stem cell lines, unlike 
microbes, never have nominal economic value - given the investment in their 
creation - even if they are considered useful only for research purposes.  Whether 
they are ever ‘pre-competitive’ is also questionable.  Still, if cell developers are not 
obliged to deposit all of their cell lines, as they are at present, giving them the option 
of selectively retaining those with greatest likelihood of commercial payoff, then 
they might be willing to contribute some research grade cells for common use.   
Secondly, a more technical consideration is whether it is possible to devise a ‘chain 
of title’ for stem cell lines, such as a genetic biomarkers to track research uses of all 
stem cell lines.  This is important for living resources that are continually replicating, 
divisible and subject to modification into multiple derivatives because when 
downstream developments become potentially patentable by the user, it is necessary 
to be able to link the patent back to the original depositor. 
Thirdly, the use of a liability rule may act as an incentive to deposition by publicly 
funded cell developers, but the more important consideration is whether it would 
provide sufficient incentive to the private sector to attract participation by the 
corporations that are most capable of taking and developing the cell lines on offer.  
Opening the semi-commons to use by non-members creates the potential for a ‘free 
rider problem’, but might nevertheless be considered.  The UKSCB is in a good 
position to advocate such a system if it should choose to do so, given its international 
profile as a leader of stem cell banking initiatives.   
Such collective regimes are not however the whole answer in relation to stem cell 
technology.  A big issue for the translation of stem cell research into therapeutic 
treatments is the high cost of clinical trials.  The matter requires either adequate 
incentives for large private investment or treatment of the clinical process as a public 
good, whereby government reimbursement is provided to private companies if they 
get to third stage trials.   
These are the ways in which I see my conceptualisation as applicable to the 
organisation of the UK Stem Cell Bank.  Further research might take an empirical 
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approach to the attitudes of public and private sector cell developers, and 
biotechnology companies who might be interested in participation in a global stem 
cell semi-commons.     
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CONCLUSIONS  
In this thesis I have sought to demonstrate the significance of appealing to ‘openness’ 
in attempts to promote facilitative governance for the equal enhancement of all 
aspects of scientific technology.  The origins, institutions and practices of science 
and technology suggest that the two systems are not intrinsically incompatible, but 
constitute complementary modes of innovation, capable of powerful conjunctions of 
understanding and utility across different fields and disciplines.  The associations of 
science with public and ‘open’, and technology with private and proprietary are 
nevertheless deeply embedded in the discourses related to governance of life sciences 
technologies.  Although this bifurcation may at one time have constituted an accurate 
reflection of the social organisation of science and technology, it is clear that it no 
longer does so, and that attempts to hold to it prevent a move toward a more realistic 
conception of modern scientific technology.  I argue that, in an environment in which 
public sector as well as private industrial science is increasingly proprietised and 
directed toward technological objectives,  the perpetuation of value-laden caricatures 
of science and technology is inappropriate.  These invest open science with a status 
superior to that of utilitarian and commercial technology and inhibit dialogue about 
the construction of effective governance by undermining equal handed policy 
treatment of all aspects of modern scientific technology.   
The main contribution of my thesis is the proposition of an integrated 
conceptualisation of ‘scientific technology’ which bridges oppositional perceptions 
of science and technology that inhibit the discourse about facilitative governance.  
My conception of the modern context neutralises these biased perceptions of science 
and technology and provides an integrated way of thinking about modern scientific 
technology that facilitates not only technologies but the negotiation, by actors in the 
system, of types of governance that would welcome all participants and advance 
equally their interests and outcomes across the public and private sectors.  My  view 
does not eradicate the distinction between public and private and its implication for 
avenues of funding, business operations and dissemination of research, but asserts 
that public and private are elements of the same environment, are equally valuable to 
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society and require the same policy considerations and access to reflexive 
governance processes.  The domain of exchange encompasses the whole gamut of 
public science, and public proprietary science, and private proprietary science, and 
private industrial scientific research, and private industrial production etc.  The 
domain is populated by all types of resources, available for access by users on 
various terms, according to applicable social as well as legal and economic norms or 
regimes.  Such regimes, whether property rights, public interests or ethical 
considerations are the ‘gatekeepers’ to access and use of resources.   
In my conceptualisation, the ‘proprietisation’ of research by increased patenting in 
the public sector, although it gives rise to much noise in the literature, does not 
constitute the complete ‘privatisation’ of science nor the demise of public support for 
science.  It reflects greater integration of science with technologies, and the fact that 
although science has long been supported as a public good, it has practical value for 
technology that is capable of holding its own in the commercial market.  The 
implication I suggest is that the domain of scientific technology, public policies and 
private choices matter more than ever.  Greater public support for university 
research, and the support of universities for publication rather than patenting, are still 
options that can be promoted and defended.  I have no firm agenda for what specific 
policies and choices ought to be made in relation to problems such as the scope of 
patentability, or patent blockages.  Any system will be subject to implementation 
difficulties but my thesis addresses the broader picture.  I suggest that in the current 
environment, the accessibility of knowledge resources may depend upon terms and 
conditions negotiated collectively or individually among the actors in the system.  In 
my conceptualisation of this environment, ‘degrees of openness’ may be instituted 
through a variety of arrangements, from contracts to commons, among actors in the 
system, in various types of organisation and affiliation.  It is in the plethora of 
commercial and non-commercial relationships and public and private choices that the 
accessibility and use of resources is defined.   
I submit that my conception of scientific technology and the public domain of 
exchange is preferable to the current appeals to a concept of openness that is of 
limited use outside of the particular institutional construct of open science.  In the 
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realm of collective strategies for example, my conceptualisation provides an 
appropriate basis for assessment of various tools and mechanisms of governance that 
might be employed to advance scientific technologies.  The potential for 
establishment of creative collective mechanisms across public and private sectors, for 
the expansion of accessibility to resources and enhancement of activities is welcome, 
and in principle aligned with my conception of a domain of exchange.  The caveat to 
this is that in my domain of interactivity, collective strategies do not constitute a 
‘deviation’ from a background environment, but a modification of behaviour by 
agreement among the willing participants in the arrangement.   
If there is a normative aspect to my thesis it is that for the purposes of equal 
facilitation of all aspects of scientific technologies, more attention ought to be paid to 
consideration of the issues and means of facilitation that affect industrial and 
commercial sectors.  The governance of biotechnology literature is weighted heavily 
toward resolution of problems in relation to the public system of science and pays 
too little attention to the real difficulties, including barriers to entry, confronted by 
private research and industry for the development of commercial goods. 
In terms of its implication of my thesis for various audiences, I suggest that the 
public sector can consider much of what is generally referred to as ‘science’ as 
‘scientific technology’.  Whether patented, or simply directed toward technological 
goals, research in most fields of publicly funded research is tied up with the pursuit 
of answers to complex problems of practical and utilitarian significance.  In my view 
these alliances between science and technologies are positive, despite the fact that we 
now have to work harder to ensure that materials and knowledge are available, 
accessible and utilisable across the spectrum of actors.   
For the private sector, my conceptualisation implies a wider range of relationships 
with a wider variety of actors across public and private sectors.  I suggest that my 
conceptualisation of the domain of exchange facilitates receptiveness to public-
private partnerships and involvement between private industry and researchers in 
both academia and the private sector.  An undivided domain in which the strengths of 
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all actors are sought and valued creates a level playing field that should enhance 
relationships and facilitate rather than inhibit mutually agreeable outcomes.   
For the UKSCB, by disregarding the ethical debate over the use of embryos, I have 
been able to clarify what is happening in regard to other issues, and construe the 
Bank as only one part of the bigger undertaking of stem cell technology and of its 
governance.  What my thesis reveals is that the failure to see the bigger picture – 
science and technology as co-existing and a need to take into account commercial as 
well as scientific aspects of scientific technology – leaves room for expansion of the 
support of the Bank for all kinds of research.  The creation of unsupportable 
distinctions between research and commercial use, even if they do not prohibit 
commercialisation per se, send a message to the user that some thought needs to be 
given to what type of research is being undertaken, which creates uncertainty and 
potential inhibition.  Further, subject to social reasons for using this particular 
existing architecture as a means of maintaining surveillance over the ongoing uses of 
human embryonic stem cells, consideration could be given to adapting the Bank to 
create a global stem cell research commons.  
Finally, my thesis points to several areas of further research.  First my basic 
conceptualisation of scientific technology would benefit from further elaboration and 
development in relation to existing concepts, such as that of the public domain, with 
which it interfaces.  Secondly, there is room for more empirical research in regard to 
specific barriers, particularly in relation to the private sector translation of research 
into therapies, and patenting practices.  Thirdly, in regard to the governance of stem 
cell technology, the obvious follow-on project to my thesis is a comprehensive 
analysis of the operations of the UK Stem Cell Bank,  with a view to determining 
whether a global research commons is feasible and desirable.  Thirdly, at the date of 
finalisation of this thesis, there is pending a further EU project in relation to the 
establishment of an EU Bank for induced Pluriopotent Stem Cells (EBiSC).  In the 
absence of social sensitivity related to embryonic derivation of the cells, the new 
pan-European bank for stem cells of adult origin will provide a prime opportunity for 
application of the conceptual foundations developed in this thesis to the design of 
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